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Abstract
Empirical evidence for the SPAARS (Schematic, Prepositional, Associative and
Analogical Representational Systems) model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 1999;
Power, 1997, 1999), as applied to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by Dalgleish
(1999, submitted) was investigated. An opportunistic sample of 12 participants was
recruited from a specialist service for PTSD. Participants had experienced a variety
of traumatic events. Co-morbidity and PTSD severity were representative of the
service's normal clinical population. Participants were assessed up to 3 times. An
interview to assess schematic themes was devised for this study and standardised
measures of PTSD and other symptomatology were also administered. The
interview was found to have reasonable inter-rater reliability. The combined results
of the analyses provided initial support for the utility of the SPAARS model applied
to PTSD. Particular Schematic-level representations were identified, which were
associated with PTSD and other symptomatology. Participants were found to
experience a wide range of aversive emotions and fear was not generally the
dominant emotion reported. Greater negative emotionality, rather than greater fear,
was associated with increased symptomatology. Some theoretical and clinical
implications of these findings are discussed.
Introduction
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Aims
This thesis aims to investigate whether multi-level theories of emotion and emotional
disorder can improve our understanding of the reactions of individuals who have
experienced a traumatic event and the change processes during psychotherapy for
these individuals. It will do so firstly by using a multi-level emotion theory
framework to report on commonalities within a clinical sample of participants who
have experienced a psychological reaction to a traumatic event and are in active
treatment within a specialist centre. Secondly, using a longitudinal design, this thesis
will describe some of the changes that participants report over the course of therapy.
This introduction will therefore review the main clinical characteristics of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and psychological theories of PTSD. Both of
these areas have substantial research literatures, which means that this review is
necessarily selective and focuses on findings that are felt to be most relevant.
Characteristics of PTSD
Although reports in the literature of psychological reactions to trauma have a long
history (e.g. Freud, 1919; Rivers 1920; Trimble, 1981), it has been suggested that
rapid development in knowledge about PTSD occurred during the 1980s and 1990s
(e.g. Yule, Williams & Joseph, 1999), which saw the introduction and subsequent
revision of PTSD as a diagnostic classification for psychiatric disorder in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual - Third Edition (DSM-III; American Psychiatric
Association, 1980), Third Edition - Revised (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987) and Fourth
Edition (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). PTSD was also described in similar terms to
DSM-IV in the tenth revision of the World Health Organisation's International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 1993).
DSM-IV and ICD-10 criteria for PTSD
Both DSM-IV and ICD-10 agree that one of the defining criteria for a diagnosis of
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PTSD is the experience of a severely traumatic event. DSM-IV requires that:
"The person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a
threat to the physical integrity of self or others." (APA, 1994, p. 467).
ICD-10 suggests that:
"This disorder should not generally be diagnosed unless there is evidence
that it arose within six months of a traumatic event of exceptional
severity." (WHO, 1993; p. 148).
Both ICD-10 and DSM-IV agree that persistent and distressing re-experiencing
symptoms are central to meeting criteria for PTSD. DSM-IV describes possible
re-experiencing symptoms more comprehensively and these can include:
"Recurrent and intrusive distressing recollection ... including images,
thoughts or perceptions ... distressing dreams ... [ajcting or feeling as if
the traumatic event were recurring ... [ijntense psychological distress at
exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or resemble an aspect
of the traumatic event ... [pjhysiological reactivity ... to ... cues that
symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event." (APA, 1994, p.
468).
DSM-IV and ICD-10 disagree on the importance of other symptom clusters in
diagnosing PTSD. In addition to re-experiencing, DSM-IV also requires the
presence of persistent avoidance and increased arousal for diagnosis, while ICD-10
does not. Avoidance can include:
"Efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings or conversations. ...activities, places
or people... [ijnabilty to recall an important aspect ... diminished interest
or participation in significant activities ... detachment or estrangement ...
[restricted range of affect ... [sjense of foreshortened future" (APA,
1994, p. 468).
Symptoms of increased arousal identified by DSM-IV can include disturbed sleep,
anger, concentration problems, hypervigilance to possible danger, and increased
reactivity to being startled.
DSM-IV also specifies three different time courses for PTSD reactions: acute
(symptoms last less than three months), chronic (greater than three month duration)
and delayed onset (at least six months after the event). Chronic PTSD can persist for
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many years. For example, Kilpatrick, Saunders, Veronen, Best & Von (1987) found
that 17 percent of sexually assaulted women surveyed 17 years later met criteria for
PTSD. Delayed onset PTSD may have been somewhat neglected in the literature
because a significant proportion of the research in the 1980s and 1990s that helped to
define PTSD used a methodology of following up survivors of disasters. Over time,
individuals who were not experiencing PTSD would tend to drop out of studies, and
many studies would not follow up survivors for long enough to identify cases of
delayed onset PTSD. Research into delayed onset PTSD has therefore had to rely on
the methodologically weaker approach of retrospective accounts. This methodology
has suggested that, after ruling out cases that appear to be due to delayed onset but
are actually due to delays in presenting for help, around 10 percent of PTSD cases in
combat veterans were delayed onset (Solomon, Kotler, Shalev & Lin, 1989). One of
the challenges for theories of PTSD has been to try to explain the variation in time
course (Dalgleish, submitted) and this issue will be returned to later in this review.
PTSD can be highly disabling, particularly in its chronic form and these disabling
effects can extend beyond the symptoms associated with the diagnostic classification
of PTSD. Foa, Keane & Friedman (2000) note that:
"Some patients with chronic PTSD develop a persistent incapacitating
mental illness marked by severe and intolerable symptoms; marital,
social and vocational disability; as well as extensive use of
psychiatric and community services." (p. 5).
McFarlane (1987) and Goenjian (1993) described adverse effects on family and
general interpersonal functioning in survivors of civilian disasters. Interpersonal
problems have also been reported in combat veterans (e.g. Kulka, Schlenger,
Fairbank, Plough, Jordan, Marmar & Weiss, 1990). The importance of social support
in protecting individuals from mental health problems is well established (e.g. Brown
& Harris, 1978 for depression). Joseph (e.g. Joseph, 1999; Joseph, Andrews,
William & Yule, 1992) has argued strongly that social support is an essential factor
in determining whether individuals can survive traumatic experiences without
developing PTSD. However, there is an issue of direction of causality here. Clearly,
many of the symptoms associated with PTSD, such as avoidance of social situations,
emotional numbing and increased irritability, could be expected to make it more
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difficult for the individual to access social support. While Joseph's conceptualisation
appears to neglect some of the more intrapsychic aspects of PTSD, an issue that will
be discussed in more detail below, it is worth noting that a meta-analysis of risk
factors for developing PTSD following trauma exposure suggested that social
support post-trauma had the highest weighted average effect size (Brewin, Andrews,
& Valentine, 2000).
Horowitz (1986; 1997) noted enduring personality changes in individuals who
experienced traumatic events. Janoff-Bulman (e.g. 1989; 1992) has drawn attention
to the ways in which trauma can affect individuals' beliefs about themselves and the
world in which they live. Both of these perspectives will be discussed in more detail
under the heading of theories of trauma, however it is worth noting two things at this
stage. Firstly, these effects increase the suffering of individuals who experience
trauma in ways that are not captured within the DSM-IV or ICD-10 diagnoses.
Secondly, these changes to the individual may again affect their ability to elicit social
support, the importance of which was highlighted in the preceding paragraph.
Co-morbidity is another factor that significantly increases the difficulties of
individuals with PTSD. McFarlane and Papay (1992) reported that 77 percent of
Australian fire fighters meeting criteria for PTSD also met criteria for one or more
additional psychiatric problems. Foa et al. (2000) observe that 80 percent of patients
with PTSD will also have co-morbid problems, typically depression, anxiety or
substance abuse. High levels of depression following trauma have been consistently
reported (e.g. Loughrey, Bell, Kee, Roddy & Curran, 1988; North, Smith &
Spitznagel, 1994). Substance abuse problems have been reported in both combat
veteran (Keane, Caddell, Martin, Zimering & Fairbank, 1983; Solomon, Mikulincer
& Kotler, 1987) and civilian trauma (Gleser, Gren & Winget, 1981; Goenjian, 1993)
populations and there is evidence for both populations that this does not simply
reflect substance abuse behaviour that was present before the trauma (Kulka et al.,
1990; Joseph, Yule, Williams & Hodgkinson, 1993). PTSD is associated with an
increased risk of suicide (e.g. Foa et al., 2000). However, given the high level of
co-morbidity with depression and substance abuse, themselves risk factors for
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suicide, it is unclear how much of this increased risk can be attributed to PTSD
alone.
A further point to make about co-morbidity is that the developmental pathways
between PTSD and other disorders remain unclear. Shalev and Yehuda (1998)
prospectively studied 211 consecutive Emergency Room admissions and found that
co-morbidity increased significantly over time. In addition to suggesting that early
intervention would be beneficial, this raises some interesting questions about the
development of PTSD and other disorders over time. Shalev and Yehuda's (1998)
findings might suggest that secondary symptomatology is accruing over time, for
example that an individual becomes depressed because of the effects of
re-experiencing, increased arousal and avoidance on his or her life. However,
McFarlane and Papay (1992) propose a contrasting direction of causation, namely
that co-morbidity can be such a drain on an individual's resources that it traps
him/her in chronic PTSD.
Related to the issue of co-morbidity, although PTSD is the most commonly
investigated sequelae of trauma, there is evidence that individuals may experience
other reactions with similar or even greater frequency. For example, Shalev and
Yehuda (1998) report that of their sample of Emergency Room admissions, 16
individuals were diagnosed as having PTSD, 11 had major depressive disorder, and
19 had a non-PTSD anxiety disorder, while 24 individuals showed co-morbidity at
four months post-trauma. This suggests that in fact, following exposure to a
traumatic event, for those individuals who go on to develop psychological problems,
the most common reaction is not PTSD, but rather some other disorder. This has
some interesting implications in terms of the underpinnings of theories of PTSD,
which have perhaps tended to (understandably) neglect trying to understand why
individuals may go on to develop disorders other than PTSD. This point will be
returned to in the section on theories of PTSD. Clinically, it should also be noted
that the issues of differential disorder pathways and co-morbidity following trauma
will often increase treatment complexity. Therefore, it is important that models of
PTSD adequately capture this complexity.
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Controversies regarding PTSD diagnosis
Following on from issues of co-morbidity, it should be noted that a number of
concerns have been raised about the diagnosis of PTSD itself. Clearly, if PTSD is an
unreliable diagnosis then this will place a limit on the validity of research based on
this concept.
Firstly, PTSD, like all psychiatric diagnoses, is a product of its historical and cultural
context. The establishment of PTSD as a diagnostic category was heavily influenced
by the experience of working with Vietnam veterans and the need to provide a
framework for services for these individuals. One effect of this was that PTSD was
not initially acknowledged in populations other than combat veterans (e.g. Flerman,
1992), which meant that it was some time before research efforts in different
populations were integrated.
Secondly, although the requirement for an obviously stressful index event may seem
essential to diagnose a condition which is seen by definition as a reaction to an event
outside normal experience (at least for Type I trauma), it should be noted that the
requirement for a single clear precursor is out of keeping with other psychiatric
diagnoses. This may help to explain controversies over what precisely can constitute
an index event. Recently Joseph (2003) suggested that PTSD could be caused by
childbirth, while acknowledging that this will be controversial because even difficult
childbirths are seen as normal events. In a similar vein, some researchers have
suggested that persistent and distressing re-experiencing, which is central to PTSD in
both DSM-IV and ICD-10 definitions, can be seen in individuals who experience
stressful events that are not of the magnitude required for PTSD diagnosis in these
classification systems, such as prolonged bullying at work (e.g. Prolonged Duress
Stress Disorder, Scott & Stradling, 1994).
Thirdly, not all researchers accept the classification of PTSD as an anxiety disorder.
The presence of other highly distressing emotions such as shame and anger have
been frequently observed (e.g. Andrews, Brewin, Rose & Kirk, 2000). It has been
suggested that these can lead to particular difficulties in treating individuals (e.g.
Brewin, 2001; this issue will be discussed in more detail below in the section on
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psychological treatments for PTSD). Dalgleish, Power and Bolton (submitted)
suggest that the framework of PTSD symptomatology can be experienced with other
emotions such as anger, disgust and sadness.
Fourthly, there is overlap between the symptoms of PTSD and other disorders, such
as anxiety and depression. This, combined with the high degree of co-morbidity
associated with PTSD (e.g. Foa et ah, 2000) may confuse the clinical picture and
lead to debates over what is part of the 'core' PTSD disorder, if such a thing exists,
and what is not. Since meeting DSM or ICD criteria for a disorder is frequently an
inclusion criterion in research, this may lead to a misleading picture of the reality of
the effects of trauma on individuals. On a related note, Yule et al. (1999) note that
"survival guilt" formed part of the DSM-III definition but was removed from later
definitions and suggest that this demonstrates how the consensus process of reaching
DSM definitions may lead to an overly narrow focus.
Despite these concerns with the validity of PTSD as a diagnostic classification, this
review will follow common practice in continuing to use the term as a useful
shorthand that represents broad consensus within the literature. However, these
concerns should be borne in mind and they may help to explain some of the variation
in the literature discussed.
Incidence and prevalence of PTSD
Post-traumatic stress disorder is a relatively common mental health problem. In the
general population, the US Epidemiological Catchment Area project suggested a
lifetime prevalence of 7.8 percent (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes & Nelson,
1995), while Foa and Rothbaum (1998) suggested that the lifetime prevalence might
be up to 9 percent. Lifetime prevalence rates for women are approximately twice
that of men (Kessler et al., 1995; Foa et al., 2000). Breslau, Davis, Andreski and
Peterson (1991) suggested that as many as a third of individuals who develop PTSD
would experience chronic difficulties, based on their work with young urban adults
in the USA.
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It is interesting to contrast the above figures regarding prevalence of PTSD with
information regarding exposure to traumatic events. Kessler et al's (1995) national
survey of individuals in the United States suggested that approximately 60 percent of
men and 50 percent of women had experienced at least one traumatic event that
would meet DSM-IV criteria. Although there were a number of methodological
limitations on Kessler et al's (1995) study, such as the use of lay interviewers,
similar or even higher figures have been reported by other studies (e.g. Norris, 1992;
Kilpatrick & Resnick, 1993; Breslau, Kessler, Chilcoat, Schultz, Davis & Andreski,
1998). These studies make it clear that many individuals who are exposed to
traumatic events do not subsequently develop PTSD. In a literature review, Green
(1994) suggested that in the normal population, between 25-30 percent of individuals
would develop PTSD following a traumatic event. Breslau et al. (1998) provide the
more conservative estimates of 9-13 percent of women and 6.2 percent of men
developing PTSD from a range of traumatic events, based on a community sample of
adults in the Detroit area.
Despite inconsistent findings of an exposure-effect relationship between the intensity
of the traumatic event and the likelihood of subsequent PTSD (e.g. compare Yule et
al., 1999 with McNally, 2003), prevalence can be significantly higher in groups
exposed to specific traumatic events. For example, Boyle, Bolton, Nurrish, O'Ryan,
Udwin & Yule (1995; cited in Yule et al., 1999) found that over half the survivors of
a cruise ship sinking developed PTSD. Foy (1992) reported that between 15-50
percent of individuals exposed to intense combat situations developed PTSD.
Violent and or sexual assault has been associated with levels of PTSD of up to
21 percent in the aforementioned Detroit community sample (Breslau et al., 1998).
Vulnerability factors in PTSD
Findings of considerable variation in responses to trauma have generated
considerable research interest in explaining individual differences in vulnerability to
PTSD (e.g. Yule et al., 1999). These differences are usually broken down into pre-,
peri-, and post-trauma factors (e.g. Foa & Rothbaum, 1998).
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Two recent meta-analyses have reviewed the evidence for a range of factors related
to PTSD outcomes (Brewin et ah, 2000; Ozer, Best, Lipsey & Weiss, 2003). The
significant pre-traumatic factors identified are wide-ranging, including gender, age,
education, adverse life events, poor physical health and financial problems.
Pre-morbid psychiatric problems can have an adverse effect, although this is not a
universal finding. Family psychiatric history has also been implicated. Previous
exposure to trauma is another significant factor, particularly in the case of childhood
abuse.
Peri-traumatic factors include the nature of the trauma and findings related to this
have already been discussed. Bereavement is particularly associated with poor
outcome. The severity of injury and the perception that the individual's life was at
risk are also significant factors. Participation in atrocities has been associated with
poorer outcome. Dunmore, Clark and Ehlers (1999) describe within a cognitive
framework the role of "mental defeat", a sense that the individual is entirely at the
mercy of events and that death would be a release, and "mental confusion", where
the individual is unable to make sense of events. Both of these appraisals are
associated with poorer outcomes.
Consideration of these individual differences in explaining whether individuals will
develop PTSD or not fits well with the (arguably) dominant contemporary
diathesis-stress paradigm of emotional disorder. A number of the vulnerability
factors identified above fit well into the (again arguably) dominant
cognitive-behavioural model. Therefore, individual differences would appear to
have intuitive appeal, which may explain their popularity in the research literature.
This thesis is based on similar conceptual grounds, in attempting to investigate
whether individual differences in representations of trauma are important. The
theoretical background to this will be discussed later in this introduction, however, it
may be worthwhile considering at this point the impact on this paradigm of the
findings of both the recent meta-analyses (Brewin et ah, 2000; Ozer et ah, 2003) that
pre-traumatic factors account for a relatively small proportion of the variance.
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Brewin et al's (2000) meta-analysis suggested that peri- and post-trauma factors were
the most important determinants of PTSD, with trauma severity, life stresses
post-trauma, and lack of social support post trauma having the highest effect sizes
(weighted average effect sizes 0.23, 0.40 and 0.32 respectively). This would classify
them as having small to moderate effect sizes in line with Cohen (1988). In contrast,
pre-trauma variables such as psychiatric history, childhood abuse, or previous trauma
have only small effect sizes (weighted average effect sizes 0.11, 0.14 and 0.12
respectively). Although the pre-trauma factors investigated by Brewin et al. (2000)
are not psychological representations or appraisals in themselves (such as the concept
of mental defeat discussed above, invoked by Dunmore et al., 1999), they include
factors that would be expected to have a significant effect on the way that the
individual makes sense of and interprets the world.
Ozer et al. (2003) report broadly similar findings, suggesting that significant factors
can be split into two groups based on their effect sizes. The first group of factors are
those more distant in time from the trauma and relate to the individual experiencing
the traumatic event, including variables such as prior adjustment, prior history of
trauma, and family psychiatric history. These factors have a small average effect
size of 0.20 or less. The second group are more immediate to or follow the trauma,
comprising variables such as perceived threat to life, peri-traumatic dissociation, and
perceived support. These factors have a small to moderate effect size, averaging
0.20 or higher (highest average effect size 0.35, for peri-traumatic dissociation).
Interestingly, the two studies differ significantly on the effect size for social support,
with Ozer et al. (2003) reporting an average effect size of 0.28 versus 0.40 in the
Brewin et al. (2000) study. This appears to be mainly due to the more stringent
inclusion criteria in the Ozer et al. (2003) study. However, Ozer et al. (2003) concur
with Brewin et al. (2000) that social support is clearly an important factor in PTSD
outcomes.
Therefore, from the meta-analyses findings it might be argued that the experience of
trauma, additional stressors post-trauma, and the social support that an individual
receives are so significant that in an adverse combination they can overwhelm
Introduction Page 16 of 114
SPAARS evidence? An empirical investigation into SPAARS applied to PTSD
virtually any individual. In other words, within a diathesis-stress paradigm, the stress
component is far more important than the diathesis. This might suggest that efforts
to identify psychological factors that make individuals vulnerable to trauma, as in
this thesis, are of limited value.
In response to this argument, it is important to consider some specific
methodological problems that Brewin et al. (2000) and Ozer et al. (2003)
acknowledge within their studies. Firstly, both note that effect sizes for the factors
that they examined tended to vary significantly across different studies. Therefore,
the risk factors did not always have the same predictive value. For example, Brewin
et al. (2000) noted that only the pre-trauma factors of psychiatric history, childhood
abuse and family psychiatric history were stable across studies. Trauma severity was
the most variable, with effect sizes ranging from -0.14 to 0.76 and seemed to be
particularly affected by sample type, having a greater effect in military samples.
Ozer et al. (2003) comment extensively on the heterogeneity of their dataset, for
example in range of traumatic events, intensity of exposure, and method of
assessment and suggest that this accounts for much of the variability that they too
found.
Secondly, most of the studies in both meta-analyses were retrospective. Brewin et al.
(2000) note that retrospective reporting will tend to inflate reports of trauma intensity
and post-trauma variables and found that the effect sizes reported for trauma severity
were significantly higher in retrospective than prospective studies. They were unable
to test this for additional life stressors and social support due to insufficient
prospective studies for these variables. In contrast, reports of childhood trauma and
childhood adversity were not affected by studies being of prospective or
retrospective design. However, Brewin et al. (2000) were not able to test whether
this applied to all pre-trauma factors, again due to the limited number of prospective
studies. Thirdly, Brewin et al. (2000) suggest that there may be mediating variables
that affect the impact of pre-trauma factors, such as shame mediating the association
between childhood abuse and PTSD (Andrews et al., 2000).
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Overall, Brewin et al. (2000) therefore conclude that risk factors for PTSD are still
poorly understood and do not rule out "a model in which pre-trauma factors interact
with trauma severity or trauma responses to increase the risk of PTSD" (p. 756).
Although Ozer et al. (2003) place greater emphasis on the role of peri-traumatic
dissociation and peri-traumatic emotionality in subsequent PTSD outcome, they note
that individuals' past experiences have sufficient effect sizes to deserve empirical
investigation. They further suggest that these experiences may influence the
meaning of the trauma to the individual, in particular their experience of loss, and
this may in turn have an effect on the peri-traumatic variables of dissociation and
emotionality. These conclusions will be borne in mind during our discussion of
psychological models of PTSD.
Two final areas of the literature will be reviewed before models of PTSD are
considered. These are, firstly, PTSD and information processing and, secondly,
effective treatments for PTSD. The reviews of both these complex areas are
necessarily brief but it is hoped that they will provide an indication of some of the
issues that a comprehensive model ofPTSD would need to address.
Information processing and PTSD
Buckley, Blanchard and Neill (2000) reviewed empirical findings in this area.
Efforts have been made to discover whether individuals with PTSD show an
attentional bias towards trauma-related information. Both preconscious (otherwise
known as automatic) and conscious (or strategic) levels of processing have been
investigated, using a variety of auditory and visual methodologies, such as the
emotional Stroop paradigm (see Buckley et al., 2000). Mixed findings have been
obtained and firm conclusions are difficult to draw because of issues such as
different trauma populations and methodologies, and small sample sizes. For
example, Harvey, Bryant and Rapee (1996) found a preconscious attentional bias for
visually presented threatening material in participants who had been in road traffic
accidents, while Trandel and McNally (1987) found no evidence for this with
Vietnam veterans.
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At the conscious processing level, more consistent evidence has accumulated. For
example, Bryant and Harvey (1995), in a well-controlled study of participants who
had been in road traffic accidents, found delayed vocal response latency to visually
presented trauma-related stimuli. Similar findings have been demonstrated in other
populations, such as for PTSD following rape (e.g. Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak &
McCarthy, 1991) and Vietnam veterans (e.g. Kaspi, McNally & Amir, 1995).
However, because of the methodological limitations of some of the studies in this
area, more work needs to be done to establish whether PTSD shows a unique
attentional bias amongst anxiety disorders, that is specific to trauma-related
information (Buckley et al., 2000).
Memory biases in PTSD have also been investigated. Again, there is insufficient
evidence to draw firm conclusions. However, Vietnam veterans with PTSD have
been found to have superior recall of trauma-related information than matched
controls in both implicit (Amir, McNally & Wiegartz, 1996) and explicit (Kaspi et
al., 1995) memory paradigms. This is striking, given that on general standardised
memory assessments, poorer short-term and long-term memory has been
demonstrated for participants with PTSD versus controls (e.g. Bremner, Scott,
Delaney, et al., 1993). McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin and Weathers (1994) have
demonstrated that Vietnam veterans have difficulties in generating specific positive
personal memories in response to emotional cue words. Similar problems have been
demonstrated in individuals with depression (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams & Ferrier,
1993) and it has been suggested that lack of availability of positive information may
be a maintaining factor in depression (e.g. Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979).
Given the co-morbidity of depression with PTSD this is an interesting finding.
Additionally, the other attentional and memory biases identified above could have
the effect of increasing a sense of current threat in individuals with PTSD, making
these plausible maintaining factors (cf. particularly the fear network and cognitive
models discussed below).
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Effective treatments for PTSD
Foa et al. (2000) performed a comprehensive review of the PTSD treatment literature
as the basis of practice guidelines from the International Society for Traumatic Stress
Studies. They concluded that the strongest evidence, in terms of number of
well-controlled studies, was for treatments with significant components of prolonged
exposure. They also concluded that there was good evidence for the cognitive
therapy treatments, together with approaches that combined exposure with cognitive
restructuring. Flowever, there was no evidence of significant differences in effect
sizes between any of these successful therapeutic approaches.
Despite Foa et al's (2000) findings of no significant differences between prolonged
exposure alone, cognitive therapy alone, or exposure and cognitive therapy
combined, various claims have been made that cognitive therapy may be more
suitable in particular cases. For example, Ehlers, Clark, Dunmore, Jaycox, Meadows
and Foa (1998) found that women with PTSD following rape who showed evidence
of 'mental defeat' or 'absence of mental planning' in imaginal exposure narratives
had poorer outcomes. Mental defeat was defined as "the victim's perception that she
gave up in her own mind and was completely defeated" (p. 461). An absence of
mental planning was seen as a lack of evidence of thoughts about specific actions
that could help the individual to cope with the situation, even if these could not be
successfully performed. Poorer outcomes were also found for participants who felt
alienated from others or permanently changed for the worse by their experiences.
Ehlers et al. (1998) therefore suggest that a combination of exposure work and
cognitive restructuring aimed at changing negative self-evaluations may be more
effective for individuals with mental defeat, absence of mental planning, or feelings
of alienation or permanent change. However, this was not empirically tested. It
must also be noted that their conclusions were drawn from a small sample (10 good
and 10 poorer outcomes). Further, although they state that there were no significant
differences between the groups, it is interesting to note that 8 of the good outcome
group were raped by a stranger compared to only 4 of the poorer outcome group and
a number of authors (see e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1992) have suggested that being raped
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by a known person may lead to increased difficulties in coping with the event, for
example, due to increased self-blame that it should have been possible to anticipate
it.
Suggestions that cognitive restructuring and exposure may be more appropriate than
exposure alone for individuals with negative self-evaluations are intuitively
appealing and occur frequently in the literature. Their appeal is often increased by
suggesting that they could increase the treatment response rate, which even for
well-supported treatments is generally only around 50 percent (e.g. Foa, Rothbaum,
Riggs & Murdock, 1991). However, empirical evidence has been generally
unsupportive. For example, in a recent study, van Minnen, Arntz and Keijsers
(2002) studied outcome and drop-out in prolonged imaginal exposure treatment for
two separate groups with chronic PTSD caused by a variety of traumatic events.
They found no stable predictors of poorer outcome, including for example, feelings
of anger, guilt and shame and concluded that there was no justification for ruling out
prolonged exposure treatment because of pre-treatment factors. Of course, it can be
argued that in practice, it is not possible to perform exposure treatment on human
participants without cognitive change occurring, for example due to changes in their
evaluations of their ability to cope with reminders of the trauma. Nevertheless,
specific cognitive restructuring does not seem to be preferentially indicated at this
time, and successful models of PTSD will need to account for this.
Finally in this section, it should be noted that there is more limited evidence for the
effectiveness of a number of other psychological treatments for PTSD, including
group therapy, hypnotherapy, and eye-movement desensitisation and reprocessing
(EMDR; see Foa et ah, 2000 for a summary of relevant findings). Detailed
consideration of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this thesis. Ideally, a
comprehensive model should be able to account for all validated treatments, but this
is perhaps unrealistic given the current state of knowledge, particularly in the case of
EMDR (e.g. Shapiro, 1995), where there is considerable controversy over its active
components (see e.g. Lohr, Hooke, Gist & Tolin, 2003).
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Psychological models of PTSD
The following review of psychological models of PTSD is selective. It will focus on
models that are thought to be most relevant in showing that while non-multilevel
models have been able to account for many of the features of PTSD, multilevel
models have significant theoretical advantages. Biological theories are therefore not
considered.
Stress response syndrome theory
Horowitz (1976, 1986, 1997) has described a normative stress response course to
traumatic events. Although based on his psychodynamically-oriented clinical
observations, Horowitz's theory uses cognitive concepts such as the development of
cognitive schemata to explain how individuals process images, thoughts, feelings and
memories related to traumatic events.
Cognitive schemata serve to organise knowledge mentally (Fiske & Linville, 1980)
by recognising and storing common elements of experiences. Schemata therefore
enable individuals to have coherent representations of themselves and the world in
which they live. Over the course of normal developmental experience, this leads to
the formation of an individual's 'assumptive world' (Parkes, 1975), which provides
the individual with a stable basis for planning and monitoring behaviour. Developed
schemata are regarded as being normally highly resistant to change, with a strong
bias to interpret new information in ways that are consistent with existing knowledge
structures (Fiske & Linville, 1980). Janoff-Buhnan (1989), whose own
schematic-based theory of PTSD will be discussed later in this section, has suggested
that the resistance of schemata to change can be seen as essential from an
evolutionary psychological perspective, because it provides the individual with a
stable existential self. In some circumstances, however, schemata can change more
rapidly. From a developmental perspective, Piaget (1952) argued that schemata
could change rapidly when it became clear that they no longer provided accurate
representations of the individual's experience. A mechanism of rapid schematic
change can also be hypothesised as being essential from an evolutionary
psychological perspective, since it is easy to imagine some situations where it is
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necessary that an organism's knowledge structures change rapidly if it is to survive.
A typical situation might be sudden exposure to danger in a situation that had
previously been seen as safe, which is of course a common experience in traumatic
events.
In Horowitz's (1976, 1986, 1997) model, normally there is an initial realisation of
the effects of the trauma that is overwhelming to the individual's assumptive world.
This causes a form of shock and a period of 'crying out'. Individuals will then try to
make sense of the event, by attempting to reconcile the meaning of the trauma with
their schematic models of themselves and the world. Horowitz (1976, 1986, 1997)
sees this as driven by a process that he calls 'completion tendency', which is a
psychological need to integrate new experience with existing schematic models. The
completion tendency leads to information about the trauma being stored in 'active
memory', which is a form of storage that continues to bring the information into
conscious awareness until the process of integration is complete.
For many individuals, however, their traumatic experience is very difficult to
reconcile with their previous knowledge, resulting in a form of information overload
associated with overwhelming feelings of anxiety. This leads to the activation of
defence mechanisms that attempt to keep the anxiety-provoking traumatic
information from overwhelming the individual. These defence mechanisms lead to
symptoms such as numbing, denial of the trauma from conscious awareness, and
avoidance of stimuli related to the trauma. However, because trauma-related
information remains in active memory, it continues to be brought into conscious
awareness, resulting in the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD (intrusions,
flashbacks and nightmares).
The two competing processes of completion tendency and defence lead to continued
swings between phases of avoidance and intrusion of traumatic information. For
most individuals, this allows them eventually to integrate the trauma-related
information with pre-trauma schemata. If, however, the individual cannot integrate
the trauma-related information, then the material will remain in active memory and
the individual will experience chronic PTSD. Horowitz (1997) also identifies the
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possibility that some individuals may defend against the trauma-related information
so thoroughly that they continue to experience symptoms such as denial, numbing
and dissociation as avoidance strategies, with the possibility of delayed onset PTSD
should these defences eventually disintegrate.
Evaluation of stress response syndrome theory
The work of Horowitz (1976, 1986, 1997) has been highly influential in determining
views of PTSD as a disorder, particularly in terms of the effects of trauma on an
individual's beliefs about themselves and the world they live in. His theory accounts
for the core symptomatology of PTSD and outlines the normative course of reaction
to trauma, offering explanations for why some individuals can go on to experience
chronic PTSD. The efficacy of both exposure and cognitive therapy can be
accounted for by the theory, at least in general terms. Exposure can be seen as an
opportunity for the individual to integrate the trauma-related information. It is not
clear why this is should be more effective than the normative course of phases of
intrusion and avoidance (Dalgleish, submitted), although it is possible that therapy
provides a safe environment where individuals are less likely to be overwhelmed by
anxiety and fail to complete processing of the information. Like Horowitz's (1976,
1986, 1997) theory, Beck's (1967, 1976; Beck et al., 1979) theory of emotional
disorders gives central importance to the concept of cognitive schemata in storing
information about the individual and their world. In Horowitz's (1976, 1986, 1997)
theory, interpretations are seen as a way of helping the individual to integrate the
trauma-related information with pre-trauma schemata and it seems logical that
cognitive therapy techniques could perform the same function.
However, there are limitations to Horowitz's (1976, 1986, 1997) theory. Firstly, the
theory is somewhat descriptive and general. Amongst other consequences, this
means that it is difficult to generate particular predictions regarding individual
reactions to trauma. Its explanation of the role of the some of the various pre-, peri-,
and post-traumatic factors that have been identified as being associated with more
severe PTSD (e.g. Brewin et al., 2000) is also rather limited. However, as a general
point it is plausible that factors that lead to a greater discrepancy between
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trauma-related information and pre-trauma schemata would lead to greater
differences in integration and therefore could lead to more severe PTSD (Dalgleish,
submitted). Secondly, Dalgleish (submitted) notes that because Horowitz's theory
only specifies one level of representation (the schematic level) it fails to account
sufficiently for other representations such as automatic thoughts and attributions.
The notion of levels of representation will be developed further below, in the section
on multi-level models of emotion.
Shattered assumptions theory
The theory of shattered assumptions of Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992) has a number of
similarities to Horowitz's theory of stress response syndromes. Again, this is a
schema-based model, which posits that PTSD is caused by difficulties in reconciling
pre-trauma schemata with trauma-related information.
Compared with Horowitz's model, Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992) provides a more
detailed exposition on the nature of pre-trauma schemata, supported by empirical
findings from interviews and questionnaires (Janoff-Bulman, 1989). She asserts that
there are three fundamental assumptions:
"The world is benevolent. The world is meaningful. The self is worthy."
(Janoff-Bulman, 1989, p. 6).
Within these assumptions, Janoff-Bulman (1989) identifies a number of elements
that she believes individuals attend to. For example, with regard to a meaningful
world, she suggests that individuals expect to see evidence of the principles of
justice, where good things happen to good people and bad people are punished.
They also expect evidence of control, where people feel that their actions determine
what happens to them. Conversely, they will reject evidence of randomness. The
fundamental assumptions are normally functional, enabling individuals to plan and
act in a way that they would be unable to if they were continually exposed to the
existential uncertainty they would have to endure if they were stripped of these
assumptions. However, traumatic events can destroy these assumptions, leaving the
individual unable to function effectively.
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Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992) suggests that recovery from trauma can occur naturally
through oscillation between re-experiencing and avoidance, as described by
Horowitz (1976, 1986, 1997). Additionally, she asserts that individuals can facilitate
their processing of the traumatic experience by deliberately reviewing their
representations of the trauma. Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992) identifies that a
significant number of individuals are eventually able to reinterpret their traumatic
experiences in a positive way, for example by seeing their experiences as having
taught them valuable lessons about the world. She also notes the importance of the
social environments of traumatised individuals in influencing their recovery, which is
consistent with the finding of Brewin et al. (2000) regarding the importance of social
support.
Evaluation of shattered assumptions theory
The more detailed analysis of possible recovery processes is one of the strengths of
Janoff-Bulman's (1989, 1992) theory. She is able to draw on a range of empirical
evidence, mainly from social psychology, to support her hypothesised fundamental
assumptions (see e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1989). Within the research literature for
PTSD, there is evidence to support her contention that blaming one's self for being
involved in a traumatic incident should predict a better outcome, because it allows
assumptions regarding personal control to be maintained. This prediction has been
supported by a number of studies (e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Brewin, 1984),
although others (e.g. Nielson & MacDonald, 1988; Frazier, 1990) reported the
opposite finding, with self-blame predicting a poorer outcome.
As a schema-based theory, most of the strengths of Horowitz's (1976, 1986, 1997)
model outlined above also apply to Janoff-Bulman's (1989, 1992) model. This
includes accounting for the core symptomatology of PTSD; the normative course of
reaction to trauma; the development of chronic PTSD; the efficacy of both exposure
and cognitive therapy (again at least in general terms).
Similarly, many of the limitations of Horowitz's (1976, 1986, 1997) theory are
shared by the theory of shattered assumptions. Again, it is somewhat descriptive and
general and it fails to account sufficiently for other representations such as automatic
Introduction Page 26 of 114
SPAARS evidence? An empirical investigation into SPAARS applied to PTSD
thoughts and attributions. In addition, Brewin and Holmes (2003) note that
Janoff-Bulman's (1989, 1992) model would seem to predict that an individual who
has experienced a traumatic event in the past should cope more easily with a
subsequent traumatic event, because there should be less of a discrepancy between
his/her fundamental assumptions and the subsequent traumatic event. However, the
available evidence suggests that a past trauma makes it more difficult for an
individual to cope with a subsequent traumatic event (e.g. Brewin et al., 2000).
Learning theory
Given the prominence of behaviourism in psychology in the first half of the 20lh
Century and the obvious applicability of learning theory to features of PTSD such as
avoidance and the success of prolonged exposure in treatment, it may seem
surprising that learning theories specifically applied to PTSD are scarce. Keane,
Zimering & Cadell (1985) developed a model based on learning theory for their
population of combat veterans. This model was able to account for many of the
clinical features of PTSD. For example, the fact that initially neutral stimuli present
in the environment during the traumatic event become associated with the event and
subsequently cause fear can be explained by classical conditioning. Stimulus
generalisation leads to the range of fear-eliciting stimuli increasing. Avoidance of
these stimuli is negatively reinforced by anxiety reduction, which makes it less likely
that an individual will expose themselves to the fear for long enough to extinguish
the association between fear and stimulus.
However, learning theory models such as that of Keane et al. (1985) are inevitably
less able to account for the numerous cognitive features of PTSD such as
re-experiencing, and changes in appraisals and schemata. Also, within a learning
theory framework, it is not clear why individuals should develop PTSD rather than
other anxiety disorders such as specific phobia (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). As with
the schematic models discussed above, in the criteria of Dalgleish (submitted)
learning theory does not include sufficient levels of representation to capture the full
complexity of PTSD adequately.
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The fear network model of emotional processing
The fear network model (Foa, Steketee & Rothbaum, 1989; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998)
has similarities with the schema-based models of Horowitz (1976, 1986, 1997) and
Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992) described above, in that it suggests that
psychopathology results from a failure to process emotionally traumatic events
successfully (after Rachman, 1980). However, in the fear network model, it is
argued that trauma-related information is represented in a particular way that leads to
difficulties in emotional processing, rather than the difficulty being due to
discrepancies between the information and pre-trauma schemata. This draws on the
work of Lang (1979) in suggesting that fear can be seen as an action programme that
prompts the organism to escape from danger. Lang (1979) extended learning theory
explanations of fear by proposing that memories of fearful events were stored in an
associative memory network comprising information regarding the event itself,
emotional and physiological responses, and the meaning of the event. Individuals
who suffered from pathological anxiety were seen as having fear networks that were
more readily triggered by ambiguous stimuli that resembled the original
anxiety-causing event in some way. Triggering would lead to the physiological
experience of fear and the tendency to interpret situations in similar ways to that of
the original event.
Foa et al. (1989) suggested that memories of traumatic events tend to contain a
particularly high number of stimulus elements. This can lead to activation of the
network and the experience of fear in many situations, which, combined with the
memory of the traumatic event itself, can destroy the individual's basic sense of
safety (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). Foa et al. (1989) also suggest that traumatic
memory networks have particularly low activation thresholds and result in very
strong physiological responses, which can help to explain the persistence of PTSD.
Foa et al. (1989) go on to make specific predictions about how the memories in a fear
network can be modified, leading to integration with normal memory processes and a
reduction in PTSD symptoms. They suggest that optimal integration occurs when an
individual's network is activated and the individual is able to experience habituation
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to fear. This causes the individual to incorporate new information within the fear
network and this eventually leads to a reduction in the strength of the associations
within the fear network. Foa et al. (1989) suggest that these processes can occur
within therapy through imaginal or in vivo exposure and also between therapy
sessions, as long as the individual experiences habituation to the fear associated with
their memories of trauma.
Evaluation of the fear network model
The fear network model, particularly in its later, more sophisticated form (Foa &
Rothbaum, 1998) has considerable explanatory power. The fear network concept is
able to account for the way in which reminders of traumatic events can trigger
intense re-experiencing. Encoding of behavioural strategies in the fear network can
explain the effects of PTSD on memory and attentional processes (Brewin and
Holmes, 2003). The later, more sophisticated model (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998)
acknowledges the role of pre-trauma schemata, in line with the work of Horowitz
(1976, 1986, 1997) and Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992). This enables the fear network
model to account for the impact of trauma on an individual's view of themselves and
their world. The model is also able to explain the efficacy of both exposure and
cognitive therapy treatments for PTSD. It has led to specific predictions about
effective treatments, some of which have received empirical support. For example
Foa, Molnar and Cashman (1995) showed that narratives of rapes during imaginal
exposure became less disorganised over the course of treatment, and this was
associated with a reduction in trauma-related anxiety. Foa, Riggs, Massie and
Yarczower (1995) found that female assault victims who displayed more facial fear
during their first imaginal exposure session, interpreted as suggesting that their fear
networks had been activated, showed more improvement following completion of
therapy, on a composite measure ofPTSD and anxiety symptoms.
It is possible to criticise the fear network model on the basis that some of the
'cognitive architecture' to support the processes theorised to occur is not fully
specified (Dalgleish, submitted; see also Brewin & Holmes, 2003). For example, it
is not clear within the model how memories of the traumatic event can be associated
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with different intensities of emotion if they are only represented within one level of
representation (the fear network). Brewin & Holmes (2003) further note that animal
studies of fear conditioning have suggested that it seems more likely that fear
activation is reduced by the establishment of new memories, in which the stimuli that
occurred at the time of the trauma are not paired with feelings of fear, than by the
modification of existing memories. These new memories, which are not associated
with fear, then compete with the memories of trauma and can inhibit the feelings of
fear. This proposal, which is controversial, is developed within Brewin, Dalgleish,
and Joseph's (1996) dual representation theory of PTSD, which will be discussed in
detail below. One final criticism of the model is that it is specific to PTSD. While
this is associated with considerable explanatory power for PTSD, the model is less
able to explain other symptoms. Given the significant co-morbidity associated with
PTSD, a model that could account for other psychological problems would have
increased clinical utility.
Dual representation theory
Brewin et al. (1996) developed a theory of PTSD in which memories of traumatic
events are stored in two separate memory systems. The first memory type is known
as the VAM (verbally accessible memory) system. This stores memories that are
integrated with normal autobiographical memory. Memories in the VAM system
have been consciously processed and contain evaluations of the trauma, together
with primary emotions (what the individual felt at the time) and secondary emotions
(associated with subsequent appraisals of the trauma). As the term "verbally
accessible" implies, these memories can be retrieved in the same way as other
autobiographical memories and the VAM system is the source of subsequent oral or
written accounts of traumatic events.
The second memory type is known as the SAM (situationally accessible memory)
system. This stores memories processed at a lower level than the VAM system, for
example, stimuli associated with the traumatic event that did not reach conscious
awareness. Brewin et al. (1996) suggest that the highly threatening nature of
traumatic events severely limits the amount of information that can be registered in
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VAM, leading to most of the information being stored within the SAM system.
Information within SAM cannot be consciously retrieved in the same way as VAM,
but can be triggered by stimuli that match the traumatic events. Matching stimuli can
be both external (for example, smells that were present during the event) and internal
(for example, emotions that were felt at the time). SAM can contain physiological
information, for example heart rate and pain. It can also contain representations of
emotion. Normally, these would be restricted to the primary emotions felt at the time
of the trauma, however, Brewin and Holmes (2003) note the possibility of more
complex appraisal-based emotions being stored in SAM if the traumatic event is of
sufficient duration.
Brewin et al. (1996) suggest that the SAM system is the source of the flashbacks
often associated with PTSD. These are triggered, as noted above, by internal or
external stimuli consistent with the traumatic event. Because SAM can contain both
physiological and emotional representations, together with more detailed perceptual
information than is normally available to VAM, flashbacks feel qualitatively
different to normal memories and are generally distressing. The non-verbal nature of
SAM means that it does not tend to integrate with normal autobiographical memory,
which often leads to persistent flashbacks. Brewin et al. (1996) further suggest that
the lack of integration of the two memory systems can account for other PTSD
symptomatology such as dissociation and nightmares.
In Brewin et al's (1996) model, there are two distinct recovery processes that are
necessary for a full resolution of PTSD. Flashbacks, caused by triggering of the
SAM representations of the trauma, are prevented by developing more detailed VAM
representations that inhibit the activation of SAMs. Because SAMs initially contain
more detail than VAMs about the trauma, it is necessary to elaborate the VAMs so
that they too become increasingly likely to be triggered by internal or external stimuli
that are consistent with the original trauma. The elaborated VAMs also need to
contain representations that the individual is safe and that the trauma occurred in the
past, so that these counter the emotion of fear that the individual felt at the time of
the original trauma. Brewin et al. suggest that these mechanisms underlie the
effectiveness of exposure therapy (see also Brewin, 2001).
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The second recovery process involves the individual dealing with the aversive
primary and secondary emotions encoded in VAM. These can include feelings of
shame or anger. The individual also may have to come to terms with discrepancies
between the traumatic experience and his or her previous schematic representations
of the self and the world, in line with the work of Janoff-Bulman (e.g. 1989). Brewin
et al. (1996) suggest that this would be accomplished by cognitive therapy
techniques.
Evaluation of dual representation theory
Dual representation theory has a number of significant strengths. Firstly, it can
integrate an impressive array of empirical data. The suggestion that there may be
separate memory representations to encode both automatic and higher-level
processing is consistent with findings within cognitive science (e.g. Slornan, 1996).
Brewin (2001; Brewin & Holmes, 2003) has suggested that neurological findings
that memory can be encoded via routes that involve either the hippocampus and the
amygdala, or more directly by the amygdala without the hippocampus, support the
notion that there are (at least) two different forms of memory. Brewin (2001)
suggests that the hippocampus-mediated route may be equated to VAM, while the
non-hippocampal route is the source of SAM. He notes the differential response to
these systems to intense arousal, which enhances the non-hippocampal route while
inhibiting the hippocampus-mediated route.
Brewin and Holmes (2003) cite evidence from Holmes, Brewin and Hennessy
(submitted) who provided direct empirical support for dual representation theory by
demonstrating that different concurrent tasks performed by participants who watched
a trauma film resulted in different levels of intrusive memories. Backward number
counting which was hypothesised to interfere with VAM, because of the verbal
nature of the task, was predicted to lead to fewer verbally accessible representations
compared to situationally accessible representations, leading to an increase in
intrusive memories. In contrast, a visuo-spatial task (keyboard pattern tapping) was
hypothesised to interfere with SAM, which would lead to fewer situationally
accessible representations and less intrusive memories. Holmes et al's (submitted)
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results were in line with these predictions of dual representation theory. Dual
representation theory can also account for findings noted earlier regarding the effects
of PTSD on attentional processes (see the section on information processing and
PTSD above). Trauma-related cues will trigger activation of SAM (and possibly
VAM) representations, resulting in a bias of attention.
Secondly, Brewin and his colleagues (Brewin et ah, 1996; Brewin, 2001; Brewin &
Holmes, 2003) make a number of interesting propositions based on dual
representation theory. Brewin et al. (1996) suggest a number of possible routes for
individuals within a dual representation framework that could lead to different
outcomes following trauma. For example, individuals may be able to strongly inhibit
memories of the trauma (both VAM and SAM), provided they do not experience too
many subsequent reminders of the trauma. These individuals may appear unaffected
by the trauma at the time. However, because they have not completed the task of
elaborating VAMs sufficiently to inhibit SAM activation, they will remain
vulnerable to this inhibition breaking down if future reminders of the traumatic event
become too intense. Brewin et al. (1996) suggested that this could explain
phenomena such as delayed onset PTSD.
Brewin (2001) suggests that VAMs are able to inhibit SAMs when they have
sufficient retrieval cues to be triggered by reminders of the trauma. Therefore, he
argues that flashbacks can be treated more efficiently by focusing exposure work on
aspects of the individual's trauma narrative that are associated with the greatest
distress. This can be contrasted with approaches such as Foa and Rothbaum (1998),
who argue that prolonged exposure is effective because it integrates new information
of safety with the existing memories of trauma. In Foa and Rothbaunvs (1998)
model, greater coherence and elaboration of the entire trauma narrative would be
associated with better outcomes. While there is not direct empirical support for
Brewin's (2001) contention, he does note that Ehlers and Clark's (2000) cognitive
model of PTSD (described below) recommends focusing therapy on what they term
"hot spots" within the trauma narrative. The fact that there is empirical evidence that
Ehlers and Clark's (2000) model leads to effective treatment (Gillespie, Duffy,
Hackman & Clark, 2002) provides some support for his contention.
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Brewin (2001) makes the point that dual representation theory suggests that the level
of arousal that an individual experiences while recalling trauma is crucial. If arousal
becomes too high, the hippocampally-mediated memory route will again become
inhibited, preventing inhibitory VAM representations from being formed. It is worth
noting that, in contrast, writers such as Foa and Rothbaum (1998) have emphasised
that successful exposure treatment requires that an individual experience sufficient
arousal to activate his/her fear network, so that he/she can habituate to the fear and
integrate this information into the network. Empirical findings that support that
some arousal is necessary for successful response to exposure have been presented
(e.g. Foa et al., 1995). Brewin's proposal would have significant treatment
implications and further empirical exploration of optimum levels of arousal in
exposure work appears merited.
It can be seen that dual representation theory presents a sophisticated account of
PTSD that can explain many of the features of the disorder. Also, while it does not
propose unique treatment methods, it does have important implications for existing
treatments. However, there are limitations to dual representation theory. Firstly,
Dalgleish (submitted) suggests that there are insufficient levels of representation
within the theory. For example, Brewin et al. (1996) suggest that schematic-level
representations of the self and world, such as those advanced by Janoff-Bulman
(1989) are encoded in VAM. In Brewin et al's theory, representations in VAM are
implicitly verbally accessible, yet most theorists would suggest that schematic-level
representations are not fully verbally accessible (e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1989; see also
the SPAARS model of Power & Dalgleish, 1997, discussed in detail below).
A second limitation of dual representation theory is that it is quite specific to PTSD.
Brewin et al. (1996) suggest some specific pathways in the development of
co-morbidity, for example that depression could develop subsequent to PTSD due to
repeated experiencing of feelings of helplessness associated with flashbacks.
However, dual representation theory's main explanatory power concerns the
development and maintenance of PTSD symptoms and treatment implications.
Given the high level of co-morbidity associated with PTSD, models that can account
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for PTSD and additional symptomatology in an integrated way would appear
desirable.
Thirdly, the suggestion that neurological mechanisms and the differential effect of
intense arousal may account for the difference between VAM and SAM
representations is intriguing but may be problematic. Brewin (2001) draws on
experiments regarding fear conditioning in animals. While feelings of intense fear at
the time of the trauma are normally associated with PTSD (and are a requirement for
diagnosis), as noted Dalgleish et al. (submitted) suggest that a variety of intense
emotions, such as disgust or anger, can lead to core symptomatology of PTSD,
particularly re-experiencing. However, even if this controversial extension of PTSD
is accepted, there are ways of getting around this problem within dual representation
theory. It could be claimed that even if the dominant reported emotion is not fear,
the nature of traumatic events makes it likely that fear will still be a strongly felt
emotion at the time of the trauma and this would be sufficient for differential
activation of memory systems. Unfortunately, this does not appear consistent with
the clinical vignettes advanced by Dalgleish et al. (submitted). Another possible way
to get around the problem is to argue that the intense arousal required to trigger these
differential memory systems can be generated by other emotions than fear. While
this appears plausible, it should be noted that Brewin and Holmes (2003) state clearly
that SAMs normally only contain the primary emotion of fear and that secondary
emotions such as anger, guilt or disgust are normally encoded within VAMs because
they depend on subsequent appraisal of the traumatic event.
Fourthly, some empirical evidence inconsistent with the proposals of dual
representation theory should be noted. Brewin (2001; Brewin et al. 1996) suggests
that recovery from flashbacks is not caused by reorganisation and integration of new
material into existing memories (as claimed by e.g. Foa & Rothbaum, 1998) but by
the creation of new memories that then inhibit existing SAMs. Brewin uses findings
from animal fear conditioning experiments to support his contention that existing
emotional memories cannot be altered (e.g. LeDoux, Romanski & Xagoraris, 1989).
However, more recent evidence from animal conditioning studies suggests that this is
not the case (Morrison, Allardyce & McKane, 2002).
Introduction Page 35 of 114
SPAARS evidence? An empirical investigation into SPAARS applied to PTSD
Brewin (2001) suggests that upsetting secondary appraisals related to the trauma
such as shame or anger will prevent individuals from being able to encode VAM
representations that will inhibit SAM-based flashbacks. Therefore, he argues that
cognitive therapy techniques would be required for these individuals to reduce the
aversiveness of these appraisals before exposure therapy could be used to treat their
flashbacks successfully. However, van Minnen et al. (2002) reported that
pre-treatment anger, guilt and shame were not related to either treatment outcome or
treatment drop out in prolonged exposure therapy.
Finally, dual representation theory is also limited in its treatment of the role of social
support in PTSD. This is a clear problem given the importance of social support as
an outcome factor already noted above (rather ironically a central finding of the
meta-analysis by Brewin et ah, 2000), although in fairness dual representation theory
is not alone in paying limited attention to social support.
Integrative psychosocial model
The Joseph, Williams and Yule (1995) psychosocial model of PTSD is integrative,
including elements of other models such as Horowitz's (1976, 1986, 1997) and
Janoff-Bulman's (1989, 1992) schematic representations. These have already been
discussed, and other elements of Joseph et al's (1995) model such as appraisals about
the event will be considered under the cognitive model discussed below. Attention
in this section will therefore be focused on the distinct features of Joseph et al's
(1995) model, namely the role of social support in the development and maintenance
of PTSD.
Joseph et al. (1995) suggest that social support provides an opportunity for
individuals to process the trauma emotionally, drawing on Foa and Kozak's (1986)
concept of trauma representations being stored in a fear network. They suggest that
effective "crisis support" depends on the availability of people who are able to listen
in an accepting way and provide both emotional and practical support. They cite
evidence from both correlational (Joseph, Andrews, Williams & Yule, 1992) and
longitudinal (Joseph, Yule, Williams & Andrews, 1993; Joseph, Dalgleish, Thrasher
& Yule, 1995) studies. These studies suggested that receiving crisis support results
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in reduced avoidance symptoms and can also reduce intrusions, and co-morbid
depression and anxiety symptoms.
Joseph et al. (1995) note that characteristics of the trauma may affect an individual's
ability to access social support. For example, they suggest that an individual's
appraisals of the event and the resulting emotions, such as guilt or depression, may
cause him/her to withdraw from social contact. They also argue that societal
attitudes to the trauma need to be considered, suggesting that unpopular wars such as
Vietnam may lead to greater levels of PTSD because veterans are more likely to feel
rejected and unsupported (see also Summerfield, 1993).
Evaluation of the integrative psychosocial model
Since meta-analyses of PTSD outcomes have suggested that social support is a very
important factor (Brewin et al., 2000; Ozer et al., 2003), the rather limited nature of
knowledge in this field is disappointing. There is a methodological problem with
many studies, including those drawn upon by Joseph et al. (1995). This is that
measures of social support are taken after the traumatic event. Even in longitudinal
designs, the initial measure is usually taken some time after the event (e.g. Joseph et
al., 1993). Therefore it is possible that other factors related to the trauma, such as
feelings of shame or depression, were affecting individuals' perceptions of the social
support that was available for them or their ability to utilise this. This would inflate
the importance of social support and neglect the importance of moderating variables.
A second problem is that the work on social support appears conceptually limited
compared to that in other fields such as depression (e.g. Brown & Harris, 1986).
Joseph (1999) notes that social support is a multifactorial construct and that different
researchers have operationalised it in different ways. He suggests that important
factors to be considered include perceived versus actual support and the nature of the
support itself, which can be, for example, practical or emotional. Joseph (1999)
argues that cognitive support may be one of the most important factors in social
support for trauma by helping individuals to process their experiences. However,
empirical work to support Joseph's proposals has not been completed.
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In summary, while there appears to be an important role for social support within
trauma, the limited conceptual development of this area prevents strong conclusions
being drawn at present. This is disappointing, particularly in comparison with work
on social support in other areas ofmental health.
Cognitive model
Ehlers and Clark (2000) recently proposed a detailed cognitive model of PTSD. One
of the challenges for cognitive models of PTSD is to explain why memories of past
events can trigger such intense feelings of fear when they are later recalled in a safe
environment. This is a particular challenge for cognitive theories because as outlined
by Beck (1967, 1976), in cognitive theory the emotion that an individual experiences
depends on the appraisal that the individual makes of a situation. According to Beck
(1976), anxiety is triggered by appraisals that a situation is currently threatening to
an individual. However, in PTSD, the danger directly associated with the traumatic
event is clearly in the individual's past.
Ehlers and Clark (2000) therefore suggest that individuals with PTSD process their
traumatic event in particular ways that maintain beliefs that they continue to be at
serious risk of harm. Some of these processes include negative appraisals that are
familiar from cognitive theories applied to other disorders, such as depression. For
example, they may overgeneralise from their experience of trauma, believing that if
the event could happen to them in a place that they thought was safe, then it could
happen anywhere. However, Ehlers and Clark (2000) go beyond these familiar
processes, suggesting that the nature of traumatic events leads to the formation of
unusual memory processes that serve to maintain the sense of current threat.
Firstly, Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest that memories of traumatic events are poorly
integrated into autobiographical memory and lack associated semantic cues, for
example, the time and place in which the event occurred. This leads to features of
memory commonly observed in individuals with PTSD. These include difficulty in
intentionally recalling traumatic memories; the vivid sense that the event is actually
happening again while the individual remembers it; and the difficulty in integrating
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memories of the traumatic event with subsequent information, including the
knowledge that the individual is no longer threatened with danger.
Secondly, Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that traumatic memories have unusually
strong associations. This helps to account for the high probability of triggering
traumatic memories by stimuli similar to those present in the index event. Ehlers and
Clark (2000) appear to conceptualise this associative memory in a similar way to
SAM within Brewin et al's (1996) dual representation theory (see above). Thus,
these associations are not subject to conscious control and an individual can therefore
re-experience the trauma and related emotions without being able to understand what
triggered this. Triggering of fear would serve to maintain a current sense of danger.
Thirdly, individuals who experience trauma become perceptually primed to
recognise stimuli that occurred at or around the time of the trauma. This increases
the likelihood of the associative memories discussed above being triggered. Ehlers
and Clark (2000) suggest that because the relatively indiscriminate implicit memory
system is involved in this perceptual priming, triggers for re-experiencing may be
only broadly similar to the original stimuli.
Fourthly, Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest that memories and appraisals of the
traumatic event share a reciprocal relationship. Appraisals bias retrieval, making it
more likely that individuals will remember events that are consistent with their
appraisals. This in turns prevents individuals from accessing information that could
help them to reject unhelpful appraisals. On the other hand, the disorganised nature
of traumatic memory can lead to unhelpful appraisals, for example individuals might
believe that they must have suffered brain damage during the trauma.
Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest that peri-traumatic cognitive processing has an
effect on subsequent appraisals and memories. Their concept of "mental defeat"
reflects "the perceived loss of all psychological autonomy, accompanied by the sense
of not being human any longer" (p. 331). They suggest that this is likely to lead to
very negative appraisals of the trauma and self. Ehlers and Clark (2000) also
propose that individuals who describe very unclear memories of the trauma are
reflecting disorganised processing at the time of the trauma. They suggest that this is
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due to 'data-driven' rather than 'conceptual' processing and leads to primarily
sensory information being encoded, without conceptual organising information. This
leads to the effects on memory described above. Ehlers and Clark (2000) further
note that peri-traumatic dissociation may play a role in memory disorganisation;
however, they do not develop this within their theory.
Additionally, Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest that in PTSD, individuals may employ
maladaptive behaviour strategies. These are intended by the individual to help them
control the aversive symptoms of PTSD but in practice they maintain them by either
generating further symptoms or by preventing change in appraisals or traumatic
memories. Many of these are familiar from other applications of cognitive therapy
such as for anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g. Salkovskis, 1996).
Examples include thought suppression, when attempts to prevent unwanted thoughts
actually lead to them occurring more frequently, and avoidance.
Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest a range of cognitive-behavioural techniques for
treating PTSD. These include psychoeducation, and imaginal exposure to the event
with cognitive restructuring of the associated appraisals. Ehlers and Clark (2000)
advocate a more focused approach to imaginal exposure, concentrating on "hot
spots" associated with intense emotional distress. Behavioural techniques also have
a prominent place within Ehlers and Clark's model (2000). They suggest that in vivo
exposure can both correct negative appraisals, for example of continued danger, and
help individuals to realise that the event happened in the past. They also advocate a
form of activity scheduling, in which individuals are encouraged to return to
activities that they enjoyed before the trauma. This has interesting parallels with
Herman's (1992) view that an essential stage in recovery from trauma is one of
reconnection with the world, although the timing differs between these models.
Herman (1992) saw reconnection as the final stage of the recovery process, while
Ehlers and Clark (2000) advocate activity scheduling as an early intervention.
Evaluation of cognitive model
The main theoretical contribution of Ehlers and Clark's (2000) model is in extending
our knowledge of the role of individual appraisals and behaviours in the development
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and maintenance of PTSD. There is empirical support for associations between
PTSD symptomatology and a number of factors that are consistent with their model.
For example, these include negative appraisals of the trauma (e.g. Dunmore, Clark &
Ehlers, 1997; Dunmore et al., 1999), of early PTSD symptoms (e.g. Dunmore et al.,
1997, 1999; Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999); and of the reactions of others (e.g. Dunmore
et al., 1997, 1999). Behaviours such as avoidance (e.g. Dunmore et al., 1999) and
thought suppression (e.g. Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999) have also been associated with
increased PTSD symptomatology. However, as Brewin & Holmes (2003) note, these
studies are based on following up individuals who have experienced trauma.
Therefore, there is always the possibility that something about the trauma, such as its
intensity, is what is actually affecting both symptomatology and appraisals and
behaviours. Stronger evidence is provided by studies such as Dunmore et al. (2001),
which control for initial symptom severity. Dunmore et al. (2001) found that the
predicted associations with PTSD symptomatology held for mental defeat, negative
appraisal of early PTSD symptoms, and avoidance and other safety behaviours.
However, even these studies are not truly controlled, in that all the participants have
experienced a traumatic event, although it is difficult to imagine a feasible alternative
research design.
Empirically, Ehlers and Clark's (2000) model has been shown to provide a basis for
effective treatment (Gillespie et al., 2002). From the point of view of treatment, an
advantage of the model is that it is able to draw on a wide range of
cognitive-behavioural techniques already used to treat other disorders. The existence
of cognitive-behavioural therapy packages for commonly co-morbid problems such
as depression, which could be easily integrated with treatment for PTSD, is another
advantage. However, as discussed above, the assertion that imaginal exposure with
cognitive restructuring should be more efficacious than prolonged exposure without
restructuring, in cases where there are complex emotions associated with negative
self-perceptions, has not been empirically supported (e.g. van Minnen et al. 2002).
While the model is able to provide a useful explanatory framework for maintenance
of PTSD symptoms and treatment strategies, some of its underlying conceptual basis
appears a little weak. Firstly, the suggestion that data-driven processing at the time
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of trauma leads to the memory distortions and subsequent negative appraisals
associated with PTSD has received limited empirical support in analogue laboratory
experiments (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). This is arguably the only unique proposal of
the model regarding traumatic memory, with the other propositions drawing
(explicitly) on other theories such as dual representation theory (Brewin et ah, 1996)
and emotional processing (e.g. Foa et al. 1989). A second criticism is that to account
for the particular features of PTSD, Ehlers and Clark's (2000) model has to introduce
a number of concepts related to memory that are unique within cognitive therapy. It
may be felt that this limits its theoretical integrity. In their defence, cognitive
therapy contains a number of models that are specific to individual disorders (e.g.
obsessive-compulsive disorder, Salkovskis, 1996). However, this reduces the
potentially integrative power of cognitive therapy in understanding the range of
psychological problems, making it essentially heuristic rather than truly explanatory.
Thirdly, despite its theoretical contortions, Ehlers and Clark (2000) willingly
acknowledge that their theory cannot readily account for important aspects of PTSD,
such as the efficacy of exposure therapy or the source of dissociation. Fourthly, the
frequent criticism that the model neglects the importance of social support can again
be levelled, however, Ehlers and Clark (2000) do explicitly note the importance of
appraisals about the reactions of others as a maintaining factor in PTSD. Finally,
Dalgleish (submitted) also identifies two technical problems with their theory. The
first is that the memory representations proposed by Ehlers and Clark (2000) are not
detailed enough in their structure. Dual representation theory (Brewin et al., 1996)
has the "cognitive architecture" necessary to be able to explain why, in different
circumstances, individuals can talk about the same events and display very different
types and intensities of emotions (often referred to as "hot" versus "cold"
cognitions). However, this architecture is not specified within Ehlers and Clark's
(2000) model. Dalgleish's (submitted) second point is that there is no
acknowledgement of schematic levels of representation within the model. This
would be required for information about the self and world to be stored, in line with
the work of, for example, Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992). Dalgleish (submitted) points
out that without this level of representation, many of the appraisals identified by
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Ehlers and Clark (2000) would not make sense. For example, an appraisal that an
individual is less competent than he/she believed requires the existence of a
pre-trauma belief that he/she was (at least reasonably) competent.
The SPAARS model
Dalgleish (1999, submitted) applied the SPAARS (Schematic, Propositional,
Associative and Analogical Representational Systems) model (Power & Dalgleish,
1997, 1999; Power, 1997, 1999) to PTSD. SPAARS is a multi- level model,
specifically intended to address both normal and abnormal emotional functioning. It
aims to integrate previous theories of emotion using broadly based principles from
cognitive science.
SPAARS has a functional emphasis, with emotions being seen as essential
components in organising responses to internal or external events that threaten the
achievement of valued goals (cf. Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Thus emotional
states are motivational and are conceptualised as triggering the activation of an
associated module within the cognitive system. This module incorporates a range of
(normally) adaptive actions for dealing with problems. So for example, if the fear
module is triggered then the autonomic reactions associated with fight or flight
would activate and the attentional threshold for threat stimuli would be lowered.
There are four different levels of information representation within SPAARS
(Schematic, Propositional, Associative and Analogical). All incoming information is
initially processed by the Analogical system. This system processes and stores
perceptual information for the various sensory modalities (e.g. visual, auditory,
kinaesthetic). Information from the Analogical system can then pass to one or more
of the other systems. The Associative system may be seen as a form of network of
associations and influences, which operate under automatic rather than controlled
processing. These influences include fundamental innate emotions (sadness,
happiness, fear, anger and disgust, in line with e.g. Ekman 1992); biological
influences; learned associations; and appraisals that were initially conscious or
preconscious but became automatic due to continued repetition. The Associative
system also performs the role of the unconscious within SPAARS.
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The Propositional system contains information in verbal form including beliefs and
semantic information. The highest level of representation in SPAARS is the
Schematic level. This contains abstracted synthesised information. It can contain
information from the other levels of representation within SPAARS, but it is more
than just the sum of its parts. It is therefore not possible to express Schematic level
representations in verbal form, although they may contain Propositional level beliefs
that can be expressed verbally. For example, Schematic level representations will
hold information about the self and the world that go beyond what an individual
could articulate.
Within SPAARS, two ways that emotions can be generated have been identified.
The first route is through the Associative system. This is an automatic, uncontrolled
process, which may leave an individual unable to account for why he/she is suddenly
feeling a particular emotion. Dalgleish (submitted) suggests that in applying
SPAARS to PTSD, the Associative system may be seen as equivalent to Foa's
concept of the fear network (e.g. Foa et ah, 1989). Therefore, this would account for
an individual experiencing emotions felt at the time of his/her trauma when faced
with stimuli similar to those present during the trauma. The second route involves
the Schematic level and is a controlled, appraisal-based process. Emotions are
generated based on an individual's appraisal of the possible impact of events on
his/her current goals. So, for example, if an individual believes that his/her current
goals will be threatened by events, he/she would feel fear. Applying this concept to
PTSD, Dalgleish (submitted) suggested that a traumatic event would normally lead
to fear, due to appraisal of the event as highly threatening to a range of possible goals
including basic survival. The Schematic level would also contain representations
consistent with the theories of Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992), for example beliefs
relating to the world being inherently safe. These representations would then
influence appraisals of traumatic events.
The multiple levels of representation and two routes to emotion within SPAARS lead
to a number of possible causes of emotional dysfunction. Power and Dalgleish
(1997, 1999) suggest that two emotions that are consistently experienced in response
to particular stimuli can become 'coupled' in a way that one emotion continually
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triggers the other and vice versa. For example, they suggest that grief and anger may
become coupled and trap an individual in a prolonged grief reaction. Another
possibility is for the same emotion to be triggered at different levels of
representation, creating a 'positive feedback loop' that maintains an emotion. For
example, Power (1999) suggests that in depression Associative-level representations
may activate related Propositional-level thoughts (similar to negative automatic
thoughts in cognitive theory; e.g. Beck, 1976), which can then trigger
Schematic-level representations. This concept has parallels with the notion of
'interlock' in Teasdale and Barnard's (1993) Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS)
theory.
Dalgleish (1999, submitted) proposes ways in which SPAARS can account for the
specific symptomatology of PTSD. He suggests that re-experiencing occurs because
memories of traumatic events cannot be easily integrated into an individual's
pre-trauma Schematic-level representations of themselves, others and the world.
These incompatible memories may be appraised as being a threat to the individual's
Schematic-level representations and hence his/her sense of a coherent self, triggering
the fear module. This leads to continued attempts to process the incompatible
information in order to reduce the appraisal of threat to the individual's sense of self.
These attempts to process the memories are also likely to lead to further activation of
the fear module by the triggering of representations of the fear that the individual felt
at the time of the trauma. This can cause the individual to feel that he/she is
constantly in danger. Dalgleish (1999, submitted) adds that repeated activation of
the fear module will lead to greater re-experiencing, by causing consistent attentional
biases for threat-related information that will in turn trigger further representations of
the trauma. He suggests that the incompatibility of the traumatic memories with
other information means that they remain highly cohesive and do not assimilate with
other memories. As a result, triggering any part of the traumatic memory is likely to
lead to re-experiencing the whole event, with a sense that it is happening in the
present. This accounts for flashbacks. Dalgleish (1999, submitted) further proposes
that chronic re-experiencing will lead to the development of Associative-level links
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between stimuli related to re-experiencing and feelings of fear, maintaining the
individual in an almost constant state of fear.
Dalgleish (1999, submitted) sees the other central symptom clusters within PTSD as
being mainly a consequence of the re-experiencing processes described above. He
proposes that avoidance is a way for an individual to protect him/herself from
continued re-experiencing. Hyperarousal is seen as a consequence of
re-experiencing causing continued activation of the fear module. Irritability and
anger may result from reduced executive processing resources for complex
appraisals of responsibility, because of the ongoing demands for processing
resources made by re-experiencing.
Postulating different Schematic-level representations enables SPAARS to describe a
number of possible reactions to trauma. This gives it an advantage in clinical
practice over theories such as Janoff-Bulman's (1989, 1992), in which it is less easy
to reflect individual differences. Dalgleish (submitted) outlines five possible
'scenarios'. For example, he suggests that there may be two different groups of
individuals who hold overly rigid beliefs that the world is safe. One group may have
developed this belief through experiencing unusually safe lives in which their goals
were normally achieved. They are therefore likely to find traumatic events
particularly hard to assimilate and will have an increased risk of chronic PTSD. The
second group is seen as having experienced normal lives, with failure to achieve at
least some goals, however, these individuals have protected their Schematic-level
representations by systematically inhibiting negative experiences that would
challenge them. These individuals may not experience acute PTSD (although they
may well have avoidance symptoms such as emotional numbing), but they would be
vulnerable to delayed-onset PTSD if, for example, later negative life events became
overwhelming.
Like dual representation theory (described above), SPAARS does not generate novel
treatments, but does have a number of implications for existing treatments for PTSD
(Dalgleish, submitted). For example, it suggests that the two routes to emotion
generation need to be considered throughout therapy. Fear associated with trauma
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would normally be generated through both the Schematic- and the Associative-level
routes. Cognitive therapy is seen as working at the Propositional-level, which may
then influence the Schematic-level route. However, if incompatible
Associative-level emotions continue to be triggered, cognitive therapy may only
work for an individual at an intellectual level, disconnected from his/her emotional
experience. Another example is that if an individual has an overly negative
pre-trauma representation of the world, he/she may find the discrepancy between this
and the supposedly safe therapy environment too stressful to enable successful
exposure work to be performed.
Evaluation of the SPAARS model
As with other multi-level models of emotional functioning, SPAARS has a number
of advantages over single-level models (Teasdale, 1999). For example, it is able to
explain why thinking or talking about the same emotional events can lead to 'hot' or
'cold' cognitions in a way that single-level models cannot, because emotional
reactions are dependent upon activation of particular levels of representation. It is
also consistent with theorising in other areas of cognitive psychology, giving it
greater potential for integration with this area. By incorporating both appraisal-based
processes in the Schematic-level route to emotion and more basic processes in the
Associative-level route, SPAARS gains all the advantages of appraisal theories of
emotion, while avoiding their main limitation: that they only account for a subset of
emotional events. Roseman and Smith (2001) outline the strengths of appraisal
theories, which include their ability to explain, for example, why different people
feel differently in response to the same event; how emotions can be irrational; and
how the emotions felt towards particular events can change over time or due to the
discovery of new information.
Turning to PTSD specifically, SPAARS is able to account for the core
symptomatology. It can incorporate many of the strengths of models previously
discussed, such as the appraisal processes of the cognitive model. As a multi-level
model, SPAARS can also provide an alternative account for Brewin et al's (1996)
dual representation theory and the empirical evidence cited in support of it.
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SPAARS provides a more detailed description of Schematic-level processes than
other models. It can account for the success of both exposure and cognitive
treatments for PTSD, which would be seen as targeting primarily the Associative and
Propositional levels respectively. However, SPAARS also has the advantage of
being able to note the implications of processes occurring at different levels. For
example, successful exposure therapy would reduce fear representations at the
Associative level and lead to changes at the Schematic level, such as representations
of ability to control fear and behave effectively. Dalgleish (1999, submitted) makes
specific proposals regarding treatment for PTSD based on the principles underlying
SPAARS. Finally, as a general model of emotional dysfunction, SPAARS can
provide an integrative perspective on the co-morbidity associated with PTSD.
However, SPAARS does have limitations. Although it is able to account for much of
the existing empirical evidence, being a general, integrative and high-level model it
has not generated many empirically testable hypotheses that would provide clear
support for its proposals. In part, this may reflect general methodological difficulties
with multi-level models (Teasdale, 1999). SPAARS also shares the common
problem with most of the other models discussed of providing only a limited account
for the role of social support.
Summary and outline of research proposals
In this Introduction, the main clinical features of PTSD have been discussed and a
selective review of psychological models of PTSD has been performed. The review
has shown that, while individual models have particular strengths, none is sufficient
to account for all of the characteristic features of PTSD.
In this thesis, the application of the SPAARS model to PTSD (Dalgleish 1999,
submitted) will be empirically investigated. SPAARS provides a strong and
integrative conceptual framework for investigating PTSD. However, although it can
plausibly account for existing findings, there is a lack of empirical evidence that
would specifically support SPAARS over other models of PTSD.
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As noted above, Teasdale (1999) has cast doubt on the possibility of empirically
differentiating between multi-level models of emotion such as SPAARS and ICS
(Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Even if this could be done, it is beyond the scope of
this thesis. Instead, therefore, attention will be focused on particular aspects of the
model that can be subjected to empirical investigation. While each of these aspects
on their own may only provide inconclusive evidence for or against SPAARS, the
overall pattern of findings may make a stronger case. It is proposed that if the results
suggest that this overall pattern of findings can add to our understanding of PTSD,
then this will strengthen the case for the application of the SPAARS model in this
area.
The first aspect of SPAARS that will be investigated concerns Schematic-level
representations, one of the two routes to emotion within SPAARS. The questions
that will be asked are whether individuals who have experienced a traumatic event
report Schematic-level representations and can they be associated with particular
emotions or symptoms?
The second main area of investigation within this thesis will focus on the emotions
experienced by participants. One of the potential strengths of SPAARS is that it is
better able than other models to account for a range of emotional responses to PTSD.
This would include individuals for whom the dominant emotion was not fear.
Dalgleish et al. (submitted) argue that other strongly experienced aversive emotions
such as anger or disgust may lead to re-experiencing, and the association between
emotions and symptoms will be explored in this thesis.
In SPAARS, 'coupled' emotions are seen as a potent cause of emotional dysfunction
(see the section on the SPAARS model above). Individuals who report a greater
number of aversive emotions might therefore also be expected to report greater levels
of dysfunction (including more chronic dysfunction) and this hypothesis will be
explored.
Findings of a greater range of emotions associated with increased dysfunction might
also provide some tentative evidence to distinguish between SPAARS and ICS. In
ICS, emphasis is placed on emotional 'interlock' leading to persistent dysfunction.
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An example of this would be physiological sensations associated with depression
(such as crying) leading to an increased availability of depressive thoughts (such as
"I'm such a failure") and the emotion of sadness. Therefore, ICS would appear to
predict that the greatest dysfunction would be evident in individuals with a narrow
range of intense, aversive emotions. Evidence for this proposition will be
investigated.
Finally, to tie together two levels of representation within SPAARS, the model
predicts that consistent links between Schematic-level representations and emotions
should be identified and this will be investigated.
In conclusion, then, the specific hypotheses that will be investigated in this thesis are
as follows.
1. Schematic-level representations will be associated with symptomatology in a
sample of individuals who have experienced traumatic events.
2. A range of intense aversive emotions will be associated with
symptomatology.
3. Coupled emotions will be associated with symptomatology and dominant
emotions other than fear will be identified in participants experiencing
symptoms of PTSD.
4. Schematic-level representations will be significantly associated with
measures of emotion.
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Method
Design
A prospective design was adopted. Participants were assessed up to three times
following consecutive therapy appointments.
Participants
The participants were an opportunistic sample of 12 individuals receiving
psychotherapy at a specialist centre for PTSD. Although this was an opportunistic
sample, efforts were made to obtain a reasonably representative mix of patients
normally seen at this centre. The sample comprised six males and six females. Six
of the individuals had experienced a single traumatic event, while the other six had
experienced repeated or multiple events. A range of traumatic events was
represented in the sample. These included assaults; road traffic accidents; other
serious accident; childhood sexual abuse; suicide of friends or partners; and combat.
Three individuals experienced traumatic events in their childhoods.
The mean time since the index traumatic event at initial research assessment was 112
months (s.d.=107). However, this figure was inflated somewhat by the individuals
who experienced childhood trauma. Excluding these individuals, the mean time was
84 months (s.d. =25). The mean age of the sample was 35.7 years (s.d.=8.0).
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) was the treatment of choice for 10 of the
participants. This would normally include an exposure component, but the extent of
this was not formally assessed. Three of these 10 individuals also attended a
supportive group programme, which had a problem-solving and generally
non-directive focus. One of this three also attended art therapy. The remaining two
participants received Interpersonal Therapy (IPT, e.g. Klerman, Weissman,
Rounsaville & Chevron, 1984). The mean time in therapy at initial research
assessment was 10.3 months (s.d. 8.9). The author was the therapist for three of the
participants.
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One participant dropped out after completing two sessions. Two of the participants




Participants were interviewed in each session. They were asked initially to talk
generally about how they felt they had been affected by the traumatic event. They
were then asked how they currently felt the traumatic event had affected their views
of themselves, other people, and the world. Further prompt questions were asked if
necessary. The interviews were recorded on audiotape and the researcher took notes
during the interview. These notes, supplemented by audiotape if necessary, were
then used to identify schemata that corresponded with those identified by Power and
Brewin (1997) and Janoff-Bulman (1989; 1992). These schemata are shown in
Table 1.
Table 1: Schematic Themes
Schemata Description
1. The Self as Powerless Feeling powerless to achieve life goals; unable to
influence aversive events; lacking control.
2. The Self as Non-existent Feeling overwhelmed by stronger personalities; lack
or loss of self-identity.
3. The Self as Futureless Feeling valued goals have been lost;
purposelessness; sense that the world is chaotic
and meaningless.
4. The Other as
Abandoning
Feelings of being rejected by a valued other with
associated feelings of loss.
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Schemata Description
5. The Other as Betraying Feelings of having been badly treated by a trusted
other.
6. The Other as Hostile Feeling threatened by others.
7. The World is Benevolent Feeling that more good things than bad will happen
and that people are inherently good.
8. The World is Meaningful Feeling that the world operates in understandable
and predictable ways, for example that good things
will happen to good people.
9. The Self is Worthy Feeling that the self is competent and moral.
Schemata 1 to 6 are proposed in Power and Brewin (1997) as a "taxonomy of
themes" commonly encountered in psychotherapy. Schemata 7 to 9 are advanced by
Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992) as "fundamental assumptions" commonly destroyed by
the experience of traumatic events. It should be noted that Power and Brewin (1997)
also proposed a theme of "The Self as Inferior". This was not included in the current
research project because it was felt to overlap closely with the fundamental
assumption "The Self is Worthy". The rationale for classifying schemata identified
at interview into broad themes was twofold. Firstly, it was hoped that this would
reduce subjectivity in interpretation and therefore increase reliability. Secondly, the
focus of the current study was to investigate general trends within a sample of
individuals with PTSD, rather than the detail of each individual. The use of broad
themes facilitated group level analysis. Inevitably, however, this led to a loss of
individual detail. This issue is developed in the Discussion.
Attempts were not made to assess the relative intensity of particular schemata
identified from the interviews because it was felt that this would be too subjective
and unreliable. If a schema was identified, it was simply determined whether the
content related to it was overall positive or negative in tone. More detailed
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information on the process of schemata classification can be found in the Procedure
section.
As the interview was specifically developed for this study, no pre-hoc information on
reliability or validity was available. An inter-rater reliability analysis was performed
(see Results section).
Clinician Administered PTSD Scale
The Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake, Weathers, Nagy, Kaloupek,
Gusman, Charney & Keane, 1990) is a structured interview that can be used both to
diagnose PTSD and to assess symptom severity. Separate scores can be calculated
for the central PTSD symptom clusters of re-experiencing, avoidance, and
hyperarousal, together with a total score that also takes account of the impact of
PTSD symptoms on an individual's functioning.
The CAPS has been demonstrated to be a reliable and valid measure that is sensitive
to clinical change (Weathers, Keane & Davidson, 2001). Weathers et al. (2001) note
that the CAPS has been used as the main diagnostic or outcome measure in over 200
studies. It was validated on a group of combat veterans, demonstrating convergent
validity with other measures of PTSD, high internal consistency, and excellent
inter-rater reliability (Blake et al., 1990). It has subsequently been demonstrated to
be valid and reliable in a range of populations, for example those who have
experienced road traffic and other accidents, sexual and physical assault, and
traumatic loss of a significant other (Weathers et al., 2001). Summarising a large
number of investigations, Weathers et al. (2001) note that inter-rater reliability has
been consistently reported at levels of 0.90 and above. Internal consistency was
typically between 0.80 and 0.90. Convergent validity has been shown, with typical
correlations of 0.70 or better between the CAPS and other measures of PTSD.
However, there is less evidence for discriminant validity. Weathers et al. (2001) note
that the high levels of co-morbidity associated with PTSD may interfere with
accurate assessments of discriminant validity, but suggest that this needs further
research.
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The CAPS was administered in the first and final sessions.
Impact of Event Scale - Revised
The Impact of Event Scale - Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997) is a 22-item
self-report instrument designed to measure the central PTSD symptom clusters of
re-experiencing (referred to as Intrusion), avoidance, and hyperarousal.
The IES-R was based on the earlier Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horowitz, Wilner &
Alvarez, 1979). The IES is a 15-item self-report instrument designed to measure
intrusion and avoidance. Initial findings from a sample of outpatients with "stress
syndromes" suggested that the measure was internally consistent and had acceptable
test-retest reliability (correlation coefficients were 0.87 for intrusion and 0.79 for
avoidance). Weiss and Marmar (1997) summarise subsequent psychometric
investigations of the IES, which have confirmed test-retest reliability and internal
consistency. They also note that the IES has been used with individuals who have
experienced a wide range of traumatic events, including civilian accidents, criminal
and sexual assaults and combat.
In the IES-R, the Intrusion and Avoidance subscales are virtually unchanged from
the IES (Weiss & Marmar, 1997). One additional item is added to the intrusion
subscale to assess re-experiencing accompanied by dissociation. The most
significant change from the IES is the inclusion of six new items to measure
hyperarousal. Weiss and Marmar (1997) report the findings of psychometric
evaluation of the IES-R, from a population of emergency services personnel. The
IES-R demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (alpha for Intrusion = 0.87, for
Avoidance = 0.85 and for Hyperarousal = 0.79) in a sample of 429 individuals.
Test-retest reliability varied depending on the time since the traumatic event and the
time between test and retest, but was found to be around 0.90 for all subscales in a
sample of individuals tested 6 weeks after trauma and then again 6 months later.
The IES-R was administered in each session.
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Dissociation Questionnaire
The Dissociation Questionnaire (DIS-Q; Vanderlinden, 1993) is a 63-item self-report
measure. It was included to provide a measure of dissociation, which has often been
noted as a clinical feature of PTSD (e.g. Brewin et ah, 1996; Horowitz, 1997; Ehlers
& Clark, 2000).
Vanderlinden (1993) reported that the DIS-Q showed acceptable test-retest reliability
and was able to differentiate patients with dissociative disorder from other
psychiatric patients, and psychiatric patients from normal controls. Vanderlinden
(1993) suggested that the DIS-Q measured 4 factors: identity confusion and
fragmentation; loss of control over behaviour, thought, and emotion; amnesia; and
episodes of "absorption" (enhanced concentration). However, the internal
consistency of the four subscales originally identified was variable. Bernstein,
Ellason, Ross and Vanderlinden (2001) reviewed factor analytic studies of the
DIS-Q. They argued that the differing frequency of occurrence of the symptoms
assessed by the DIS-Q resulted in range restriction and the false impression of
multidimensionality in factor analyses. They therefore suggested deriving a unitary
measure of dissociation based on the total score of the DIS-Q was more valid. This
recommendation was adopted in the current study, and the mean of all 63 items was
used to produce a single measure of dissociation.
The DIS-Q was administered in each session.
Basic Emotions Scale
The Basic Emotions Scale (BES; Power, submitted) is a 20-item self-report measure
that provides scores for the emotions of anger, sadness, disgust, fear and happiness.
Power (submitted) reported psychometric properties of the BES, based on a primarily
student sample of 219 participants. Acceptable internal reliability was found for all
of the subscales (Cronbach alpha ranged from 0.790 to 0.842). Test-retest reliability
was not assessed.
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The intention in developing the BES was to test the ability of an approach predicated
on basic emotions to model self-reported emotion (Power, submitted). This approach
draws on the SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 1999) to suggest that
complex emotions arise from coupling, i.e. combinations of basic emotions.
Confirmatory factor analyses suggested that the model that best fitted the data
included the five basic emotions and enabled them to be inter-correlated with each
other. This supported the proposal that self-reported emotional experience could best
be understood in terms of basic emotions that combine to create more complex
emotions. However, Power (submitted) notes the possibility that delayed recall of
complex emotions may tend to falsely combine emotions that occurred sequentially,
making them seem as if they are coupled.
In summary, while the psychometric properties of the BES need further investigation
to establish it as a standardised measure, it was the only available instrument that
shared the same conceptual basis as the SPAARS model. It therefore seemed the
most appropriate measure to use in this study.
The BES was administered in every session.
Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation
The Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation (CORE; CORE system group, 1998) is
a 34-item self-report measure. Mean scores can be calculated for four subscales:
Well-being, Problems, Functioning and Risk. Two further subscales provide
summary mean scores. These are Total score and Total (Excluding Risk).
The CORE was developed as a standardised measure of mental health outcomes,
designed to be administered at the start and end of treatment, though it can also be
used to measure interim change (Evans, Connell, Barkham, Margison, McGrath,
Mellor-Clark, & Audin, 2002). Evans et al. (2002) report psychometric evaluations
of the CORE. These suggest excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha 0.75
to 0.95 across the subscales). Test-retest reliability was slightly low for the Risk
subscale (0.64) but excellent for the other subscales (0.87 to 0.91). The CORE
discriminated between clinical and non-clinical samples and demonstrated
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convergent validity with a range of psychometric measures. It also appeared
sensitive to clinically significant change.
As a standardised measure of clinical outcomes the CORE was included partly to
measure change over the course of the study. The other reason for using the CORE
was that it covers a wide range of psychological and other symptoms, whereas the
other symptom measures were focused on PTSD.
The CORE was administered in the first and final sessions.
Significant Others Scale
The Significant Others Scale (SOS; Power, Champion & Aris, 1988) provides a
self-report measure of perceived emotional and practical social support. Power et al.
(1988) argue that in order to assess the quality of social support it is not necessary to
evaluate every individual in a support network. Instead, accurate assessments can be
obtained by evaluating the quality of an individual's key relationships. The version
that was used in the current study enabled participants to nominate up to three
individuals.
A number of variables can be calculated from the SOS. The current study focused
on the two summary variables of discrepancy between actual and ideal emotional
support, and discrepancy between actual and ideal practical support. Power et al.
(1988) found significant differences in these variables between individuals identified
as depressed on the self-report GHQ-28 measure (Goldberg & Hillier, 1979),
individuals with other significant symptoms on the GHQ-28, and symptom-free
individuals. Power (1988) found that the initial measure of discrepancy in emotional
support interacted with subsequent life events in predicting depression 6 months
later. Acceptable test-retest correlations have been reported for the SOS (Power et
al., 1988).
The SOS was administered in the first and final sessions.
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Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders - Clinician Version
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders - Clinician Version
(SCID-CV; First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 1997) is an extensive structured
interview designed to diagnose the presence of psychiatric disorders identified within
DSM-IV. It was included to assess co-morbidity.
First et al. (1997) summarise findings related to the psychometric properties of the
SCID-CV. Some studies of inter-rater reliability have reported excellent levels of
agreement, with kappa coefficients between 0.70 and 1.00 in designs where all raters
had access to the same information (for example, videotaped interviews). In a study
using the DSM-III-R version of the SCID-CV (Williams, Gibbon, First et al., 1992)
lower kappa coefficients were found when interviewers were unable to draw on
supporting information from talking to therapists or reviewing patients' notes, but
inter-rater reliability was still comparable to other diagnostic instruments. First et al.
(1997) note that the validity of the SCID-CV is difficult to assess, because of the lack
of a "gold standard" in psychiatric diagnosis to which it could be compared.
Flowever, evidence has been found of increased detection of psychiatric disorders
co-morbid with substance abuse (Kranzler, Ronald, Burleson et al., 1995) when
using the SCID-CV rather than standard clinical assessment.
The SCID-CV was administered in the first session only. The PTSD section of the
SCID-CV was not used, because of its overlap with the CAPS. Weathers et al.
(2001) suggest that the CAPS is at least as effective as the SCID-CV in diagnosing
PTSD.
Procedure
The study received ethical approval from the Lothian Primary Care/Public and
Mental Health Research Ethics Committee.
Potential participants were asked by their therapists if they would consider taking
part in the research project and were given an information sheet. Written informed
consent was obtained from all participants.
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Those who agreed were then interviewed following consecutive therapy sessions.
The time between assessments therefore varied considerably, depending on the
frequency of therapy sessions. The mean time between assessments was 19.3 days
(s.d.= 14.6 days).
Inclusion / exclusion criteria
The focus of interest was change in Schematic-level representations and
symptomatology and it was hypothesised that change would occur throughout
therapy. Therefore, the only requirements that were imposed regarding therapy
course were that participants had to be in active therapy (i.e. not in assessment or
maintenance phases) and had to have at least three sessions of therapy to complete at
the time they entered the research. The requirement for at least three remaining
sessions of therapy was imposed because it was intended to assess each participant
three times during the course of therapy.
The only exclusion criterion was that a participant's first language had to be English.
This was imposed because of the importance of accurately identifying schemata in
the interviews. Participants did not have to meet formal diagnostic criteria for PTSD
to be included. Instead, the less stringent criterion that they had to have experienced
a psychological reaction to a traumatic event, which included at least one of the main
symptom clusters of PTSD (re-experiencing, avoidance, or hyperarousal), was
applied. This meant that individuals whose primary presenting problem was not
PTSD (for example, depression) could be included, if they also had significant
symptomatology normally associated with PTSD. It was decided to use this less
stringent criterion to increase the range of potential participants. It was not thought
essential that participants meet full diagnostic criteria for PTSD in order for links
between schemata and symptomatology to be investigated. If a significant number of
participants had not met diagnostic criteria for PTSD, as assessed by the CAPS, then
statistical comparisons would have been performed between those who did and did
not meet diagnostic criteria. However, only one individual scored below the
moderate PTSD threshold on the CAPS (see Results).
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Format of assessment sessions
The interview to identify Schematic-level representations was performed first. In the
first and final sessions, the CAPS was administered next. Then the IES-R, BES, and
DIS-Q were completed by the participant. In the first and final sessions, the
participant then completed the CORE and the SOS. In the first session only, the
SCID-CV was then administered. Also in the first session only, any demographic
information that had not arisen during the interview was then collected (e.g. date of
birth, date the traumatic event occurred, date therapy started, etc). This information
was verified from participants' medical records.
Procedure for identification of Schematic-level representations
Notes were taken during the interview of statements that were thought to be related
to Schematic-level representations. If necessary, the participant was asked to talk
about particular topics in more detail. Attention was also paid to non-verbal
behaviour during the interview that would increase confidence that the individual
was describing information relevant to Schematic-level representations (for example,
signs of distress while talking). Following the interview, the presence or absence of
the schematic themes was rated. As explained above, in an attempt to improve
reliability, the intensity of the theme was not rated. Instead, it was simply
determined whether it was positive or negative in overall tone. This rating was
normally based on the interview notes alone. If it was felt that these were
insufficiently detailed, then the audiotape recording was utilised.
Examples of statements from the interviews that were interpreted as evidence of the
schematic themes are shown in Table 2. In some cases, examples of particular
themes were not found in any of the participants. These are noted in Table 2.
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Table 2: Examples of statements consistent with schematic themes
Theme +/- Example Statement
The Self as
Powerless
+ "I'm still getting the thoughts [about the traumatic event]
but they're not stopping me from doing things
- "It doesn't seem to matter what 1 do... things improve for a
while and then I'll suddenly be back to square one."
The Self as
Non-existent
+ Not found in sample.
- Not found in sample.
The Self as
Futureless
+ "I'm looking forward to things, starting to plan again."
- "1 just can't see myself in any kind of job..."
The Other as
Abandoning
+ Not found in sample.
- "1 don't like to get close to people... I've found once they
find out things they don't want to know me... "
The Other as
Betraying
+ Not found in sample.




+ Not found in sample.
- "I'm always watching out now when I'm out in public... 1
don't like it if 1 can't see what people are up to around me."
The World is
Benevolent
+ "I'm maybe a bit more aware of what could go wrong now,
but 1 think that's a good thing ... maybe I'm growing up"
- "1 was really aware that something could go wrong when 1
was driving..."
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Theme +/- Example Statement
The World is
Meaningful
+ "1 still feel like things happen for a reason... but sometimes
it's not clear at the time..."
"... all these things are happening around the world to




+ "1 think it's made me a better person... 1 think I've got more
sympathy now for other people's problems."
- "1 just feel so sad and useless ... 1 am sad."
It may be noted from Table 2 that some of the schematic themes are similar and may
even overlap in particular statements. For example, one participant spoke about
rediscovering her plans for the future, which was interpreted as signifying positive
representations for both "Self as Powerless" and "Self as Futureless". It is
acknowledged that this overlap in schemata may have made the classification less
reliable. This issue will be returned to in the Discussion.
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Results
Preliminary data analysis
Inspection of the data suggested that most variables were distributed normally,
within acceptable limits and significant anomalies were not found. However, due to
the small sample size, non-parametric techniques were used. Also, because of the
number of analyses that were performed on the small sample, the alpha level was set
at the more conservative 0.01 level, rather than the usual 0.05 level, in order to
reduce the risk of chance effects resulting in false positive findings.
Before reviewing the evidence for the specific hypotheses that are investigated in this
thesis, some general characteristics of the sample will be described and the results of
the inter-rater reliability analysis that was performed will be reported.
Characteristics of the Sample
The CAPS scores at Session 1 suggested that most of the individuals were
experiencing clinically significant levels of PTSD. The mean total CAPS score was
68.58 (s.d.=27.66). Weathers et al. (2001) suggest that CAPS total scores between
60 and 79 represent severe PTSD symptomatology. This would be consistent with
referrals to a specialist PTSD centre. Using the provisional severity score guidelines
of Weathers et al. (2001), the classifications for the participants are shown in Table
3.
Table 3: CAPS classifications
Classification Number of Participants
Asymptomatic / few symptoms 0
Mild PTSD / subthreshold 1
Moderate PTSD / threshold 4
Severe PTSD 3
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Classification Number of Participants
Extreme PTSD 4
Evidence was found that most participants were also experiencing other clinically
significant psychological problems. The mean score at Session 1 for the CORE
summary variable Total (Excluding Risk) was 1.99 (s.d.=0.95). This is above the
clinical cut-off scores for both male and female clinical populations. Inspection of
the data set confirmed that 9 individuals scored at or above the relevant clinical cut
off, while 3 scored below it.
The SCID-CV, administered at the first session, identified co-morbidity in 8 of the
12 participants. Major Depressive Episode was the most common co-morbid
diagnosis, found in 6 individuals, with Dysthymic Disorder identified in 1 other
participant. Another individual had co-morbid diagnoses of Panic Disorder with
Agoraphobia and Social Phobia. Of the 8 participants for whom co-morbidity was
found, 3 individuals also met criteria for current Alcohol Abuse and a further 2 met
criteria for past Alcohol Abuse. 2 individuals met criteria for past Substance Abuse.
Therefore, initial assessments suggested that this was a sample of individuals who
experienced significant PTSD and other symptomatology, displaying high levels of
co-morbidity, particularly depression, consistent with the literature on PTSD in
clinical populations (e.g. Foa et al., 2000). As such, it seems reasonable to suggest
that although they were an opportunistic sample, they can be considered to be
reasonably representative of clinical populations in specialist PTSD centres.
inter-rater reliability analysis
The interview to assess Schematic-level representations was a key measure in this
study. However, as discussed in the Measures section above, as a new assessment
there was no pre-hoc information on the reliability and validity of the interview.
Obviously, this was an important issue, because the psychometric characteristics of
the interview would influence the findings of this study. As an initial step in
Results Page 65 of 82
SPAARS evidence? An empirical investigation into SPAARS applied to PTSD
investigating the psychometric characteristics of the interview, it seemed appropriate
to consider whether these schemata could be reliably identified, or whether they were
significantly influenced by the author's biases or theoretical orientation. To address
this issue, an inter-rater reliability analysis was performed.
The other rater reviewed the notes of ten randomly selected interviews and rated
whether schemata were present or absent, and whether they were felt to be positive
or negative in overall content. The other rater had a master's level qualification in
applied social research and extensive experience of interviewing. A sample
interview, which was not subsequently used in the inter-rater reliability analysis, was
discussed jointly as a practice exercise before the ten interviews were rated.
Separate Kappa coefficients were calculated to assess levels of agreement on whether
schemata were present or absent; and if they were positive or negative in content.
The Kappa coefficient for the presence or absence of schemata was 0.486. For
positive schemata, Kappa was 0.509 and for negative schemata, Kappa was 0.658.
All of these values were in the fair to good agreement range. While this was not
particularly impressive, the levels of agreement were above chance and were
therefore felt to be sufficient to proceed with the analysis. Issues regarding the
validity and reliability of the interview will be returned to in the Discussion.
Description of Schematic-level representations found in the sample
Using the templates discussed above (see Method), which were identified by Power
and Brewin (1997) and Janoff-Bulman (1989, 1992), schemata were found in every
participant. At first interview, the number of schemas present varied from 3 to 6
(mean=4.83, s.d.=0.94). Breaking this down into positive and negative schemata
showed that positive schemata ranged from 0 to 2 (mean=0.58, s.d.=0.79) and
negative schemata ranged from 2 to 6 (mean=4.25, s.d.=1.36). At first interview,
evidence of at least one of the Power and Brewin (1997) core themes was found for
every participant and all of the core themes except "the Self as Non-existent" were
found in at least one participant. More detailed information is shown in Table 4
below.
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Table 4: Core themes identified at first interview
Core Theme Number of Participants (Interview 1)
The Self as Powerless 10
The Self as Non-existent 0
The Self as Futureless 5
The Other as Abandoning 1
The Other as Betraying 9
The Other as Hostile 8
At the same time, the applicability of the schemata identified by Janoff-Bulman
(1989, 1992) was confirmed. Negative beliefs about the Benevolence of the World
were found for every participant. Beliefs about the Meaningfulness of the World and
the Self as Worthy were not universal but were still found in 6 and 7 of the
participants respectively.
Some change in Schematic-level representations could be observed over the course
of the three interviews. However, the degree of change was limited, as shown in
Figures 1 and 2 below. It was therefore decided that associations between changes in
Schematic-level representations, emotions and symptomatology would not be
investigated further.
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Figure 1: Changes in Positive Schematic-level
Representations Across Interviews
□ Interview 1 □ Interview 2 □ Interview 3
i i i i i i
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Participant
Figure 2: Changes in Negative Schematic-level
Representations Across Interviews
Participant
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Investigation of the specific hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Schematic-level representations will be associated with
symptomatology.
To test this hypothesis, Spearman correlation coefficients (2-tailed) were calculated
for the positive and negative schemata with the various symptom measures (CAPS,
IES-R, DIS-Q and CORE) at each of the three sessions. The schema "the Self as
Non-existent" was excluded because it was not found in any participant at any of the
interviews. The results of this analysis are summarised in Tables 5 to 7 below.
Meaningful correlations could not be calculated for some of the schemata, due to
only one of the participants endorsing them at particular interviews. These schemata
are not shown in the tables.
Table 5: Session 1 Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between schemata and
symptom measures (N = 12).
Schemata
Powerless Futureless Betraying Hostile Meaningful Worthy












Note: No significant correlations at the 0.01 level were found between schemata and
IES-R or CORE measures.
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Table 6: Session 2 Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between schemata and
symptom measures (N = 9)
Schemata
Powerless Futureless Abandoning Betraying Hostile Meaningful Worthy
Positive/
Negative










Table 7: Session 3 Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between schemata and
symptom measures (N = 12 for IES-R and DIS-Q; N = 11 for CAPS and
CORE)
Schemata
Powerless Futureless Abandoning Betraying Hostile Benevolent Meaningful Worthy
Positive/
Negative
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Schemata
Powerless Futureless Abandoning Betraying Hostile Benevolent Meaningful Worthy
Positive/
Negative















































Key for Tables 5 to 7:
CAPS: Re-exp = Re-experiencing, Avoid = Avoidance, Hyper = Hyperarousal.
IES-R: Avoid = Avoidance, Hyper = Hyperarousal.
CORE: Well = Well-being.
Significant correlations are shown, with the p values given underneath the correlation value.
Non-significant correlations are not shown.
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There is a risk of course in performing this number of correlations that spurious
associations will be found simply by chance. However, the use of the
non-parametric correlation (Spearman's rho), and the more stringent alpha level of
0.01 were intended to control for this. It can be seen that many of the
Schematic-level representations were not significantly associated with
symptomatology. However, a greater number of significant associations were found
than would be expected due to chance alone. Also, the significant correlations were
all in the direction predicted by the hypothesis, namely negative Schematic-level
Representations were associated with greater symptomatology and positive
Schematic-level Representations were associated with less symptomatology.
The correlations between particular Schematic-level Representations and symptom
measures were somewhat inconsistent across the three sessions. However, the
Schematic-level Representations "Self as Powerless" and "Self as Worthy" were
associated with symptom measures at all three sessions. Positive Schematic-level
Representations relating to "Self as Powerless" were associated with lower (better)
CAPS total scores at Session 1, while negative Schematic-level Representations
relating to "Self as Powerless" were associated with higher (worse) CAPS total
scores at Session 3. The CAPS was not administered at Session 2. Positive
Schematic-level Representations relating to "Self as Powerless" were associated with
lower (better) scores on the IES-R Hyperarousal subscale at Sessions 2 and 3, but not
at Session 1. Positive and negative Schematic-level Representations related to "Self
as Worthy" were related to most of the CORE variables at Session 3, but not Session
1 (the CORE was not administered at Session 2). Negative Schematic-level
Representations of "Self as Worthy" were associated with CAPS Avoidance and
CAPS total scores at Session 1, and with CAPS Re-experiencing and CAPS total
scores at Session 3. Less consistent relationships were found with the Dissociation
Questionnaire (Session 2 only), and IES-R Hyperarousal (Session 3 only).
Somewhat inconsistent associations between Schematic-level Representations
relating to "Self as Futureless" and symptomatology were found at Session 1 and
Session 3. At session 1 only, higher (worse) CAPS Avoidance scores were
associated with negative Schematic-level Representations of "Self as Futureless",
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while at Session 3 only, higher (worse) IES-R Hyperarousal scores were associated
with negative Schematic-level Representations. Higher (worse) scores on the CORE
at Session 3 were also associated with Schematic-level Representations related to
"Self as Futureless".
These results appeared to provide equivocal support for Hypothesis 1. Significant
associations were found between some of the Schematic-level Representations
identified by the interviews and the symptom measures. However, there was
inconsistency in the associations found. Also, most of the Schematic-level
Representations identified by the interviews were not significantly associated with
symptomatology. These issues will be returned to in the Discussion.
Hypothesis 2: Emotions will be associated with symptomatology.
Spearman correlations (2-tailed) were calculated between the BES emotion variables
and the symptom measures. A summary variable of negative emotionality was also
calculated. This was the mean of the scores on the BES emotional dimensions of
Anger, Sadness, Disgust and Fear. The correlations are shown in Tables 8 to 10
below.
Table 8: Session 1 Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between BES and
symptom measures (1X1=12)
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DIS-Q .761 .938 .820
.007 <.0005 .002
CORE Well-being .769 .836 .726 .808 .935
.003 .001 .008 .001 <.0005
CORE Problems .766 .874 .736 .844 .907
.004 <.0005 .006 .001 <.0005
CORE Function .773 .825 .806 .851 .904
.003 .001 .002 <.0005 <.0005
CORE Risk .841 .875 .758 .848
.001 <.0005 .004 <.0005
CORE Total .826 .895 .778 .876 .949
.001 <.0005 .003 <.0005 <.0005
CORE Total-Risk .812 .888 .757 .862 .939
.001 <.0005 .004 <.0005 <.0005
Table 9: Session 2 Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between BES and
symptom measures (N=9)
Variable Anger Sadness Disgust Fear Happiness Negative
Emotionality
IES-R Avoidance .847 .899 .936 -.924 .916
.004 .001 <.0005 <.0005 .001
IES-R Intrusion .916 .800 .833
.001 .01 .005
IES-R Hyper .932 .865 .841 -.834 .865
<.0005 .003 .004 .005 .003
DIS-Q .912 -.803
.001 .009
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Table 10: Session 3 Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between BES and
symptom measures (N = 12 for IES-R and DIS-Q; N = 11 for CAPS and
CORE)
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It can be seen that significant correlations were found between the measures of
emotion and many of the symptom variables, in every session. As discussed under
Hypothesis 1, some significant associations would be expected due simply to chance,
due to the large number of correlation coefficients that were calculated. Again,
however, the use of non-parametric correlations and the more stringent alpha level of
0.01 should militate against this. The significant correlations were all in the direction
predicted by the hypothesis, namely greater negative emotions were associated with
greater symptomatology and greater happiness was associated with less
symptomatology. As with Hypothesis 1, however, the patterns of correlations were
somewhat inconsistent. To pick just one example, higher (worse) CAPS
Re-experiencing scores were significantly associated with Sadness, Fear and
Negative Emotionality scores at Session 3, but with none of the emotion variables at
Session 1. Therefore, although as a whole these results would seem to provide
support for Hypothesis 2, confidence in them would be increased if this
inconsistency could be explained. This issue will be returned to in the discussion.
Bearing this caveat in mind, it is interesting that many of the symptom variables were
significantly correlated more than one of the basic emotions and with the Total
Negative Emotionality variable (which of course is strongly inter-correlated with the
basic emotions). This provides support for Hypothesis 3: that a wider range of
intense aversive emotions is associated with greater dysfunction, consistent with the
SPAARS model.
Hypothesis 3: A wider range of intense aversive emotions is associated with
greater dysfunction.
To investigate this hypothesis further, it was attempted to derive an estimate of
coupled emotions, hypothesised by SPAARS to be a potent source of emotional
dysfunction (e.g. Power, 1997; 1999). This was done by multiplying together the
Session 1 BES scores for the various combinations of negative basic emotions, such
as Sadness-Fear, Anger-Disgust, etc. Multiplication would result in a substantial
increase in the derived scores if individuals scored highly on both the combined basic
emotions. This should make any effect of coupled emotions more apparent. Since
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this was a derived measure, which had not been validated, scores were only
calculated for Session 1, as an initial exploration. The scores for the coupled
emotions were then correlated with the symptom measures, as shown in Table 11
Table 11: Session 1 Correlations (2-tailed) between coupled emotions and
symptom measures (N=11 for DIS-Q, 12 for other variables)
Variable Anger + Anger + Anger + Sadness Sadness Disgust +






IES-R Avoidance .811 .804 .727
.001 .002 .007
IES-R Intrusion .729 .711
.007 .01
IES-R Hyper
DIS-Q .827 .818 .782 .882
.002 .002 .004 <.0005
CORE Well-being .804 .804 .895 .926 .884 .821
.002 .002 <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 .001
CORE Problems .818 .818 .902 .923 .867 .804
.001 .001 <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 .002
CORE Function .832 .741 .909 .888 .881 .846
.001 .006 <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 .001
CORE Risk .717 .749 .842 .873 .873 .866
.009 .005 .001 <.0005 <.0005 <.0005
CORE Total .867 .846 .944 .951 .916 .846
<.0005 .001 <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 .001
CORE Total-Risk .853 .839 .930 .944 .895 .832
<.0005 .001 <.0005 <.0005 <.0005 .001
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Table 11 shows that many of the symptom measures were significantly correlated
with one or more of the derived measures of coupled emotions at Session 1. In the
case of the CORE symptom variables, all of the possible coupled emotion
combinations were significantly correlated. In contrast, most of the CAPS scores
were not significantly related to coupled emotions. As reported under Hypothesis 2
(Table 8), none of the CAPS scores at Session 1 were significantly associated with
any of the negative basic emotions, from which the purported derived measure of
coupled emotions was calculated. Therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that CAPS
scores were generally not significantly correlated with the derived measures.
However, this does not explain the lack of significant correlations between the CAPS
and the BES scores. This issue will be returned to in the Discussion. For the
moment, it seems reasonable to suggest that some support has been found for the
SPAARS proposal that coupled negative emotions are associated with greater
dysfunction, although it must be acknowledged that the derived measure has not been
validated.
Although PTSD is classified as an anxiety disorder, the significant associations
found between a range of basic and coupled emotions and symptomatology might
tentatively suggest that a more general model of emotional functioning, such as
SPAARS, might support a better understanding of individuals with PTSD. To
investigate this further, the dataset was inspected. Table 12 shows the BES scores
for each participant at each session, identifying which participants reported feeling
other emotions as strongly or more strongly than fear. Each BES score ranges from
1.00 (low) to 7.00 (high).
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Table 12: Dominant emotions other than fear
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
Participant Fear Other emotionsof equalor greater intensity Fear Other emotionsof equalor greater intensity Fear Other emotionsof equalor greater intensity
1 3.75 Happiness (4.75) 3.50 Happiness (6.00) 3.75 Happiness (6.00)
2 4.25 None 4.25 None 3.00 Happiness (4.50)
3 3.75 Anger (3.75) 4.50 Anger (4.75) 4.00 Anger (4.75)
4 5.00 Sadness (5.75) 4.50 Anger (6.25)
Sadness (6.25)
Disgust (6.00)
5 5.75 Sadness (6.00)
Anger (5.75)
7.00 None 7.00 None
6 6.00 None 6.50 None 6.75 None
7 6.50 Anger (7.00)
Disgust (6.75)
Sadness (6.50)
6.50 Disgust (7.00) 6.25 Disgust (7.00) Anger
(6.75) Sadness
(6.25)
8 2.50 Happiness (6.25) 3.50 Happiness (5.25)
Anger (4.25)
4.50 None












11 5.50 None 5.50 None





It can be seen that it was relatively uncommon for fear to be the most prominent
emotional state. However, over the course of the three sessions, 5 individuals could
be identified for whom fear was the dominant emotion on at least one occasion. Of
course, the BES is still in its early stages of development as a measure, which limits
the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn. For example, it is not clear at
present what would represent a significant difference between scores for different
basic emotions. Overall, however, there does appear to be some evidence to support
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the contention that a more general model of emotional functioning might have value
in understanding PTSD. This issue will be returned to in the Discussion.
Hypothesis 4: Schematic-level representations will be significantly associated
with measures of emotion.
To test this hypothesis, Spearman correlation coefficients (2-tailed) were calculated
between Schematic-level Representations identified at interview and the BES basic
emotions and the derived measure of total negative emotionality. The resulting
correlations are summarised in Tables 13 to 15. Meaningful correlations could not
be calculated for some of the schemata, due to only one of the participants endorsing
them at particular interviews. These are not shown.
Table 13: Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between schemata, basic
emotions and negative emotionality at Session 1 (ISM 2)







Note: No significant correlations at the 0.01 level were found between emotions and
schemata other than "Self as Powerless".
Table 14: Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between schemata, basic
emotions and negative emotionality at Session 2 (N=9)











Note: No significant correlations at the 0.01 level were found between emotions and
schemata other than "Self as Powerless".
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Table 15: Spearman correlations (2-tailed) between schemata, basic
emotions and negative emotionality at Session 3 (N=11)
Schemata +/- Anger Sadness Disgust Fear Happiness Negative
Emotionality
Self as Worthy +
_
.786 .811 .715 .808
.002 .001 .009 .001
Note: No significant correlations at the 0.01 level were found between emotions and
schemata other than "Self as Worthy".
As can be seen from Tables 13 to 15 above, a small number of significant
correlations were found between schemata and emotions. As before, there was a risk
with performing a large number of correlations that apparently significant results
would be found due to chance alone. Again, the use of non-parametric statistics and
the more conservative alpha level of 0.01 helped to ameliorate this. As before, the
significant correlations found were all in the directions predicted by the hypothesis,
with positive Schematic-level Representations associated with less intense negative
emotions and greater happiness and vice versa. Again, the pattern of correlations is
somewhat inconsistent. The Schematic-level Representation "Self as Powerless" is
significantly associated with emotions at Sessions 1 and 2, but not at Session 3, while
"Self as Worthy" is significantly associated with emotions at Sessions 2 and 3, but
not Session 1. One of the challenges for the SPAARS model if it is to be applied to
PTSD would be to account for the significant relationships between emotions and
some of the Schematic-level Representations but not others. This issue will be
developed in the Discussion. However, it is interesting to note that the
Schematic-level Representations for which significant relationships were found with
emotions were "Self as Powerless" and "Self as Worthy". These Schematic-level
Representations were those identified in the investigation of Hypothesis 1 as being
most robustly associated with symptomatology.
It seemed logical as a next step to investigate whether there were significant
associations between the derived coupled emotion measures and Schematic-level
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Representations, since coupled emotions are seen as a potent source of dysfunction in
SPAARS. As an initial exploration of this, Spearman correlations (2-tailed) were
calculated between coupled emotion measures and schemata for Session 1. No
significant correlations (at the more conservative alpha level of 0.01) were observed.
These findings will be considered in the Discussion.
Before moving on to the Discussion, a brief comment on the statistical power of the
current study will be made.
Power Analysis
It was not possible to identify a study from the literature that would have enabled a
power analysis to be carried out before the current study was conducted. A
retrospective power analysis could have been performed. However, it was felt that
this was unnecessary due to the significant results that were obtained, which implies
there was sufficient power to support a number of the hypotheses.
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The aim of the current thesis was to investigate whether empirical evidence
supported the application of the SPAARS model (Power & Dalgleish, 1997, 1999;
Power, 1997, 1999) to PTSD (Dalgleish, 1999, submitted). It was clearly
acknowledged at the outset that it would be impossible to provide conclusive
evidence within the scope of a small-scale study. This was due partly to the
methodological difficulties associated with investigating a complex multi-level
model (Teasdale, 1999) and partly due to the number of participants, which placed a
limit on the confidence of any statistical findings. However, it was proposed that an
accumulation of evidence in favour of a number of the hypotheses would make a
stronger case for further investigation into the usefulness of the SPAARS model in
understanding PTSD. This Discussion will therefore firstly consider some of the
general limitations with the current study as a whole. It will then describe the
findings and any additional limitations of the investigations of each of the four
hypotheses in turn, before an attempt is made to integrate these findings.
The current study had a number of limitations. The sample was small and a large
number of correlation coefficients were calculated. This imposed limits on the
confidence that can be placed in the statistical analyses. For example, it was more
difficult to balance the risks of Type I versus Type II error. As previously mentioned
in the Results section, efforts were made to control for the risk of Type I error,
through the general use of non-parametric statistics and the more conservative alpha
level of 0.01. While this did increase the confidence that findings were genuinely
statistically significant rather than due to chance, it did not eliminate the possibility
of Type I errors completely. Also, it could attract the converse criticism of being too
conservative and increasing the possibility of Type II errors, with genuinely
significant results being rejected. During analysis of the data, a large number of
correlations that were significant at the normal alpha level of 0.05, but not at the 0.01
level, were disregarded. This made it difficult to explore the relationships between
particular variables in greater detail. For example, while investigating Hypothesis 1,
an inconsistent pattern of correlations between Schematic-level Representations and
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symptoms across the three sessions was noted. In the current study, it was not
possible to rule out the possibility that a more consistent pattern would have been
found with a larger sample and a less stringent alpha value. Therefore, for a number
of the hypotheses it was difficult to reach any stronger conclusion than that the
findings were suggestive and perhaps merit further investigation.
The uncontrolled nature of the current study created further difficulties. It was
fundamentally an opportunistic sample, which meant that there might have been
unpredictable factors within the sample that prevented it from being representative of
the wider population of individuals with PTSD. Despite the opportunistic nature of
the sample, efforts were made to represent a range likely to be encountered in clinical
practice and, as described in the Results section, there was some evidence to suggest
that this was achieved in terms of, for example, gender, index trauma and symptom
severity. However, these efforts might have inadvertently introduced an undetected
sampling bias. All of these factors must be borne in mind when considering whether
the conclusions reached can be generalised.
Questions might also be asked about the reliability and validity of the measures used.
Clearly, any such limitations in the measures would have affected the reliability and
validity of the findings. While the CAPS, CORE and SCID-CV, and to a lesser
extent the IES-R, are validated and standardised instruments, the BES is still being
developed. However, the most contentious measure is surely the use of an interview
to establish Schematic-level representations. It was decided to use an interview
because within the SPAARS model, Schematic-level representations are complex
and dynamic entities that cannot be described fully in verbal terms (Power &
Dalgleish, 1997; 1999). However, this introduces considerable subjectivity into the
assessment of the key Schematic-level representation variables. Attempts were made
to reduce subjectivity by standardising the categories into which Schematic-level
representations could be classified, as described in the Method, and the inter-rater
reliability analysis found fair to moderate agreement with the Schematic-level
representations identified. This provided some reassurances regarding subjectivity,
however, it must be acknowledged that finding greater agreement in the inter-rater
reliability would have increased confidence in the findings. Also, this is only part of
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the process of establishing the reliability and validity of any psychological measure.
For example, the test-retest reliability of the interview was not established.
Therefore, while some change in Schematic-level Representations was observed over
the course of the three interviews, it was not clear if this was meaningful.
Accordingly, as described in the Results section, it was decided not to investigate this
further in the current study.
Another problem with the interview is that the themes used to classify
Schematic-level representations were selected pre-hoc. The rationale for selection
can be defended on the grounds of previous research, in that they combined a set of
general themes associated with a range of psychopathology (Power & Brewin, 1997)
with schemata previously found in individuals with PTSD (e.g. Janoff-Bulman,
1989, 1992). However, there is no guarantee that this method would identify every
relevant theme. A better method for future research would be to determine relevant
themes through interviews with a representative sample of individuals with PTSD
and then use this as the basis for classifying Schematic-level representations. This
would also enable more precise operational definitions of the themes to be made,
which should increase the reliability of this measure.
A further limitation of the current study was that the statistical techniques that could
be used for this size of sample limited the conclusions that could be drawn regarding
pathways of causality. Therefore, although relationships were found between
Schematic-level representations, emotions, and symptoms, it was unclear how these
various components interacted. For example, the evidence could be interpreted as
suggesting that negative Schematic-level representations may lead to patterns of
emotion, which, if sufficiently aversive to an individual, can lead to dysfunction (i.e.
symptomatology). However, an alternative interpretation was that aversive emotions
might arise from appraisals of symptomatology. Also, it is possible that both
pathways between Schematic-level representations, emotions and symptoms have a
significant effect in PTSD. Clearly, further research with larger samples and more
detailed modelling techniques would be needed to explore these pathways, which
could also be expanded to incorporate behaviours.
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Also connected to the issue of sample size, it was not possible in the current study to
investigate the effects of factors such as co-morbidity or type of trauma, although as
stated above, efforts were made to represent these factors in the sample. Separating
the effects of some of these factors is arguably less relevant in clinical research. For
example, given most individuals with PTSD are likely to experience co-morbidity
(e.g. Foa et ah, 2000), the clinical utility of a model that excludes co-morbidity is
likely to be compromised. However, it is possible that these factors act to confound
significant findings, and this could be investigated in larger-scale research.
Finally, a more general methodological issue needs to be considered. SPAARS is a
multi-level model of individual emotional functioning. Individual differences can be
found in any level of the model, and in the particular emotion or combination of
emotions that an individual experiences, whether driven by the Schematic or
Associative-level. In clinical practice, this enables complex individual variations to
be formulated. However, to test whether generally applicable, clinically relevant
conclusions can be drawn, it is necessary to look at group differences. This requires
summarising some of the individual variability, with an inevitable loss of detail.
This may obscure some effects that are consistent with the model. Perhaps future
research can attempt to balance this tension by providing more detailed analysis of
individual cases, together with more sophisticated analysis of general trends.
Attention will now be turned to the specific hypotheses that were investigated.
The first hypothesis was that Schematic-level Representations, identified by
interview, would be significantly associated with symptomatology. Evidence for this
would support the usefulness of a schematic level of representation in providing a
comprehensive model of PTSD symptomatology. The results provided some support
for this hypothesis. Schematic-level Representations relating to "Self as Powerless"
and "Self as Worthy" were significantly associated with symptom measures at each
of the three sessions. Schematic-level Representations relating to "Self as
Futureless" were associated to a number of symptom measures at Session 3 only.
However, the pattern of correlations was somewhat inconsistent. For example,
CAPS total scores were related to "Self as Powerless" at Session 1 but not at Session
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3. Also, none of the other five Schematic-level Representations were significantly
associated with symptom measures.
Looking first at the inconsistency in the pattern of correlations, it is possible that this
was at least partly due to the conservative statistical analysis performed leading to
the rejection of genuinely significant results, as discussed above. Alternatively, this
could have been due to the limitations of the interview as a psychological measure,
again as discussed above. An instrument of low reliability would be likely to lead to
inconsistent results. A greater number of significant correlations were found in the
final session and this might reflect the assessment of Schematic-level
Representations varying over time as knowledge of the individual and his/her
symptomatology increased. This could have lead to a subconscious bias that might
have affected the assessment of Schematic-level Representations. This was not
directly controlled for in the inter-rater reliability analysis, although the analysis was
based on an equal number of first, second and final sessions.
The lack of significant correlations with other Schematic-level Representations might
be partly due to some of the limitations with the interview that have just been
described. Alternatively, it might be partly due to the inappropriate rejection of
genuinely significant results. Another possibility was mentioned earlier, in the
discussion of some of the general limitations of this study. This is that the
Schematic-level Representations that were assessed were determined pre-hoc. While
there was some justification for this, in that the pre-hoc selection was based on
existing research and it was felt that there was a need to categorise the
Schematic-level Representations in some way in order to increase reliability, it was
acknowledged that there was no guarantee that the Schematic-level Representations
that were chosen were those most significantly associated with PTSD.
To summarise the evidence for Hypothesis 1, this seems at best suggestive at present.
A number of highly significant correlations were found. Two of the Schematic-level
Representations, "Self as Powerless" and "Self as Worthy" were associated with
symptom measures at each of the three sessions. However, there were a number of
methodological concerns related to the findings, which would require further
Discussion Page 87 of 95
SPAARS evidence? An empirical investigation into SPAARS applied to PTSD
investigation before it could be confidently claimed that Schematic-level
Representations are consistently associated with symptom measures.
The second hypothesis proposed that emotions would be significantly associated
with symptom measures. In the SPAARS model (Power, 1997; 1999; Power &
Dalgleish, 1997; 1999), it is hypothesised that intense emotions, particularly coupled
emotions, are associated with psychopathology. Therefore, finding evidence of these
associations would provide evidence for the applicability of the SPAARS model to
this sample.
It is suggested that the results generally supported Hypothesis 2. A large number of
highly significant correlations were found between symptom measures and the five
basic emotions measured by the BES (anger, sadness, disgust, fear and happiness)
and with a measure of overall negative emotionality (the mean of the four negative
basic emotions). As with Hypothesis 1, there was again some inconsistency in the
pattern of correlations, however the overall number of highly significant correlations
seems more convincing.
However, as described above, only preliminary psychometric evaluation has been
performed for the BES (Power, submitted). This imposes a limit on the confidence
that can be placed in the findings. Overall, however, it is suggested that the balance
of evidence supported Hypothesis 2.
The third hypothesis proposed that a wider range of intense, aversive emotions would
be associated with greater dysfunction, consistent with the SPAARS model (Power,
1997; 1999; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 1999). To investigate whether this was the
case, a measure was derived that was intended to assess coupled negative emotions.
A large number of highly significant correlations were found between this derived
measure of coupled emotions and a range of symptom measures at Session 1. As
with the basic emotions of the BES, there was some inconsistency in the pattern of
correlations, however the overall number of highly significant correlations seemed
reasonably convincing. However, the derived measure of coupled emotion was
devised for this study, as described in the Results section. While it appears a
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plausible measure, it has not been validated and therefore these findings must be
treated with caution.
To provide further, though indirect support for Hypothesis 3, the data set was
inspected, to determine whether fear appeared to be the dominant emotion in
participants. It was found that for the majority of participants, fear was not clearly
the dominant emotion reported. This provides some support for the utility of a
general model of emotional functioning, such as SPAARS, in providing a more
comprehensive model of PTSD. However, again the limited psychometric
evaluation performed on the BES (Power, submitted) must be borne in mind when
considering what confidence can be placed in this finding.
The final hypothesis that was investigated was whether Schematic-level
Representations were associated with emotions. Finding evidence of significant
associations would provide some evidence for SPAARS, since within the SPAARS
model (Power, 1997; 1999; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 1999) it is proposed that one
of the two ways in which emotions are generated is via appraisal processes at the
Schematic-level.
The evidence for this hypothesis was limited. Although a few highly significant
associations were found with the basic emotions and mean negative emotionality
measures from the BES, they were somewhat inconsistent. However, it is interesting
that those associations that were found were with the Schematic-level
Representations "Self as Powerless" and "Self as Worthy". These were the
Schematic-level Representations that were previously found to be most consistently
associated with symptomatology. It seems possible therefore that these
Schematic-level Representations were particularly significant in this group of
participants and might provide a useful starting point for further investigation into
Schematic-level Representations in PTSD. However, due to the limitations of the
interview in assessing Schematic-level Representations that have been discussed
above, it is not possible to determine this with any confidence at present.
No significant associations at all were found between the derived coupled emotion
measure described above and the Schematic-level Representations identified at
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Session 1. This could be seen as presenting difficulties for the SPAARS model,
since coupled emotions are seen as a key cause of psychopathology (Power, 1997;
1999; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 1999). However, due to the psychometric
limitations that have been already described in both the interview and the derived
coupled emotion measure, it seems prudent to suggest that at present this finding
remains equivocal. Also, even if this finding were confirmed, it would not
necessarily rule out the importance of coupled emotions within SPAARS.
Appraisal-driven emotions based on Schematic-level Representations would
plausibly seem to be highly individual, and coupled emotions perhaps even more so.
Therefore, particular Schematic-level Representations would not necessarily be
significantly associated with coupled emotions. However, since coupled emotions
are hypothesised within SPAARS to be a major cause of psychopathology, then it
would be expected to find significant associations between coupled emotions and
symptoms. This would be consistent with the findings in this study, although these
must be considered tentative at present due to the untested nature of the derived
coupled emotion measure.
Considering the findings of the four hypotheses as a whole, it is suggested that
sufficient evidence has been presented to justify further investigation of the
usefulness of the SPAARS model in understanding PTSD. The strongest evidence
appears to come from the analysis of Hypothesis 2, which found quite robust
associations between a range of emotions and psychopathology. Investigation of
Hypothesis 3 suggested that coupled emotions were significantly associated with
PTSD and that participants experienced a wide range of emotion, not simply fear.
Although there were a number of methodological issues with the investigation of
Hypothesis 3 (described above), on balance this does seem to suggest that a general
model of emotional functioning may support an improved understanding of PTSD.
The evidence that was found linking Schematic-level Representations to
symptomatology and emotions was at best suggestive, due to methodological issues.
There was a suggestion that particular Schematic-level Representations may have
greater potential significance within PTSD. However, it was clear that the
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methodological difficulties of assessing Schematic-level Representations would need
to be addressed before significant progress could be made in this area.
Arguably, the most important implication of the current study is the questions it
raises about conceptualising PTSD as an anxiety disorder. Analysis of the BES
scores showed that fear was infrequently the dominant emotion reported. This
suggests that more complex emotional states need to be considered in investigations
of PTSD, including the possibility of multiple or coupled emotions. This is
consistent with the proposals of Dalgleish et al. (submitted) that dominant emotions
other than fear can be associated with a traumatic event, and can produce
symptomatology commonly found in PTSD, such as re-experiencing and avoidance,
because of the discrepancy between the traumatic experience and pre-trauma mental
representations. It is interesting to note also the findings of Shalev and Yehuda
(1998) that PTSD was not the most common reaction to traumatic events.
These findings may raise questions regarding the integrity of PTSD as a diagnostic
concept. This is an important issue, because constraints on the reliability of the
diagnosis must limit the validity of research in this area. It seems plausible that these
issues may be related to the high levels of co-morbidity associated with PTSD (e.g.
Foa et ah, 2000), which have often prevented firm conclusions from being reached
about what is discrete PTSD and what may be influenced by another disorder (see
e.g. McNally, 2003, for comments on the diagnostic integrity of PTSD). As an
integrative model, SPAARS clearly has the potential to guide attempts to separate
out the various components of PTSD and co-morbid disorders, and identify the
relationships between them.
Tentatively, it is proposed that there might be particular combinations or intensities
of negative Schematic-level representations that are associated with poorer outcome.
The representations associated with symptoms were "Self as Powerless", "Self as
Worthy" and "Self as Futureless". Combinations of these representations seem
similar to the concept of hopelessness (e.g. Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy, 1989),
which has been associated with certain types of depression. As noted previously,
depression is frequently co-morbid with PTSD (e.g. Foa et al., 2000). It seems
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plausible that the unpredictable and uncontrollable symptoms of PTSD could lead to
hopelessness, particularly if this interacted with congruent pre-trauma
Schematic-level representations. It also seems plausible that hopelessness would
have an adverse effect on recovery, whether or not it led to full-blown depressive
disorder. It is also interesting to consider whether this could explain Ehlers et al's
(1998) finding that mental defeat is linked to poorer outcome. While the
Schematic-level representations found in the case studies (Appendix 1) are consistent
with this hypothesis, it is clearly speculative at present and requires empirical
investigation.
Moving on from Schematic-level representations, the findings of the current study
suggest the role of multiple emotions in psychological dysfunction, consistent with
the SPAARS model. Various combinations of emotions were found to be associated
with symptomatology. The theoretical implications of this have been discussed
above. Clinically, this suggests that the multiple and complex emotional reactions of
an individual to PTSD need careful assessment. Tentatively, it also suggests that
treatments that develop skills in emotion management may be beneficial.
The mixed and complex emotions found to be associated with PTSD in this study has
some other interesting implications in terms of treatment. For example, in the
Introduction, it was noted that a number of authors (e.g. Ehlers et al., 1998) have
suggested that individuals who experience emotions other than fear, particularly
when re-experiencing, may benefit more from treatment that includes cognitive
restructuring, rather than exposure treatment alone. Against this, van Minnen et al.
(2002) found no evidence that feelings such as anger, guilt, or shame affected
outcome in exposure treatments. The results of the current study may provide a way
of integrating these contrasting findings, by suggesting that the complexity of
individuals' emotional reactions to re-experiencing are often underestimated.
Therefore, for example, the presence of anger in itself may not necessarily lead to
poorer outcomes, however, if it is coupled with another emotion of sufficient
intensity then this might be detrimental.
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However, this raises a more general question about the mechanisms of effect for
exposure treatments in PTSD. If the efficacy of exposure is explained in strict
learning theory terms as being due to the extinction of conditioned fear responses
(e.g. Wolpe, 1958), and the findings of the current sample can be generalised,
suggesting that 'pure' fear responses to reminders of traumatic events are relatively
rare, how is exposure an effective treatment? In practice, taking such a strict
theoretical position, that excluded more cognitive components, for example, fear
networks (Lang, 1979) or self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), would be relatively rare.
Also, it could be argued that some fear component would normally be present, so
perhaps exposure is effective for fear and has indirect effects on other emotions.
However, it seems clear that despite the proven efficacy of exposure as a treatment
for PTSD, there are unanswered fundamental questions about its mechanism of
effect.
The current study suggests an alternative perspective regarding exposure. An
essential component of SPAARS is the notion of two routes to emotion, through the
Associative and Schematic levels. Power and Dalgleish (1999) discuss potential
implications of the two routes for psychotherapy change processes. For example,
they propose that therapy may involve both "fast" change processes at the Schematic
level, and "slow" change processes at the Associative level. They suggest that the
rapid action of CBT for panic (see, e.g. Clark, 1996) may be due to fast change at the
Schematic level, as the individual learns to reinterpret his/her physiological
symptoms as being harmless rather than life threatening. Power and Dalgleish
additionally propose that the actual physiological symptoms will persist for much
longer, because these operate at the Associative-level, subject to slow change
processes.
Speculatively, exposure may also lead to fast change processes in Schematic-level
representations related to PTSD symptoms. Many individuals with PTSD fear the
consequences of exposure to memories of their traumatic events (see e.g. Ehlers &
Clark, 2000; Herman, 1992). For example, they may fear that they will go mad or
die of a heart attack. This can be seen as a secondary fear appraisal, based on their
predicted response. Prolonged exposure should lead to both a reduction in the fear
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that is associated with stimuli related to the traumatic event (Associative-level in
SPAARS) and to a change in their perception of their ability to cope with these
memories (Schematic-level), reducing the secondary fear appraisal. This
conceptualisation, that positive changes in beliefs in ability to cope at the
Schematic-level are an important part of successful treatment for PTSD, fits neatly
with the tentative suggestion above that negative Schematic-level representations
consistent with hopelessness may be important in the maintenance of PTSD.
Implosive therapy (i.e. flooding) has been shown to be an effective treatment for
symptoms of re-experiencing, anxiety and depression in Vietnam veterans (Keane,
Fairbank, Caddell & Zimering, 1989). Although it is easy to imagine negative
consequences of this approach, learning that they can cope with their emotions even
when flooded with reminders of their traumatic experiences would provide
individuals with very powerful experiences of control. This would potentially lead to
fast change processes occurring at the Schematic level. Clinically, this leads to an
interesting practical and ethical dilemma. The greater an individual's fear of
exposure, the more powerful an experience of successfully coping with this is likely
to be. However, too much fear may overwhelm the individual, with adverse
consequences. As a related point, when is the teaching of emotional management
skills as an adjunct to exposure indicated? Note that the teaching of breathing
techniques is part of the standard protocol for CBT with exposure treatment in
approaches such as Foa and Rothbaum (1998). It is argued that the effects of these
adjunctive treatments on the efficacy of the primary exposure treatment may need
investigation.
Conclusion
The current study has investigated the utility of the SPAARS model in improving our
understanding of PTSD. Taken together, the findings suggest that a case can be
made for further investigations into the usefulness of applying SPAARS to PTSD.
Quite robust relationships were found between emotions and symptoms and there
was a suggestion that Schematic-level Representations may be significantly
associated with symptoms and emotions. In summary, SPAARS is a conceptually
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strong model that can potentially integrate a wide range of findings relevant to PTSD
and other disorders. The current study has provided initial empirical support for a
range of components of the SPAARS model. Further research is required, in
particular to increase our understanding of the pathways between the various
SPAARS levels of representation, however, it is proposed that the current study
supports further investigation of the application of the SPAARS model to PTSD.
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Appendix 1: Case Studies
The purpose of presenting the cases is to demonstrate how some of the findings
regarding schemata, emotions and symptoms appeared in clinical practice. One case
was selected as a "better" and one as a "worse" outcome, determined by change in
symptomatology and Schematic-level Representations across the interviews.
Case Study 1 ("worse" outcome group)
James was a 42-year-old ex-serviceman. He described a difficult childhood, with a
distant, undemonstrative mother, and an unpredictable father, who could be
affectionate or abusive. His father frequently told James he was useless. He
described a strong fear of death from an early age.
Things appeared to improve for James when he joined up. He formed strong
emotional bonds within the service and felt a sense of belonging to a family that he
had never experienced before. His training gave him a sense of competence and
achievement that, again, he had never attained before.
James' first traumatic experience occurred 20 years ago. He was assigned to look
after a fellow serviceman who was emotionally distressed. James left his friend to
get him a beer. When he returned his friend was gone. He was later found dead and
it was unclear whether this was a suicide or accidental.
James managed to continue to function after this event by trying not to think about
his friend and by sedating himself with alcohol. However, he was experiencing
regular nightmares and starting to feel that his "nerve had gone".
Two years later, he was present during a serious accident. Two of his friends died as
a result of a fire, one of them in front of him. During the accident, James panicked
briefly, although this did not have a significant effect on the outcome. He was
convinced at the time that he was going to die.
James stayed in the service for a further 5 years, but he continued to experience
nightmares. He also described feeling constantly frightened, which was having a
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significant effect on his functioning. He therefore decided to leave the service.
Shortly before he left, his leg was injured in an accident and he has been left with a
permanent impairment. He was later told that this was a result of incompetent
medical treatment by the military.
After leaving the service, James struggled with a succession of jobs. He felt
constantly afraid and increasingly incompetent because of his continued failure. He
was put on anti-depressants and eventually saw a clinical psychologist, who
diagnosed PTSD and started CBT with a focus on his feelings of guilt over the friend
James was assigned to look after. James did not finish treatment, which he blamed
on the breakdown of his marriage. Due to financial difficulties, James had to give up
his house and eventually moved in with his mother. His father had died shortly
before this.
When James entered the current study, he had completed CBT with prolonged
exposure for his memories of the accident, which he described as helpful in reducing
re-experiencing. He was clinically depressed, and the focus of his ongoing treatment
was CBT for his depression. He had been in therapy for 5 months when he joined
the study.
At Session 1, James was identified as having negative representations on a number of
schemata. These included "the Self as Powerless", "the Self as Worthy", "the World
as Meaningful" and "the Self as Futureless". He described himself as unable to cope
with stress, having an overwhelming feeling of failure, and unable to see any future.
He said he lived in constant fear ("World as Benevolent"). He also described a
strong feeling of betrayal ("Other as Betraying"), associated with the rejection by the
Veteran's Agency of a recent application to have his pension increased. It was felt
that James' early experiences had contributed to these Schematic-level
representations. His military career gave him feelings of competence that he never
had before, which helped him to cope with his childhood experience of being
constantly labelled incompetent by his father. His subsequent failure in jobs since
leaving the service had reinforced this underlying feeling of incompetence.
Similarly, the service gave James a sense of family he had not previously enjoyed.
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Unfortunately, his traumatic experiences and leg injury echoed his earlier experience
of not being cared for by his real family. His wife's affair and behaviour after the
break-up contributed to his sense of betrayal. James also seemed overwhelmed by
events and his current problems, and presented with a profound sense of
hopelessness.
In terms of symptomatology at Session 1, James was classified as having "extreme"
PTSD on the CAPS. He scored above the clinical cut-off on every CORE subscale
except Risk. He also scored highly on the IES-R. On the BES, his dominant
emotion was Fear, but he also scored highly on Anger, Sadness and (self-) Disgust.
His overall negative emotionality score at Session 1 was the second highest in the
sample.
James showed very little change in Schematic-level representations over the course
of the study, with only 1 less negative representation at Session 3 ("World as
Meaningful"). There was no change in his CAPS classification and he again scored
above clinical cut-offs on the same CORE subscales. His IES-R scores remained
very high. His overall negative emotionality had increased and remained the second
highest in the sample for Session 3.
One of the most relevant points for the SPAARS model in this case is the interaction
of James' childhood with the traumatic events and his subsequent experiences.
These seem to have resulted in powerfully disabling Schematic-level representations,
for example regarding his competence and self-worth. Another key point is that, in
the same way that the evidence found above suggested links between schemata,
emotion and symptoms, links could be seen in the maintenance of James' problems.
For example, his traumatic symptoms made him feel fearful, and angry, depressed,
and disgusted at himself for being continually afraid and unable to take control of his
life. This would then reinforce his beliefs in his own incompetence.
Case Study 2 ("better" outcome group)
David was a 30-year old man. Nearly 4 years before he joined the research study, he
was violently assaulted. He described longstanding difficulties in social
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relationships. He felt that he had always been shy and reported a history of conflict
with his immediate family.
David initially tried to cope with the trauma by trying to ignore it. This proved
unsuccessful. He was clinically depressed when he entered therapy, which was 7
months before he joined the study. He received IPT, which focused more on his
disturbed social relationships than symptoms of trauma.
At Session 1, David had negative Schematic-level representations relating to his
sense of threat, particularly in social situations, and lack of trust of people ("Other as
Hostile", "World as Benevolent" and "Other as Betraying"). He reported feeling
intense anger at perceived injustices ("World as Meaningful"). However, David also
had a positive representation regarding his increasing ability to cope with his
symptoms ("Self as Powerless").
David was not clinically depressed when he entered the study. His CAPS
classification was "mild" PTSD. He scored below the clinical cut-offs for the CORE
subscales and had low scores on the IES-R and DIS-Q. His highest scoring negative
emotion on the BES was Fear, but his score for Happiness was higher.
David continued to make progress over the course of the study. He became
increasingly positive about his ability to cope with his remaining symptoms ("Self as
Powerless", "Self as Worthy"). His sense of anger at injustices faded ("World as
Meaningful"). And while he acknowledged that the world was not as safe as he
believed before the trauma, he felt that his experience had been valuable and had
taught him to be aware of risks ("Self as Powerful", "World as Benevolent").
However, he still felt threatened in social situations and did not trust people ("Other
as Hostile", "Other as Betraying").
David was classified as "asymptomatic" on the CAPS at Session 3 and had no
significant symptomatology on any of the other measures. His dominant emotion on
the BES was Happiness, although he did still report feelings of fear and anger.
David's case is interesting firstly because of his continued positive changes in
Schematic-level representations over the course of the study. There seems to be
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evidence of the processes of accommodation and assimilation described by a number
of authors, including Janoff-Bulman (1992) and Dalgleish (submitted), in the context
of SPAARS. Secondly, as in the case of James described above, there was evidence
of pre-trauma Schematic-level representations that seem to interact with the
traumatic experience to give the event its particular meaning to the individual.
Interestingly, despite David's generally excellent recovery from his traumatic
experience, there was evidence that these negative Schematic-level representations
would persist. This raises the question of what effect similar traumatic experiences
might have in future. These issues were expanded upon in the Discussion.
Evidence was also found suggesting that other Schematic-level themes could be
associated with broader symptomatology than PTSD. The theme of "Other as
Betraying" was associated with the CORE, a general measure of dysfunction. This
shows the potential of the SPAARS model to integrate a wider range of
symptomatology into a coherent framework. This finding can only be regarded as
tentative at present, due to a lack of consistent correlations. However, the main focus
of the current study was not to investigate more general psychopathology. Stronger
findings might emerge in a study that incorporated additional general measures.
The usefulness of being able to account for broader themes and symptomatology is
indicated by the current sample, in which 9 individuals were identified as having
negative Schematic-level representations consistent with "Other as Betraying" at
Session 1. The level of response to this theme may seem surprisingly high. It might
have been anticipated in individuals who had experienced, for example, sexual abuse
or the suicide of a partner. However, it was also observed in individuals who felt let
down by their treatment by the military following PTSD onset, or who felt that their
friends and family had betrayed them. The case studies of James and David (see
above) demonstrated some of the clinical implications of Schematic-level
representations of "Other as Betraying".
The case studies also showed how pre-trauma Schematic-level representations could
interact with traumatic experiences with lasting effect. The.theoretical implications
of this have already been discussed. It is suggested that in clinical practice it may be
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helpful for both therapist and patient to incorporate these interactions into
formulations of PTSD. This may help patients to understand why they in particular
are experiencing PTSD, when they are often able to identify others who have gone
through the same experience and appear unaffected. Speculatively, interactions with
pre-trauma Schematic-level representations might also provide an indication of
prognosis, although this would require empirical investigation. It is interesting to
note contrasting indications from the case studies. David showed few signs of
symptomatology at Session 3, however, negative Schematic-level representations
were still detected at final interview. Conversely, James had deteriorated on a
number of symptom measures. His negative Schematic-level representations were
virtually unchanged over the course of the study and it was felt that these were a
factor in his poor outcome.
The finding that David had persistent negative Schematic-level representations
despite symptomatic relief from PTSD also raises some interesting questions relevant
to clinical practice. For example, would the use of more general measures reveal
more general psychopathology in individuals who have recovered from PTSD
symptoms? Would persistent negative Schematic-level representations be found in
many recovered PTSD patients? Does this leave them more vulnerable to future
traumatic events? Should psychotherapy focus mainly on the symptoms of PTSD,
for example using prolonged exposure, or should it have a broader focus?
Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer any of these questions definitively at
present. However, speculatively, the high co-morbidity associated with PTSD (e.g.
Foa et ah, 2000) suggests that individuals who have recovered from PTSD may still
have more general psychopathology, which could be associated with negative
Schematic-level representations (as found in the case of "Other as Betraying'" in the
current study). The meta-analyses of vulnerability factors in PTSD (Brewin et al.,
2000; Ozer et al., 2003) have identified previous traumatic experiences as being a
consistent risk factor, with a small but significant effect size. This suggests that
recovered PTSD patients will be more vulnerable to future traumatic events.
Arguments have already been presented that this increased vulnerability may be due
to pre-trauma Schematic-level representations. It should be noted that pre-trauma in
Case Studies Page 111 of 112
SPAARS evidence? An empirical investigation into SPAARS applied to PTSD
this context means before the index traumatic event that leads most directly to PTSD,
since it seems plausible that these Schematic-level representations may have been
affected by the earlier traumatic event. The question of whether psychotherapy for
PTSD should have a broader focus is an interesting one. Authors such as Herman
(1992) have emphasised the importance of a comprehensive treatment programme
for PTSD, which not only addresses symptoms such as avoidance and
re-experiencing but also helps the individual to "reconnect" with others and the
world. It is suggested that a clear rationale would have to be given to patients for
working on issues that may seem unrelated to the trauma (particularly in the case of
individuals who may be inhibiting information that would threaten overvalued
schemata). A psychoeducation component of treatment, based on the SPAARS
model, might provide the basis of this rationale. Alternatively, a relapse prevention
approach to supplement normal treatment for PTSD might be indicated. This could
potentially reduce future vulnerability without the need to work through negative
Schematic-level representations.
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SCID-CV Scoresheet DIAGNOSTIC SUMMARY 1
SCID-CV DIAGNOSTIC SUMMARY
MOOD DISORDERS
Current Lifetime Bipolar I Disorder (D4, p. 36)
□ □ 296.40 Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent Episode Hypomanic
□ □ 296.0x Bipolar I Disorder, Single Manic Episode
□ □ 296.4x Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent Episode Manic
□ □ 296.6x Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent Episode Mixed




3—Severe, Without Psychotic Features




□ □ 296.7 Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent Episode Unspecified
Other Bipolar Disorders




O O 301.13 Cyclothymic Disorder (D12, p. 37)
C3 01 296.80 Bipolar Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (D12, p. 37)
Major Depressive Disorder (D16, p. 38)
O O 296.2x Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode




3—Severe, Without Psychotic Features





□ 300.4 Dysthymic Disorder (A60, p. 23)
O O 311 Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (D19, p. 39)
2 DIAGNOSTIC SUMMARY SCID-CV Scoresheet
Current Lifetime Other Mood Disorders
0 O 293.83 Mood Disorder Due to General Medical Condition (A64, p. 24)
Indicate General Medical Condition:
check specifier:















SCHIZOPHRENIA AND OTHER PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS
O 01 Schizophrenia (C 7, p. 29)
check specifier:
295.30 Paranoid Type (C8, p. 30)
295.20 Catatonic Type (C9, p. 30)
295.10 Disorganized Type (C10, p. 30)
295.90 Undifferentiated Type (Cll, p. 30)
295.60 Residual Type (CI2, p. 30)
Schizophreniform Disorder (CI5, p. 30)
Schizoaffective Disorder (C20, p. 31)
Delusional Disorder (C26, p. 32)
Brief Psychotic Disorder (C31, p. 33)
Psychotic Disorder Due to a General Medical Condition With Delusions
(C34, p. 34)






□ □ 293.82 Psychotic Disorder Due to a General Medical Condition With
Hallucinations (C34, p. 34)
Indicate General Medical Condition:
O O 291.5 Alcohol-Induced Psychotic Disorder With Delusions (C38, p. 35)
O O 291.3 Alcohol-Induced Psychotic Disorder With Hallucinations (C38, p. 35)
O O 292.11 Other Substance-Induced Psychotic Disorder With Delusions (C38, p. 35)
Indicate substance:
292.12 Other Substance-Induced Psychotic Disorder With Hallucinations
(C38, p. 35)
Indicate substance:
298.9 Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (C39, p. 35)
SCID-CV Scoresheet DIAGNOSTIC SUMMARY 3
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS
Current Lifetime Alcohol Use Disorders
O O 303.90 Alcohol Dependence (El5, p. 42)
O O 305.00 Alcohol Abuse (El6, p. 42)
□ □ 304.90 Amphetamine Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 304.30 Cannabis Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 304.20 Cocaine Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 304.50 Hallucinogen Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 304.60 Inhalant Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 304.00 Opioid Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 304.60 Phencyclidine Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 304.10 Sedative, Hypnotic, or Anxiolytic Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 304.90 Other (or Unknown) Substance Dependence (E31, p. 46)
□ □ 305.70 Amphetamine Abuse (E32, p. 46)
□ □ 305.20 Cannabis Abuse (E32, p. 46)
□ □ 305.60 Cocaine Abuse (E32, p. 46)
□ □ 305.30 Hallucinogen Abuse (E32, p. 46)
□ □ 305.90 Inhalant Abuse (E32, p. 46)
□ □ 305.50 Opioid Abuse (E32, p. 46)
□ □ 305.90 Phencyclidine Abuse (E32, p. 46)
□ □ 305.40 Sedative, Hypnotic, or Anxiolytic Abuse (E32, p. 46)
□ □ 305.90 Other (or Unknown) Substance Use (E32, p. 46)
ANXIETY DISORDERS
Panic Disorder With Agoraphobia (F23, p. 49)
Panic Disorder Without Agoraphobia (F24, p. 49)
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (F38, p. 52)
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (F64, p. 56)
Anxiety Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (F71, p. 57)
Anxiety Disorder Due to a General Medical Condition (F86, p. 60)
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Current Lifetime


















300.22 Agoraphobia Without History of Panic Disorder (F65, p. 56)
300.23 Social Phobia (F66, p. 56)
300.29 Specific Phobia (F67, p. 56)
300.02 Generalized Anxiety Disorder (F68, p. 56)
SOMATOFORM DISORDERS
O O 300.81 Somatization Disorder (F72, p. 58)
O O 300.82 Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder (F72, p. 58)
O O 300.7 Hypochondriasis (F73, p. 58)
O O 300.7 Body Dysmorphic Disorder (F74, p. 58)
EATING DISORDERS
O O 307.1 Anorexia Nervosa (F75, p. 58)
O O 307.51 Bulimia Nervosa (F76, p. 58)
ADJUSTMENT DISORDERS
O 309.0 Adjustment Disorder With Depressed Mood (F82, p. 59)
O 309.24 Adjustment Disorder With Anxiety (F82, p. 59)
□ 309.28 Adjustment Disorder With Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood
(.F82, p. 59)
O 309.3 Adjustment Disorder With Disturbance of Conduct (F82, p. 59)
□ 309.4 Adjustment Disorder With Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct
(F82, p. 59)
O 309.9 Unspecified Adjustment Disorder (F82, p. 59)
SCID-CV Scoresheet DIAGNOSTIC SUMMARY 5
OTHER DSM-IV AXIS I DISORDERS
Current Lifetime
□ □ Write in code and diagnosis:
□ □ Write in code and diagnosis:
□ □ Write in code and diagnosis:
DSM-IV AXIS IV: Psychosocial and Environmental Checklist
Check:
n Problems with primary support group. Specify:
O Problems related to the social environment. Specify:
□ Educational problems. Specify:
O Occupational problems. Specify:
Housing problems. Specify:
O Economic problems. Specify:
O Problems with access to health care services. Specify:
O Problems related to interaction with the legal system/crime. Specify:
O Other psychosocial and environmental problems. Specify:
6 DIAGNOSTIC SUMMARY SCID-CV Scoresheet
DSM-IV Axis V: Global Assessment of Functioning Scale
Consider psychological, social* and occupational functioning on a hypothetical
continuum of mental health—illness. Do not include impairment in functioning as a result
of physical (or environmental) limitations.





100 Superior functioning in a wide range of activities, life's problems never seem to get out of
J hand, is sought out by others because of his or her many positive qualities. No symptoms.
91
90 Absent or minimal symptoms (e.g., mild anxiety before an exam); good functioning in all areas,
I interested and involved in a wide range of activities, socially effective, generally satisfied withlife, no more than everyday problems or concern (e.g., n occasional argument with family
81 members).
80 If symptoms are present, they are transient and expectable reactions to psychosocial
I stressors (e.g., difficulty concentrating after family argument); no more than slight impairment in
71 social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., temporarily falling behind in schoolwork).
70 Some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social,
I occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), butgenerally functioning pretty well, has some mea ingf l interpersonal relationships.
61
60 Moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR
| moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with
51 peers or co-workers).
50 Serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any
1 serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep
41 a job).
40 Some impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., speech is at times illogical, obscure,
or irrelevant) OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations,
judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects family, and is unable to
work; child frequently beats up younger children, is defiant at home, and is failing at school).
31
30 Behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR serious impairment in
I communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidalpreocc pation) OR inability to functi n in almost all are s (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home,
21 or friends).
20 Some danger of hurting self or others (e.g., suicide attempts without clear expectation of death,
I frequently violent, manic excitement) OR occasionally fails to maintain minimal personal hygiene(e.g., smears feces) OR gross i pairment in c mmunicati n (e.g., largely incoher nt r mute).
11
10 Persistent danger of severely hurting self or others (e.g., recurrent violence) OR persistent
| inability to maintain minimal personal hygiene OR serious suicidal act with clear expectation
1 of death.
0 Inadequate information.
SCID-CV Scoresheet OVERVIEW 7
OVERVIEW
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
What's your date of birth? Date ofBirth: j
month day year
Are you married?
IF NO: Were you ever?
Marital Status:






IF YES: How many?
Where do you live?
Whom do you live with?
EDUCATIONAL HISTORY
How far did you get in school? Education:
IF FAILED TO COMPLETE A
PROGRAM IN WHICH HE/SHE
WAS ENROLLED: Why didn't you
finish?
1—Grade 6 or less
2—Grade 7 to 12 (without graduating high school)
3—Graduated high school or high school equivalent
4—Part college




8 OVERVIEW SCID-CV Scoresheet
OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY
What kind of work do you do?
Are you working now?
— IF YES: How long have you
worked there?
IF LESS THAN 6 MONTHS:
Why did you leave your last
job?
Have you always done that kind
of work?
L IF NO: Why is that?
What kind of work have you done
before?
How are you supporting yourself
now?
[
IF UNKNOWN: Has there ever been
a period of time when you were
unable to work or go to school?
IF YES: When? Why was that?
STATUS OF CURRENT TREATMENT
IF UNKNOWN: Have you been in
any kind of treatment in the past
month?
Treatment Setting: (Circle one)
1—Current inpatient (including residential treatment)
2—Current outpatient
3—Other (e.g., 12-step program such as AA)
4—No current treatment
IF INPATIENT: When did you come
into the hospital?
IF OUTPATIENT: When did you




CHIEF COMPLAINT AND DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM
What led to your coming here (this
time)? (What is the major problem
you are having trouble with?)
IF DOES NOT GIVE DETAILS
OF PRESENTING PROBLEM:
Tell me more about that. (What
do you mean by. . . ?)
ONSET OF PRESENT ILLNESS OR EXACERBATION
When did this begin? (When did you
first notice that something was
wrong?)
When were you last feeling OK
(your usual self) ?
NEW SYMPTOMS OR RECURRENCE
Is this something new or a return of
something you had before?
(What made you come for help now?)
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT AND POSSIBLE PRECIPITANTS
(USE FOR REPORTING AXIS IV)
Did anything happen or change just
before this all started?
(Do you think this had anything to do
with your [PRESENT ILLNESS]?)
What other kinds of problems were
you having when this began?
10 OVERVIEW
COURSE OF PRESENT ILLNESS OR EXACERBATION
SCID-CV Scoresheet
After it started, what happened next?
(Did other things start to bother you?)
Since this began, when have you felt
the worst?
IF MORE THAN A YEAR AGO:
In the last year, when have you
felt the worst?
TREATMENT HISTORY
When was the first time you saw
someone for emotional or psychiatric
problems? (What was that for? What
treatment(s) did you get? What
medications?)
What about treatment for drugs or
alcohol?
(THE LIFE CHART ON PAGE 12
OF THE SCORESHEET MAY BE
USED TO DOCUMENT A COMPLI¬
CATED HISTORY OF PSYCHO-
PATHOLOGY AND TREATMENT)
Have you ever been a patient in a
psychiatric hospital?
IF YES: What was that for? (How
many times?)
IF GIVES AN INADEQUATE
ANSWER, CHALLENGE
GENTLY: e.g., Wasn't there
something else? People don't
usually go to psychiatric hospitals
just because they are [TIRED/
NERVOUS/OWN WORDS].
Have you ever been a patient in a
hospital for treatment of a medical
problem?
IF YES: What was that for?
SCID-CV Scoresheet OVERVIEW 11
OTHER CURRENT PROBLEMS
CURRENT SOCIAL FUNCTIONING (USE FOR REPORTING AXIS V)
12 OVERVIEW SCID-CV Scoresheet
OVERVIEW DIAGNOSES
MOST LIKELY CURRENT DIAGNOSIS:
P25
DIAGNOSES THAT NEED TO BE RULED OUT:
P26
LIFE CHART
Age (or date) Description (symptoms, triggering events) Treatment
SCID-CV Scoresheet A. MOOD EPISODES 13
A. MOOD EPISODES





A. Five (or more) . . . during the same 2 weeks ... at least one of the
symptoms is either (1) depressed mood, or (2) loss of interest or
pleasure.


















A5 (5) psychomotor agitation or retardation
Notes:
+1 I A5 i
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
14 A. MOOD EPISODES SCID-CV Scoresheet
















I A1° I AT LEAST FIVE OF A(l)-A(9) ARE "+" AND AT LEAST ONE OF
THESE IS A(l) OR A(2)




lA11 I C. Clinically significant impairment or distress
Notes:




I A12 I D. Not due to a substance or a general medical condition (check p. 24)






Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet A. MOOD EPISODES 15
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
16 A. MOOD EPISODES SCID-CV Scoresheet
A19 (2) decreased need for sleep
Notes:
+I A19
A20 (3) more talkative than usual or pressured speech
Notes:
? - + A20
A21 (4) flight of ideas or racing thoughts
Notes:




| A23 | (6) increase in goal-directed activity or psychomotor agitation
Notes:
+I A23
| A24 | (7) excessive involvement in pleasurable activities
Notes:
+I A24
A25 AT LEAST THREE OF B(l>-B(7) ARE "+" (OR FOUR IF MOOD IS





Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet A. MOOD EPISODES 17





I A27 I E. Not due to a substance or a general medical condition (check p. 24)
WARNING: A "YES" answer to the interview question equals a "-"rating
Notes:




| A28 | CRITERIA A, C, D, AND E ARE "+"





A29 Total number of Manic Episodes A29
Bl
p. 26
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present






A. Persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood, lasting throughout at
least 4 days
Notes:




B. During the period of mood disturbance, three (or more) of the following
symptoms have persisted (four if the mood is only irritable) and have
been present to a significant degree:
I A31 I (1) inflated self-esteem or grandiosity
Notes:
? - + A31
A32 (2) decreased need for sleep
Notes:
+1>. A32
| A33 | (3) more talkative than usual or pressured speech
Notes:
+1 A33
lA34l (4) flight of ideas or racing thoughts
Notes:
? - + A34
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet A. MOOD EPISODES 19
A35 (5) distractibility
Notes:
? - + A35
A36 (6) increase in goal-directed activity or psychomotor agitation
Notes:
+IS- A36
I A37 I (7) excessive involvement in pleasurable activities
Notes:
? - + A37
| A38 | AT LEAST THREE OF B(l)-B(7) ARE "+" (OR FOUR IF MOOD IS





A39 C. Unequivocal change in functioning that is uncharacteristic
Notes:










I A41 I E.Not severe enough to cause marked impairment, or to necessitate
hospitalization, and no psychotic features






Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
20 A. MOOD EPISODES SCID-CV Scoresheet
j A42 | F. Not due to a substance or a general medical condition (check p. 24)







| A43 | CRITERIA A, B, C, D, E, AND F ARE "+"





| A44 | Total number of Hypomanic Episodes A44
B1
p. 26
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet A. MOOD EPISODES
DYSTHYMIC DISORDER CRITERIA
21








B. Presence of two (or more) of the following:
| A46 | (1) poor appetite or overeating
Notes:
? - + A46
lA47l (2) insomnia or hypersomnia
Notes:
+1O-. A47
| A48 | (3) low energy or fatigue
Notes:
? - + A48
| A49 | (4) low self-esteem
Notes:
? - + A49
| A50 | (5) poor concentration or difficulty making decisions
Notes:
+1 A50
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
22 A. MOOD EPISODES SCID-CV Scoresheet
A51| (6) feelings of hopelessness
Notes:
+Io- I A51 I
A52 AT LEAST TWO "B" SYMPTOMS ARE "+" ? - + A52
B1
p. 26
A53 C. Never without the symptoms in A and B for more than 2 months at a
time




A54 Age at onset of current Dysthymic Disorder A54








I A57 I F. Does not occur exclusively during the course of a chronic psychotic
disorder




A58 G. Not due to a substance or a general medical condition (check p. 24)
WARNING: A "YES" answer to the interview question equals a rating
Notes:




A59 H. Clinically significant distress or impairment
Notes:




Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet A. MOOD EPISODES 23








Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
24 A. MOOD EPISODES SCID-CV Scoresheet
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet A. MOOD EPISODES
SUBSTANCE-INDUCED MOOD DISORDER CRITERIA
25
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
26 B. PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS SCID-CV Scoresheet
B. PSYCHOTIC AND ASSOCIATED SYMPTOMS








? - + I 83 I
B4 Somatic delusion
Describe:
? - + B4
B5 Other delusions
Describe:
? - + B5
B6 Auditory hallucinations
Describe:




Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet B. PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS 27
1 68 1 Tactile hallucinations
Describe:
? - + B8
B9 Other hallucinations
Describe:
? - + B9
1 810 I Catatonic behaviors
Describe:
+IO-. I 810 I
I B11 | Grossly disorganized behavior
Describe:
? - + B11
B12 Grossly inappropriate affect
Describe:
+Io-. B12
I 813 I Disorganized speech
Describe:
? - + B13
I 814 I Negative symptoms
Describe:
? - + B14
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
28 B. PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS SCID-CV Scoresheet
B15 CHRONOLOGY OF PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS
If any delusions or hallucinations, note type, course, onset and offset dates, and
whether present during past month (e.g., "bizarre delusions of being controlled by




Type of symptom Course Onset Offset past month
B15
SCID-CV Scoresheet C. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS 29
C. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF
PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS D1
p. 36






30 C. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
SCHIZOPHRENIFORM DISORDER CRITERIA
SCID-CV Scoresheet C. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS 31
SCHIZOAFFECTIVE DISORDER CRITERIA
32 C. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
DELUSIONAL DISORDER CRITERIA
SCID-CV Scoresheet C. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS 33
BRIEF PSYCHOTIC DISORDER CRITERIA
34 C. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
SCID-CV Scoresheet C. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF PSYCHOTIC DISORDERS 35
SUBSTANCE-INDUCED PSYCHOTIC DISORDER CRITERIA
298.9 Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified




Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
36 D. MOOD DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
D. MOOD DISORDERS
SCID-CV Scoresheet D. MOOD DISORDERS
BIPOLAR II DISORDER CRITERIA
37
OTHER BIPOLAR DISORDERS
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
38 D. MOOD DISORDERS
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER CRITERIA
SCID-CV Scoresheet
SCID-CV Scoresheet D. MOOD DISORDERS 39
DEPRESSIVE DISORDER NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
40 E. ALCOHOL/OTHER SUBSTANCES SCID-CV Scoresheet





A. A maladaptive pattern of alcohol use leading to clinically significant
impairment or distress, as manifested by one (or more) of the following
occurring within a 12-month jperiod:
1E21 (1) failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home
Notes:
+1 E2
E3 (2) use in situations in which it is physically hazardous
Notes:
? - + E3
E4 (3) recurrent alcohol-related legal problems
Notes:
? - + E4
E5 (4) continued alcohol use despite having problems caused or
exacerbated by the effects of alcohol
Notes:
•i! 1 + E5





Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet E. ALCOHOL/OTHER SUBSTANCES
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE CRITERIA
41
A maladaptive pattern of alcohol use, leading to clinically significant
impairment or distress, as manifested by three (or more) of the following
occurring at any time in the same 12-month period:
E7 (3) often taken in larger amounts OR over a longer period than was
intended
Notes:
? - + ! E7
E8 (4) there is a persistent desire OR unsuccessful effort to cut down or
control alcohol use
Notes:
? - + E8
E9 (5) a great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain alcohol,
use alcohol, or recover from its effects
Notes:
+1>• E9
E1° I (6) important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up
or reduced because of use
Notes:
+1 E10
E11 | (7) continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent
physical or psychological problem
Notes:




Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold; + = Present
42 E. ALCOHOL/OTHER SUBSTANCES SCID-CV Scoresheet
E13 (2) withdrawal
Notes:
? - + E13
I E14 I AT LEAST THREE DEPENDENCE ITEMS ARE "+" AND





E15 303.90 Alcohol Dependence







E16 305.00 Alcohol Abuse + E16
Check here if criteria have been met in the past month.
r
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet E. ALCOHOL/OTHER SUBSTANCES 43
NONALCOHOL SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS
E17 CIRCLE THE NAME OF EACH DRUG RECORD PERIOD OF HEAVIEST USE
EVER USED (OR WRITE IN NAME IF (AGE OR DATE, AND DURATION) AND
"OTHER"). DESCRIBE PATTERN OF USE.
E17
Sedatives-hypnotics-anxiolytics: Quaalude,
Seconal, Valium, Xanax, Librium,
barbiturates, Miltown, Ativan, Dalmane,
Halcion, Restoril, or other:
Cannabis: marijuana, hashish, THC, or other:
Stimulants: amphetamine, "speed," crystal
meth, dexadrine, Ritalin, "ice," or other:
Opioids: heroin, morphine, opium,
Methadone, Darvon, codeine, Percodan,
Demerol, Dilaudid, unspecified or other:
Cocaine: intranasal, IV, freebase, crack,
"speedball," unspecified or other:
Hallucinogens/PCP: LSD, mescaline, peyote,
psilocybin, STP, mushrooms, PCP ("angel
dust"), Special K (ketamine), Extasy, MDMA,
or other:
Other: steroids, "glue," paint, inhalants,
nitrous oxide ("laughing gas"), amyl or butyl
nitrate ("poppers"), nonprescription sleep or
diet pills, unknown, or other:




44 E. ALCOHOL/OTHER SUBSTANCES SCID-CV Scoresheet
NONALCOHOL SUBSTANCE ABUSE CRITERIA
A. A maladaptive pattern of substance use, leading to clinically significant
impairment or distress, as manifested by one (or more) of the following
occurring within a 12-month period:
1E18 I (1) failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home
Notes:
+1 E18
IE19 I (2) use in situations in which it is physically hazardous
Notes:
+1o-. E19
E20 (3) recurrent substance-related legal problems
Notes:
+1o.. E20
E21 (4) continued substance use despite having problems caused or
exacerbated by the effects of the substance
Notes:
+1o-. E21









Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet E. ALCOHOL/OTHER SUBSTANCES
NONALCOHOL SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE CRITERIA
45
A maladaptive pattern of substance use, leading to clinically significant
impairment or distress, as manifested by three (or more) of the following
occurring at any time in the same 12-month period:




E24 (4) there is a persistent desire OR unsuccessful effort to cut down or
control substance
Notes:
? - + E24
E25 (5) a great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain
substance, use it, or recover from its effects
Notes:
? - + E25
E26 (6) important social, occupational, or recreational activities given up or
reduced because of use
Notes:
? - + E26
E27 (7) continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent
physical or psychological problem
Notes:
+10- E27
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
46 E. ALCOHOUOTHER SUBSTANCES SCID-CV Scoresheet
E28 (1) tolerance
Notes:




E30 AT LEAST THREE DEPENDENCE ITEMS ARE "+" AND
OCCURRED WITHIN THE SAME 12-MONTH PERIOD









__ 304.60 Inhalant Dependence
304.00 Opioid Dependence
304.60 Phencyclidine Dependence
304.10 Sedative, Hypnotic, or Anxiolytic Dependence
304.90 Other (or Unknown) Substance Dependence




















305.40 Sedative, Hypnotic, or Anxiolytic Abuse
305.90 Other (or Unknown) Substance Use
Check here if criteria have been met in the past month.
F1
p. 47
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS 47
F. ANXIETY AND OTHER DISORDERS
PANIC DISORDER CRITERIA
1«1 A. (1) recurrent unexpected panic attacks
Notes:




F2 A. (2) at least one of the following: (b) worry about the implications of the
attack; (a) concern about having additional attacks; (c) a significant
change in behavior
Notes:




F3 Four (or more) of the following panic attack symptoms developed abruptly
and reached a peak within 10 minutes
Notes:




F4 | (1) palpitations ? - + F4
F5 | (2) sweating ? - + F5
F6 | (3) trembling or shaking ? - + | F6
F7 | (4) shortness of breath ? - + I 17
F8 | (5) choking +1 I 1=8
F9 | (6) chest pain ? - + | F9
F10 | (7) nausea or abdominal distress ? - + | F10
F11 | (8) feeling dizzy ? - + F11
F12 | (9) derealization or depersonalization ? - + F12
F13 | (10) fear of losing control or going crazy ? - + F13
F14 | (11) fear of dying ? - + F14
F15 | (12) paresthesias ? - + F15
F16 | (13) chills or hot flashes +1 F16
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
48 F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet




F18 C. Not due to a substance or a general medical condition (check p. 60)
WARNING: A "YES" answer to the interview question equals a rating
Notes:


















F21 B. (2) agoraphobic situations are avoided, endured with marked distress or













Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS 49
F23 AGORAPHOBIA IS PRESENT F23








|F24| AGORAPHOBIA IS ABSENT F24








Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
50 F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER CRITERIA
F25 Obsessions:
(1) recurrent and persistent thoughts, impulses, or images
Notes:























F29 OBSESSIONS (1), (2), (3), AND (4) ARE "+" ? - + F29
1 F30 1 Compulsions:
(1) repetitive behaviors or mental acts
Notes:




Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SC1D-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS 51
F31 (2) the behaviors or mental acts are aimed at preventing or reducing
distress
Notes:




F32 COMPULSIONS (1) AND (2) ARE "+"
+1
F32



















F36 D. If another Axis I disorder is present, the content of the obsessions or






Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
52 F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
F37 E. Not due to a substance or a general medical condition (check p. 60)
WARNING: A "YES" answer to the interview question equals a rating
Notes:
Check here if criteria have been met in the past month.
F38 OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER CRITERIA A, B, C, D,
AND E ARE "+"










POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER CRITERIA











Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS 53
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the
following were present:
1 F40 1 (1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event
that involved death, serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity






1 F41 I (2) response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror
Notes:




B.The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of
the the following ways:
I F42 I (1) distressing recollections of the event
Notes:
? - + F42
I F43 I (2) dreams of the event
Notes:
? - + F43
I F44 I (3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring
Notes:
? - + F44
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
54 F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet




1 F46 1 (5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues
Notes:
+1O-. F46





C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing
of general responsiveness, as indicated by three (or more) of the
following:
1 F48 1 (1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations
Notes:
+1>. F48




F50 (3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
Notes:
? - + F50
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS 55
F51 (4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
Notes:
? - + F51
F52 (5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
Notes:
+1>• F52
F53 (6) restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)
Notes:
+1 F53
F54 (7) sense of a foreshortened future
Notes:
+1>• F54




D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal as indicated by two (or more)
of the following:
F56 (1) difficulty falling or staying asleep ? - + F56
F57 (2) irritability or outbursts of anger ? - + F57
F58 (3) difficulty concentrating +1<S' F58
I F59 I (4) hypervigilance +1o- F59
|F60| (5) exaggerated startle response +1>. F60




Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
56 F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet








1 F64 1 POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER CRITERIA A, B, C, D, E,
AND F ARE "+"









F65 300.22 Agoraphobia Without History of Panic Disorder
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F65
F66| 300.23 Social Phobia
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F66
F67 300.29 Specific Phobia
Check here if present in the past month.
+1N. F67
|F68| 300.02 Generalized Anxiety Disorder
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F68
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS
ANXIETY DISORDER NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED
57
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
58 F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
SOMATOFORM DISORDERS
F72 300.81 Somatization Disorder OR
300.82 Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder




Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F73
F74 300.7 Body Dysmorphic Disorder
Notes:
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F74
EATING DISORDERS
F75 307.1 Anorexia Nervosa
Notes:
Check here if present in the past month.
+1 F75
F76 307.51 Bulimia Nervosa
Notes:
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F76
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS
ADJUSTMENT DISORDERS CRITERIA
59
F77 A. The development of emotional or behavioral symptoms in response to
an identifiable stressor(s)
Notes:
? _ + F77
END
SCID
F78 B. These symptoms or behaviors are clinically significant
Notes:




F79 C. Does not meet criteria for another specific Axis I disorder and is not an
exacerbation of a preexisting Axis I or Axis II disorder
Notes:




1 F80 1 D. The symptoms do not represent Bereavement. WARNING: A "YES"
answer to the interview question equals a " rating
Notes:




1 F81 | E. Once the stressor has terminated, the symptoms do not persist for more
than an additional 6 months.
Notes:




F82 Make diagnosis of Adjustment Disorder based on predominant symptoms:
Check one:
309.0 Adjustment Disorder With Depressed Mood




309.28 Adjustment Disorder With Mixed Anxiety and
Depressed Mood
309.3 Adjustment Disorder With Disturbance of Conduct
309.4 Adjustment Disorder With Mixed Disturbance of
Emotions and Conduct
309.9 Unspecified Adjustment Disorder
END
SCID
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present




Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS
SUBSTANCE-INDUCED ANXIETY DISORDER CRITERIA
61
I F87 I A. Prominent anxiety, panic attacks, obsessions or compulsions
Notes:
+1<s» F87
F88 B. Either: (1) the symptoms in A developed during or within a month of
substance intoxication or withdrawal or (2) medication use is






















Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
SCID-CV Scoresheet DRUG LIST
DRUG LIST
Sedatives-hypnotics-anxiolytics ("downers")
Quaalude ("ludes"), Seconal ("reds"), Valium, Xanax, Librium, barbiturates, Miltown, Ativan, Dalmane,
Halcion, Restoril
Cannabis
marijuana, hashish ("hash"), THC, "pot," "grass," "weed," "reefer"
Stimulants ("uppers")
amphetamine, "speed," crystal meth, dexadrine, Ritalin, diet pills, "ice"
Opioids
heroin, morphine, opium, Methadone, Darvon, codeine, Percodan, Demerol, Dilaudid
Cocaine
snorting, IV, freebase, crack, "speedball"
Hallucinogens ("psychedelics")
LSD ("acid"), mescaline, peyote, psilocybin, STP, mushrooms, Extasy, MDMA
PCP (phencyclidine)
"angel dust," Special K (ketamine)
Other
Steroids, "glue," ethyl chloride, paint, inhalants, nitrous oxide ("laughing gas"), amyl or butyl nitrate






















POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER SCALE FOR DSM-IV
(CAPS2)
Current Diagnostic Version
Dudley D. Blake, Frank W. Weathers, Linda M. Nagy,
Danny G. Kaloupek, Dennis S. Charney & Terence M. Keane
National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Behavioral Science Division - Boston VA Medical Center
Neurosciences Division - West Haven VA Medical Center







CAPS2 - PAGE 1 OF 20
Criterion B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the following ways:
1. (B1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts or perceptions
Note: In young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are
expressed.
Frequency
In the past week have you had unwanted memories of the event? What were they like? What did you
remember? Did they ever occur while you were awake, or only in dreams? (Exclude if memories occurred c
during dreams) How often?
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much distress or discomfort did these memories cause you? Were you able to put them out of your min
and think about something else? (How hard did you have to try?) How much did they interfere with your I
I I 0. None
□ 1. Mild, minimal distress or disruption of activities
□ 2. Moderate, distress clearly present but still manageable, some disruption of activities
I I 3. Severe, considerable distress, difficulty dismissing memories, marked disruption of activities







1APS2 - PAGE 2 OF 20
2. (B2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: In children, there may be frightening dreams without
recognizable content.
Frequency




□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much distress or discomfort did these dreams cause you? Did they ever wake you up? (If yes,
what happened when you woke up? How long did it take you to get back to sleep?) (listen for report of







1. Mild, minimal distress, may not have awoken
2. Moderate, awoke in distress but readily returned to sleep
3. Severe, considerable distress, difficulty returning to sleep
4. Extreme, incapacitating distress, did not return to sleep







CAPS2 • PAGE 3 OF 20
3. (B3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience,
illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening
or when intoxicated). Note: In young children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur.
Frequency
In the past week have you suddenly acted or felt as if the event were happening again? (Have you ever had
flashbacks about the event, did this ever occur while you were awake or only in dreams? (exclude if occurred
only during dreams)) Tell me more about that. How often?"
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much did it seem as if the event were happening again? (Were you confused about where you actually
were or what you were doing at the time?) How long did it last? What did you do while this was happening?
(Did other people notice your behaviour? What did they say?)
□ 0. No reliving
□ 1. Mild, somewhat more realistic than just thinking about the event
□ 2. Moderate, definite but transient dissociative quality, still very aware of surroundings, daydreaming
quality
~| 3. Severe, strongly dissociative (reports images, sounds or smells), but retained some awareness
of surroundings
□ 4. Extreme, complete dissociation (flashback), no awareness of surroundings, may be unresponsive,
possible amnesia for the episode (blackout)
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4. (B4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or resemble an
aspect of the traumatic event
Frequency
In the past week have you gotten emotionally upset when something reminded you of the event? (Has anything
ever triggered bad feelings related to the event?) What kinds of reminders made you upset? How often?
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity








1. Mild, minimal distress or disruption of activities
2. Moderate, distress clearly present but still manageable, some disruption of activities
3. Severe, considerable distress, marked disruption of activities
4. Extreme, incapacitating distress, unable to continue activities
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5. (B5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or resemble an aspect
the traumatic event.
Frequency
In the past week have you had any physical reactions when something reminded you of the event? (Did your
body ever react in some way when something reminded you of the event?) Can you give me some examples
(Did your heart race or did your breathing change? What about sweating or feeling really tense or shaky?) W
kinds of reminders triggered these reactions? How often?:
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity







0. No physical reactivity
1. Mild, minimal reactivity
2. Moderate, physical reactivity clearly present, may be sustained if exposure continues ■
3. Severe, marked physical reactivity, sustained throughout exposure
4. Extreme, dramatic physical reactivity, sustained arousal even after exposure has ended
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Criterion C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness
(not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
6. (C1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings or conversations associated with the trauma
Frequency
In the past week have you tried to avoid thoughts or feelings about the event? (What kind of thoughts or feeling;
did you try to avoid?) What about trying to avoid talking with othor pooplo about it? (Why is that?) How often?
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much effort did you make to avoid thoughts/feelings/conversations? (What kinds of things did you do? Wh;
about drinking or using medication or street drugs?) (Consider all attempts at avoidance, including distraction,
suppression and use of alcohol/drugs) How much did that interfere with your life?
None
Mild, minimal effort, little or no disruption of activities
Moderate, some effort, avoidance definitely present, some disruption of activities
3. Severe, considerable effort, marked avoidance, marked disruption of activities or involvement in
certain activities as avoidant strategy
4. Extreme, drastic attempts at avoidance, unable to continue activities or excessive involvement in
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7.(C2) efforts to avoid activities, places or people that arouse recollections of the trauma
Frequency
In the past week, have you ever tried to avoid certain activities, places or people that reminded you of
event? (What kinds of things did you avoid? Why is that?) How often ?
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much effort did you make to avoid activities, places or people? (What did you do instead?) How
that interfere with your life?
None
Mild, minimal effort, little or no disruption of activities
Moderate, some effort, avoidance definitely present, some disruption of activities
Severe, considerable effort, marked avoidance, marked disruption of activities or involver
certain activities as avoidant strategy
| 1 4. Extreme, drastic attempts at avoidance, unable to continue activities or excessive involve
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8. (C3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
Frequency
In the past week have you had difficulty remembering some important parts of the event? Tell me more about
that. (Do you feel you should be able to remember these things? Why do you think you cannot?) How much of
the important parts of the event have you had difficulty remembering? (What parts do you still
remember?]
□ 0. None, clear memory
□ 1. Few aspects not remembered (less than 10%)
□ 2. Some aspects not remembered (approx 20-30%)
□ 3. Many aspects not remembered (approx 50-60%)
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9. (C4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
Frequency
In the past week have you been less interested in activities that you used to enjoy? (What kinds of thine
you lost interest in? Are there some things you do not do at all anymore? Why is that?) (exclude if no
opportunity, if physically unable or if developmental appropriate change in preferred activities) How mi
activities have you been less interested in? (What kinds of things do you still enjoy doing?) When di
first start to feel that way? (After the event?)
□ 0. None
□ 1. Few activities (less than 10 %)
□ 2. Some activities (approx 20-30 %)
□ 3. Many activities (approx 50-60 %)
□ 4. Most or all activities (> 80 %)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong was your loss of interest? (Would you enjoy the activities once you got started?)
No loss of interest
Mild, slight loss of interest, probably would enjoy after starting activities
Moderate, definite loss of interest, but still has some enjoyment of activities
Severe, marked loss of interest in activities
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10. (C5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
Frequency
In the past week have you felt distant or cut off from other people? What was that like? How much of the time
have you felt that way? When did you first start to feel that way? (After the event?)
□ 0. None of the time
□ 1. Very little of the time (less than 10%)
□ 2. Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
□ 3. Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
□ 4. Most or all of the time (> 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong were your feelings of being distant or cut off from others ?(Who do you feel closest to? How many
people do you feel comfortable talking with about personal things?)
I I 0. No feelings of detachment or estrangement
□ i. Mild, may feel 'out of synch" with others
I I 2. Moderate, feelings of detachment clearly present, but still feels some interpersonal connection
I I 3. Severe, marked feelings of detachment or estrangement from most people, may feeLclose to only
one or two people
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11. (C6) restricted range of affect (eg unable to have loving feelings)
Frequency
In the past week have there been times when you felt emotionally numb or had trouble experiencing feelii
love or happiness? What was that like? (What feelings did you have trouble experiencing?) How much o
time? When did you first start having trouble experiencing emotions? (After the event?)
□ 0. None of the time
□ 1. Very little of the time (less than 10%)
□ 2. Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
□ 3. Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
□ 4. Most or all of the time (> 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How much trouble did you have experiencing emotions? (What kinds of feelings were you still able to
experience?) (Include observations of range of affect during interview)
No reduction of emotional experience
Mild, slight reduction of emotional experience
Moderate, definite reduction of emotional experience, but still able to experience most emot
Severe, marked reduction of experience of at least two primary emotions (eg, love, happine
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12. (C7) sense of a foreshortened future (eg, does not expect to have a career, marriage, children or a no
life span)
Frequency
In the past week have there been times when you felt there is no need to plan for the future, that somehoi
future will be cut short? Why is that? (Rule out realistic risks such as life-threatening medical conditions) I
much of the time? When did you first starting to feel that way? (After the event?)
□ 0. None of the time
□ 1. Very little of the time (less than 10%)
□ 2. Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
□ 3. Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
□ 4. Most or all of the time (> 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong was this feeling that your future will be cut short? (How long do you think you will live? How
convinced are you that you will die prematurely?)
No sense of a foreshortened future
Mild, slight sense of a foreshortened future
Moderate, sense of a foreshortened future definitely present, but no specific prediction about
Severe, marked sense of a foreshortened future, may make specific prediction about longevity
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Criterion D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by tw
more) of the following:
13. (D1) difficulty falling or staying asleep
Frequency
In the past week have you had any problems falling or staying asleep? How often? When did you first sts
having problems sleeping? (After the event?)
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Nightly or almost every night
Yes No
Sleep onset problems? □ □
Mid-sleep awakening?
Early a.m. awakening? □ □
Total number of hours sleep per night





How much of a problem did you have with your sleep? (How long did it take you to fall asleep? How ofter
you wake up in the night? Did you often wake up earlier than you wanted to? How many total hours did y
each night?)
| | 0. No sleep problems
I I 1. Mild, slightly longer latency, or minimal difficulty staying asleep (up to 30 minutes loss of slee
□ 2. Moderate, definite sleep disturbance, clearly longer latency, or clear difficulty staying asleep (
minutes loss of sleep)
I I 3. Severe, much longer latency, or marked difficulty staying asleep (90min to 3 hrs loss of sleep
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14. (D2) irritability or outbursts of anger
Frequency
In the past week have there been times when you felt especially irritable or showed strong feelings of anger?
Can you give me some examples? How often? When did you first start feeling that way? (After the event?)
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong was you anger? (How did you show it? (If reports suppression:) How hard was it for you to keep
from showing your anger?) How long did it take you to calm down? Did your anger cause you any problems?
□ 0. No irritability or anger
□ 1. Mild, minimal irritability, may raise voice when angry
□ 2. Moderate, definite irritability or attempts to suppress anger, but can recover quickly
□ 3- Severe, marked irritability or marked attempts to suppress anger, may become verbally or
physically aggressive when angry
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15. (D3) difficulty concentrating
Frequency
In the past week have you found it difficult to concentrate on what you were doing or on things going on
you? What was that like? How much of the time? When did you first start having trouble concentrating
the event?)
□ 0. None of the time
□ 1. Very little of the time (less than 10%)
□ 2. Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
□ 3. Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
□ 4. Most or all of the time (> 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How difficult was it for you to concentrate? (Include observations of concentration and attention in inten
How much did that interfere with your life?
I | 0. No difficulty with concentration
I I 1 • Mild, only slight effort needed to concentrate, little or no disruption of activities
I | 2. Moderate, definite loss of concentration but could concentrate with effort, some disruption
□ 3. Severe, marked loss of concentration, even with effort, marked disruption of activities
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16. (D4) hypervigilance
Frequency
In the past week have you been especially alert or watchful, even when there was no real need to be? (Have
you felt as if you were constantly on guard?) Why is that? How much of the time? When did you first start
acting that way? (After the event?)
□ 0. None of the time
□ 1. Very little of the time (less than 10%)
□ 2. Some of the time (approx 20-30%)
□ 3. Much of the time (approx 50-60%)
□ 4. Most or all of the time (> 80%)
Description/Examples
Intensity
How hard did you try to be watchful of things going on around you? (Include observations of hypervigilance in
interview) Did your hypervigilance cause you any problems?
□ 0. No hypervigilance
I I 1. Mild, minimal hypervigilance, slight heightening of awareness
□ 2. Moderate, hypervigilance clearly present, watchful in public (eg, chooses safe place to sit in a
restaurant or movie theatre)
I I 3. Severe, marked hypervigilance, very alert, scans environment for danger, exaggerated concern for
safety of self/famiiy/home
□ 4.Extreme, excessive hypervigilance, efforts to ensure safety consume significant time and energy
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17. (D5) exaggerated startle response
Frequency
In the past week have you had any strong startle reactions? When did that happen? (What kinds of things
you startle?) How often? When did you first have these reactions? (After the event?)
□ 0. Never
□ 1. Once
□ 2. Two or three times
□ 3. Four or five times
□ 4. Daily or almost every day
Description/Examples
Intensity
How strong were these startle reactions? (How strong were they compared to how most people would
respond?) How long did they last?
0. No startle reaction
i ] 1. Mild, minimal reaction
□ 2. Moderate, definite startle reaction, feels 'jumpy'
□ 3. Severe, marked startle reaction, sustained arousal following initial reaction
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Criterion F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other
important areas of functioning.
20. subjective distress
Overall, how much have you been bothered by these symptoms you've told me about? (Consider distress
reported on earlier items)
I 0. None
HI 1. Mild, minimal distress
□ 2. Moderate, distress clearly present but still manageable
I 3. Severe, considerable distress
I 4. Extreme, incapacitating distress
21. impairment in social functioning
Have these symptoms affected your relationships with other people? How so? (Consider impairment in social
functioning reported on earlier items)
] 0. No adverse impact
□ 1. Mild impact, minimal impairment in social functioning
HZ 2. Moderate impact, definite impairment, but many aspects of social functioning still intact
□ 3. Severe impact, marked impairment, few aspects of social functioning still intact
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22. impairment in occupational or other important area of functioning
Are you working now?
I I Yes
□ No
If 'Yes', in the past week have these symptoms affected your work or your ab
work? How so?
(Consider reported work history, including number and duration of jobs, as wt
quality of work relationships. Jf premorbid functioning is unclear, inquire about
experiences before the trauma. For child/adolescent traumas, assess pre-trai
school performance and possible presence of behaviour problems)
[ [ 0. No adverse impact
j ] 1. Mild impact, minimal impairment in occupational functioning
j | 2. Moderate impact, definite impairment, but many aspects of occup
~
functioning still intact
□ 3. Severe impact, marked impairment, few aspects of occupational
functioning still intact
[ ] 4. Extreme impact, little or no occupational functioning
If 'No' have these symptoms affected any other important part of your life? H
(As appropriate, suggest examples such as parenting, housework, schoolwo
volunteer work etc.)
j ]] 0. No adverse impact
| | 1. Mild impact, minimal impairment in other important functioning
□ 2. Moderate impact, definite impairment, but many aspects of other
functioning still intact
□ 3. Severe impact, marked impairment, few aspects of other importa
functioning still intact
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Global Ratings
23. global validity
estimate the overall validity of responses. Consider factors such as compliance with the interview, mental st
(eg, problems with concentration, comprehension of items, dissociation) and evidence of efforts to cxaggcra
or minimise symptoms.
[ | o. Excellent, no reason to suspect invalid responses
□ 1. Good, factors present that may adversely affect validity
] 2. Fair, factors present that definitely reduce validity
[ | 3. Poor, substantially reduced validity



























||] post-therapy Q follow-up
Number of sessions :
Therapy type
01 = CBT 04 = CAT
02 = BT 05 = DBT
03 = IPT
(other - see codes)
Mode of therapy
01 = individual only
02 = individual + group
03 = couple 05 = OEG
04 = family 06 = Bulimia gp
(other - see codes)
IMPORTANT- please read this first
This form has 34 statements about how you have been OVER THE LAST WEEK. Please read each statement
and think about how often you felt that way last week. Then tick the boxes that most closely reflect this.
Please use a dark pen (not pencil) as the sheets will be scanned by computer, and tick the boxes clearly.
Thank you for your co-operation. not only some¬
often
most / all
at all occasionally times the time
1 I have felt terribly alone and isolated l|:|Oo □ l Dji ill Dili IZ] 4 f
2 I have felt tense, anxious or nervous □ o □ l □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 P
3 I have felt I have someone to turn to for
support when needed
□ 4 □ $ □2: □ 1 ■"©□ f
4 I have felt OK about myself I I4 □ 3 □ 2 □ 1 □ 0 w
5 I have felt totally lacking in energy and
enthusiasm
□ □2 l l3 □ 4 p
6 I have been physically violent to others □Q □ l □2 □3 □ 4 r
7 I have felt able to cope when things go wrong I I4 13 □2 □V □0 f :
8 I have been troubled by aches, pains or other
physical problems □o □ l □2 □3 □ 4 P
9 I have thought of hurting myself □o n □2 □3 I I4 r
10 Talking to people has felt too much for me □o □1 □2 □3 □ ■4 f
11 Tension and anxiety have prevented me doing
important things O □i □2 □3 ■ i?: [H] 4 P ;
12 I have been happy with the things I have done □3 □2 □1 □ 0 f
13 I have been disturbed by unwanted thoughts
and feelings
□o D5 □2 □3 □ P
14 I have felt like crying □o □ l □2 □3 □ 4 w
PLEASE TURN OVER
Survey : 8763
MHF and CORE System Group Survey 65 (+ additional information)
Page : 1
I








15 I have felt panic or terror □ « Eh □ 2 □ 3 □4 p
16 I made plans to end my life □ o □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 r
17 I have felt overwhelmed by my problems □ ° □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □4 w
18 I have had difficulty getting to sleep or □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 P
staying asleep
19 I have felt warmth or affection for someone □ 4 □ 3 □ 2 □ 1 □ f
20 My problems have been impossible to put to
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3one side I K P
21 1 have been able to do most things 1 needed to □ < □ 1 |2 □ 1 LP
22 1 have threatened or intimidated another person □ o □ 1 □2 □ 3 I k r
23 1 have felt despairing or hopeless □ o □-1 □ 2 □ 3 EK vjp-
24 1 have thought it would be better if 1 were dead □ o □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □4 r
25 1 have felt criticised by other people □ 1 | i 2,..» ""I 1 | j V □4"
26 1 have thought 1 have no friends Eh □ 2 □ 3 □4 f
27 1 have felt unhappy □ ■ □ 2 □ 3 :P
28 Unwanted images or memories have been
□ o □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □4distressing me P
29 1 have been irritable when with other people n<r ni n:: rr □4 T
30 1 have thought 1 am to blame for my problems
□ o □ 1 □ 2 □3 □4and difficulties P
31 I have felt optimistic about my future □ 4 Eh □ 2 I I □0
32 I have achieved the things I wanted to □ 4 □ 3 □ 2 □0 f
33 I have felt humiliated or shamed by other people □ o □1 □ 2 □ 3 □4 f
34 I have hurt myself physically or taken dangerous
o□ □ 1 <M□ □ s □4risks with my health r
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE
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Please list below up to seven people who may be important in the individual's life. Typical
relationships include partner, mother, father, child, sibling, close friends, plus keyworker. For
each person please circle a number from 1 to 7 to show how well he or she provides the type
of help that is listed.
The second part of each question asks you to rate how individuals would like things to be if
they were exactly as they hoped for. As before, please put a circle around one number
between 1 and 7 to show what the rating is.
Person 1 - Never Sometimes Always
1 a) Can you trust, talk to frankly and share your feelings with this
person? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 a) Can you lean on and turn to this person in times of difficulty?. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 a) Does he/she give you practical help? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 a) Can you spend time with him/her socially? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Person 2 -
1 a) Can you trust, talk to frankly and share your feelings with this
person'' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 a) Can you lean on and turn to this person in times of difficulty?. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 a) Does he/she give you practical help? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 a) Can you spend time with him/her socially? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Person 3 -
1 a) Can you trust, talk to frankly and share your feelings with this
person? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 a) Can you lean on and turn to this person in times of difficulty? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 a) Does he/she give you practical help? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 a) Can you spend time with him/her socially? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b) What rating would your ideal be? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE NUMBER ONLY FOR EACH QUESTION
Appendix A
Impact of Event Scale-Revised
Instructions: Below is a list of difficulties people sometimes have after stressful life events.
Please read each item and then indicate how distressing each difficulty has been for you
DURING THE PAST SEVEN DAYS with respect to
, how much were you








1. Any reminder brought back feelings about it. 0 1 2 3 4
2. I had trouble staying asleep. 0 1 2 3 4
3. Other things kept making me think about it. 0 1 2 3 4
4. I felt irritable and angry. 0 1 2 3 4
5. I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought
about it or was reminded of it.
0 1 2 3 4
6. I thought about it when I didn't mean to. 0 1 2 3 4
7. I felt as if it hadn't happened or wasn't real. 0 1 2 3 4
8. I stayed away from reminders about it. 0 1 2 3 4
9. Pictures about it popped into my mind. 0 1 2 3 4
10.1 was jumpy and easily startled. 0 1 2 3 4
11.1 tried not to think about it. 0 1 2 3 4
12.1 was aware that I still had a lot of feelings about it,
but I didn't deal with them.
0 1 2 3 4
13. My feelings about it were kind of numb. 0 1 2 3 4
14.1 found myself acting or feeling like I was back
at that time. 0 1 2 3 4
15.1 had trouble falling asleep. 0 1 2 3 4
16.1 had waves of strong feelings about it. 0 1 2 3 4
66
Not at A little
all bit
17.1 tried to remove it from my memory. 0 1
18.1 had trouble concentrating. 0 1
19. Reminders of it caused me to have physical reactions, 0 1
such as sweating, trouble breathing, nausea, or a pounding heart.
20.1 had dreams about it. 0 1
21.1 felt watchful and on-guard. 0 1
22.1 tried not to talk about it. 0 1
Impact of Event Scale - Revised
Scoring Information
Avoidance Subscale = mean of items 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17, 22
Intrusion Subscale = mean of items 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 16, 20
Hyperarousal Subscale = mean of items 4, 10, 14, 15, 18, 19,21
Assessing Psychological Trauma and PTSD
A Handbook for Practitioners
Chapter 15: The Impact of Event Scale-Revised
by Daniel S. Weiss, PhD
& Charles R. Marmar, MD
Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco
& PTSD Program, San Francisco VA Medical Center
Correspondence to Dr. Weiss
UCSF Box 0984
Department of Psychiatry
San Francisco, CA 94143-0984
Tel: (415)221-4810x3080
Fax: (415)750-6921
In J.P Wilson, & T.M. Keane (eds.), Assessing psychological trauma and PTSD: A
Practioner's Handbook. New York: Guilford.
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We would like to know about how you feel IN GENERAL.
The question asks about HOW OFTEN you feel the emotion.
For each question, please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7 to indicate how
you feel.
IN GENERAL. I FEEL THIS EMOTION:
never Sometimes Very
often
ANGER 1 2 3 4 5 6
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6
SHAME 1 2 3 4 5 6
ANXIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6
HAPPINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3 4 5 6
MISERY 1 2 3 4 5 6
GUILT 1 2 3 4 5 6
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6
JOY 1 2 3 4 5 6
IRRITATION 1 2 3 4 5 6
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6
TENSE 1 2 3 4 5 6
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6
AGGRESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3 4 5 6
WORRIED 1 2 3 4 5 6
CHEERFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6
DISSOCIATION QUESTIONNAIRE
(DlS-Q)
Tltis questionnaire consists of two parts. The first part contains a few generaJ questions about
your background. In the second part you are asked to indicate to what extent the following
experiences apply to you. The experiences mentioned in the questionnaire may occur when
people are under the influence of alcohol, drugs or medicines, it is intended to answer this
questionnaire regarding your condition without the use of anv such means. You are asked to
react to the statements by circling the figure that applies to you. Anv answer is good, so long
as it reflects your own view.
Please react to all (of the) statements.
Example
To what extent does the following statement apply to you.
1 find it hard to make up mv mind. 1 2 (3
5y circling one of the figures, you can indicate whether that statement is more or less applicable
to you. Ir the statement "moderately', like in the above mentioned example, is applicable to
you, you will circle figure 3. Against each statement, vou wall put a figure that is most applicable
to vou.
1 = thus is no; a; all applicable
2 = this a little bit applicable
a - 'Jus is moderately applicable
4 = thus is quite a bit applicable
r = this :s extremely applicable
Vanderknden-Yan Dvck-Vertommen-Yandcrevcken
L inversitai: ( Vol rum St lo/.o!
i eu ven.sestcervwcc 517




Will you please fill in and cross where appropriate ?
lour age: years
Your sex : 0 male
0 female







Your training: O Elementary education
O First-grade secondary: general educational
O technical
O vocational





(Please cross tire training that corresponds most to your own training).
Do you remember having experienced severely damaging, life-threatening or traurrvatic events
O \o
O Yes. i e. (several answers being possible):
O severe bodily injury
O physical abi!5£
O state of wai
O sexual abuse bv family members
n cnvtol U** ^ ^ ^
C) emotional maltreatment
O otherwise : namely •'
PART 2
1 = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = moderately, 4 — quite a bit, 5 = extremely.
1. At times I lxave the feeling dial I am dreaming. 1 2 3 4 5
2. I regularly have the feeling that everything is unreal. 1 2 3 4 5
3. At times it appears that 1 have lost contact with my body. 1 2 3 4 5
4. I gorge myself with food without thinking about it. 1 2 3 4 5
5. While driving and / or bicycling, 1 suddenly realize that I cannot 1 2 3 4 5
remember what happened on the way.
6.1 can, without reason, without wanting to, burst out laughing or 1 2 3 4 5
cr)ing.
7. It happens that I have the feeling that I am somebody else. 1 2 3 4 5
8. It happens that I am listening to someone and suddenly realize 1 2 3 4 5
that I have not heard part or the whole of the story.
9. When I am tired, it seems as if a strange power from outside takes 1 2 3 4 5
possession of me and decides for me what to do.
10.1 get into situations in which 1 do not want to be. 1 2 3 4 5
11. At times I feel a great distance between myself and the things I 1 2 3 4 5
think and do.
12. At times I wonder who I am exactly 1 2 3 4 5
13. It happens that 1 find new articles among my things without 1 2 3 4 5
being able to remember having ever purchased these.
14. 1 regularly feel an urge to eat something, even when I am not 1 2 3 4 5
hungry.
15. It happens that 1 get angry without wanting to be at all. 1 2 3 4 5
16. It happens that I am determined to do something, but my body 1 2 3 4 0
acts auite differently aeainst mv own will.
_____
"I/. It happens that I feel confused. 1 2 3 4 5
IS. At moments I cannot remember where I was the dav (or days) 12 3 4 5
Ivlore
I = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = extremely. J
19. It happens that I am told that I act as it friends or family members 1 2 3 4 5
were strangers to me.
20. In particular situations I experience myself as a split personality. 1 2 3 4 5
21. It happens that I cannot remember anything about certain 1 2 3 4 5
important events in my life, such as my final examinations or
wedding-day.
22. It happens that I am about to say something, but then something 1 2 3 4 5
quite different crosses my lips.
23. There can be a sudden, complete change in my mood. 1 2 3 4 5
24. It happens that I do something without thinking about it. 1 2 3 4 5
25. I immediately forget what other people tell me. 1 2 3 4 5
26. It happens that I am doing something and that I am suddenly 1 2 3 4 5
struck bv a black-out.
27. It occurs that I look at myself in the mirror without recognizing 1 2 3 4 5
myself.
28. It happens that I get the feeling that my body undergoes an 1 2 3 4 5
alteration.
29. It happens that I have the feeling that other people, other things 1 2 3 4 5
and the world surrounding me, are not real.
30. I have the feeling that my body is not (really) mine. 1 2 3 4 5
31. When I watch television. 1 do not notice anvthing about what 1 2 3 4 5
goes on around me.
32. It happens that entire blocks of time drop out and that I cannot 1 2 3 4 5
remember what 1 did then.
33. I can remember so vividly something that happened formerly, 1 2 3 4 5
that 1 have the Iceling that I am reliving it. _
34. It Itappens that it seems as ii someone else iitside me decides
w hat I do.
1 = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = extremely. ]
35. Sometimes I discover that I have done something without 1 2 3 4 5
remembering anything about it.
36. I wonder how I can prevent myself from doing certain things. 1 2 3 4 5
37. Sometimes 1 suddenly notice that 1 find myself in a place that is 1 2 3 4 5
unknown to me, without knowing how I got there.
38. It happens that I am not sure whether certain memories have 1 2 3 4 5
really taken place, or if 1 merely dreamed about them.
39. Sometimes I find myself in a well-known place that appears 1 2 3 4 5
strange and unknown to me.
40. I have the feeling that I do certain things without knowing why. 1 2 3 4 5
41. Sometimes I think or do something against my liking in a way 1 2 3 4 5
that does not suit me at all.
42. I notice that I watch myself closely in everything I do. 1 2 3 4 5
43. I can enclose myself in fantasies or day-dreaming so much that 1 2 3 4 5
it seems to be really happening.
44. It happens that I am staring aimlessly, without thinking about 1 2 3 4 5
anything.
45. 1 often think about nothing. 1 2
46. I find it very hard to resist bad habits. 3 2
47. I sometimes forget where I have put something. 1 2
4S. When eating, I do so without thinking about it. 1 2
49. It happens that I catch mvself day-dreaming. 1 2
50. I wish I had more control of mvself.
_ 1 2_
51. When ! walk. ! am aware ol each steD I make. 1
52. In particular situations. I notice that 1 am able to do certain things 1
with ihe proa test caM?. thai I find verv hard to do in others (e tt










1 = not at all, 2 — a little bit, 3 = moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 — extremely.
53. When eating, I am aware ot everv bile I take.
.54. 1 lose every notion of time.
55. It happens that I cannot remember whether I have really donesomething or if I merely planned it
56. It happens that I want to do two things at the same time and thatI notice that I am arguing with myself the pros, and cons.
5/. It happens that I have the feeling that my mind is split up.
58. It happens that I find notes, drawings or annotations ofmy own,without remembering having ever made these.
59. I have the feeling that I am made up of two (or more) persons.
60. I often do something without thinking about it.
61. It happens that I hear voices in my head telling me what I am todo or making comment on what 1 am doing.
62. I see myself differently from the way other people see me.
63. It happens that I feel that I am looking at the world through ahare, so that the people and things surrounding me appearremote or vague.
"> 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 3
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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